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The American Journal of Sociology

 SEPTEMBER 1917

Americans and the World-Crisis *Albion W. Small* 145

Sociology before Comte; A Summary of Doctrines and an
Introduction to the Literature *Harry E. Barnes* 174

Twelfth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological
Society, to be Held at Philadelphia, December 27-29,
1917—Tentative Program 248

News and Notes 251

Reviews 255

Charles A. Ellwood: An Introduction to Social Psychology, J. O. DEALEY; Walter E. Woff: American World Politics, ARNOLD BENNETT HALL; Ida M. Tarbell: New Ideals in Business, E. L. TALBERT; William Hoey: Mental Conflicts and Misconduct, THOMAS H. HAINES; Mary E. Richmond: Social Diagnosis, AMELIA SEARS; David Stewart Boyer: Industrial Accident Prevention, ARTHUR J. TODD; John Niles (ed.): City Planning, SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD; George M. Kober and William C. Hansen (eds.): Diseases of Occupation and Vocational Hygiene, PAUL NICHOLAS LESCH; Loretta Perry, Millinery as a Trade for Women, FRANCES FENTON BERNARD; Thomas Harrison Ross: Form and Functions of American Government, ARNOLD BENNETT HALL; John E. Commons and John B. Andrews: Principles of Labor Legislation, E. A. MILLER; Henry P. Fairchild: Outline of Applied Sociology, E. S. BOGARDUS; Carl Kelsey: The Physical Basis of Society, E. S. BOGARDUS; Walter Robinson Smith: An Introduction to Educational Sociology, F. J. CLOW; Michael F. Gayer: Being Well-Born, ERVILLE B. WOONE; Loomis Havens Meyer: The Drama of Savage Peoples, F. STUART CHAPIN; William H. S. STEVENS: Unfair Competition, J. E. HAGERTY; Sophy H. Fossell: The Children's Library, FRANCES FENTON BERNARD; Winifred Stuart Gibbs: The Minimum Cost of Living. A Study of Families of Limited Income in New York City, FLORENCE NESSITT.

Recent Literature 278

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The American Journal of Sociology

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NUMBER 2

AMERICANS AND THE WORLD-CRISIS

ALBION W. SMALL
University of Chicago

NOTE.—The following pages contain the substance of a Commencement address delivered at Colby College, Sunday evening, June 17, 1917. The address was not written and was not intended for print. If it were to be transposed into the style presumed to be suitable for a journal of this type, accuracy and fulness of statement, with citations of evidence, would be necessary to an extent impossible in the circumstances under which the copy has been prepared. A summer cottage at one of the most isolated spots on Cape Cod does not supply means of academic precision. The further fact that such pertinence as the address may have belongs to it less as an impersonal argument than as a reflex of intimate experience, decided in favor of reproducing it as nearly as possible in the form in which it was spoken.

On my way to the service in this church this morning, one of the most dramatic of the apostle Paul's utterances came into my mind. The thought followed: If what I have to say this evening were to be cast in the form of a sermon, those words should be the text. By a coincidence which stimulated my interest, President Roberts read as the Scripture lesson of the morning the chapter which contains the passage: "For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places." A school of interpretation which is unhappily not yet

extinct might find it easy to prove to its own satisfaction that the apostle foresaw and specifically predicted those political factors which have lately been known in Russia as "the dark forces." Not being inclined to that style of exegesis, I feel no temptation to suggest that the apostle was thinking especially of those other equally dark forces of which I shall speak more in detail. I hope, however, that before I am through your thoughts will go back to these words, as symbolic not less of our stage than of the apostle's in the eternal conflict between good and evil.

At the first meeting with my class of graduate students, on the opening day of the summer quarter, 1910, one face held my attention from all the rest. At the time, the only word which I could find for my impression of that face was *spectral*. It was the type of face which is associated in my imagination with Savonarola and St. Francis of Assisi. At the end of the hour the young man whose face was so unusual introduced himself. In a few words he outlined his personal history. Educated and consecrated in France as a Roman Catholic priest, he had come to this country with the intention of making it his home. He had received an appointment as professor in an important seminary for the training of priests. With the approval of his archbishop, he had decided to devote his summer vacations to further academic work in a subject remote from that of his professorship.

Therewith an acquaintance began which I cherish as among the most notable of the many close associations with students during my thirty-six years of college and university teaching. For three successive summer quarters this young man returned to the University of Chicago, and at the end of the third quarter he received his degree of Master of Arts. Meanwhile I had found in him one of the choicest spirits it has ever been my privilege to know. He revealed himself to me in ways which I had never supposed possible to a priest with a layman, and especially with a Protestant. In this acquaintance I learned, what even Bobby Burns may not have suspected, that—"A priest's a man for a' that." If nothing had deflected the course of my friend's career, his native and acquired mental and spiritual qualities would doubtless have assured him high rank among American Catholics.

Early in the autumn of 1914 I was startled, but not surprised, to learn that immediately after the German violation of Belgium my friend had renounced his ecclesiastical prospects, had crossed the Atlantic with all speed, and had enlisted as a soldier of France. At long intervals he sent me samples of the laconic postal-card messages permitted to soldiers: He was well and hoped to be sent to the front soon; he had been wounded, but was well again and hoping to rejoin his company in the trenches; he had been wounded again and probably disqualified for further fighting; he had regained strength enough to be serving as interpreter at staff headquarters; and in January of this year came a long letter, the leading theme of which was this: "Until lately I have felt that I had no desire ever to see my adopted country again. But I have reconsidered. After the war the problem will remain, Can America save her soul? I now intend to return, if I live, after I can render no more service here, and spend the rest of my life trying to help work out that salvation."

This soldier of Jesus Christ, detailed for service at the French front of the Army of the Prince of Peace, was right. For Americans, everything else in the present world-crisis is incidental to the problem: *Will America evade or accept the moral issue which Germany has forced upon the world, and thus lose or save her soul?*

I am looking impatiently for my friend's next letter, to find out whether his hope concurs with mine that at last we have made what Dr. Robins used to call the "generic choice," which decides between perdition and salvation. At all events, the nearest aspect of the present world-crisis is this: Without our choice, we, the people of the United States, have been carried by the tide of times into an ordeal more critical than that of '61 or '76. It is the more fierce because its most meaning phase is relatively silent, subtle, spiritually searching. The present testing process does not fall chiefly in the loud forum of politics, nor amidst the roar of battle. It is rather first and foremost a demonstration of national mind and heart. *Have we the mental vision and the moral grip to champion, according to our physical strength, against the shifty enemy that now threatens it, the principle that moral imperatives, not physical force, shall set the standards for the civilized world?*

Let us turn back for a moment of that sort of national stock-taking which Americans must learn to practice before our nation can achieve the stage of discretion. If anyone in the audience has the curiosity to find out how long I have been working on this particular phase of the problem, I might refer him to the files for 1879 of a certain paper published in Maine. They contain a full confession of my first severe political disillusion. In season and out of season, I have been ever since trying to assemble the literal facts. I went to Europe as a student thirty-eight years ago, unquestioning in the faith, as it had been delivered to Americans upon the Fourth of July, that America is "a spectacle to all the world." In less than two months upon European soil all my previous political notions had been scrapped by discovery that America was a "spectacle" to the people with whom, up to that time, I had come in contact, almost precisely in the same sense in which Buffalo Bill's "Wild West Show" was a "spectacle" when it began to exhibit in our eastern cities. Few Americans are yet aware of it, but substantially that estimate of America has prevailed in Europe until the present hour. Even the scholarly President of the United States has encouraged the popular American vanity that the people of Germany are looking longingly for the emancipating moment when they may cast aside a hated form of government and adopt ours. On the contrary, it is nearer the truth to say that if, at any time within the last fifteen years, the German Social Democrats had gained full control of the entire civic and military machinery of the Empire, they would have lost not a moment in arranging with the Kaiser and his bureaucrats to run it for them.

I have no means of knowing whether the present war has altered the opinion of Germans in general that the government of the Empire is the best in the world. At all events, we Americans are certainly deluding ourselves in assuming that, unless a spiritual revolution, of which we have no credible evidence, has occurred, the Germans would willingly substitute our form of government for theirs. So long as we cherish such a fiction, we misinterpret their psychology as pitifully as they have misinterpreted ours.

It would be a rash man who would commit himself to a formula of what will not happen in any one of the countries now at war.

This much is notorious, however, among all who are intimately acquainted with the Germans: A revolution which should displace the present German government by a democracy in form and spirit of the American or the British type would be much more astonishing, and, so far as visible evidence indicates, it is far more improbable than the Russian revolution was until it had become an accomplished fact.

One of my colleagues who is of German parentage has said: "The Germans respect their government, but they do not love it; the Americans love their government, but they do not respect it." A further detail in the same bill of particulars is that high and low in Germany, as a general rule, regard America as synonymous with thinly disguised anarchy. This impression is sometimes spontaneous, sometimes artificially induced. Sometimes it has been maliciously stimulated. Whatever the reasons, the fact is that, not merely in Germany, but in every country of Continental Europe, and with slightly less certainty in Great Britain, if you could get a typical citizen of the more intelligent strata to express his candid opinion of America, the result would make you blush or boil, according to your temperament. It will be good for us to let this indictment sink in, and not too quickly to set up a denial.

Two years ago a Serbian, who had been a newspaper man in various parts of Eastern Europe, made his way to Chicago. He asked one of my neighbors, "Do you know what they say in Serbia about this country? They say that the United States of America is the place where the Jews have the money, the Irish have the politics, and the Americans have the flag!" Inaccurate enough in detail, to be sure, but the formula is fairly representative of the bizarre impressions which America has thus far created in Europe.

And do you wonder at it, when you run over some of the evidence which has weighed so heavily in European opinion? Does jury service in the United States in general command the type of citizen necessary to make our jury system respectable? Are taxes levied and collected in any state of our Union with fairness enough to save our boasted democracy from reproach? Do you know a single city in the United States as honestly and efficiently governed as every city in Germany? To be sure, Mayor Mitchel

is giving New York City an administration for which he deserves the thanks of every American, but news of that has probably not yet reached Europe. Do you know another country in the civilized world as lavish as ours in its public expenditures, and with so little in proportion to show for what it pays? Do you know of another nation among the great powers of the world whose people, even at this late moment, are as unconvinced and as unconcerned as we whether there is any cause under heaven for which it is worth while to offer their fortunes and their lives?

For the purposes of this hour it is unnecessary to defend ourselves against this foreign indictment. It would certainly be as pitiful as pleading the baby act if we should set up our traditional self-satisfaction in reply. Between the two extremes, there is ample room for reflection on works meet for national repentance. I have referred chiefly to the domestic aspects of our American crudity. Our attitude toward international relations has been not less juvenile, but I will treat that aspect of the case in a different setting. Let me merely remark in passing that for a generation the American sociologists have been called everything uncomplimentary from silly to criminal, while they were trying to fulfil their mission of calling attention to the radical fact which war is now demonstrating on the world's blackboard, namely, that we live in an interlocking world. Not a blade of grass is growing in Maine today, not a spear of wheat in the Dakotas, that will not have its value made or marred by what takes place in Europe between the present time and the time of harvest. Not our agriculture, nor our transportation, nor our manufacture, nor our commerce, nor our finance, nor our science, nor our morals, nor our religion can be what we alone want them to be. Each and all can be only what we can succeed in making them, in unavoidable reaction with all the activities of all the other peoples of the world.

Up till now, we Americans have on the whole been living in such pioneer conditions that an influential fraction of us still construe the universal law of life in variations of the slogan: "Every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost." In fact, this never has been, is not, and never can be better than a casual and superficial version of the human lot. Humanity moves

forward as a whole in the degree in which men learn to appropriate the advantages and to control the disadvantages of teamwork with one another. But teamwork means operating as a team—each member in his place, and working in his place to make the team efficient and the members consequently successful—no member getting a success which forces the team to carry him as dead weight, not to say as grit in its running gear. The vital question in American life today is whether we can achieve a controlling sense of responsibility of the individual to the whole; whether we can develop a type of citizenship which feels bound to share the common burdens, or whether we must grow apart and disintegrate, because the different groups of us have no care beyond the particular interests of each.

Those molders of public opinion have had more than their share of influence in America who have taught politics and economics, and morals and religion in an individualistic sense. They have circulated the illusion that the scheme of things is a magnified free-lunch counter and that the wisdom of this world and of the next consists in being present before the supplies are gone. To save our souls, we must decide whether we are to believe in perpetuity that our rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in this world and our prospects of felicity in the next are hand-outs from the kitchen door of Divine Providence, with no obligation on our part to saw wood in return.

God only knows whether the American people have gained or lost in moral stature since our Civil War. At that time hundreds of thousands of men, both North and South, counted not their lives dear unto themselves so long as a cause which they appraised as vital was in danger. At that time other hundreds of thousands of sisters, and wives, and mothers of those men, North and South, counted not their happiness dear unto themselves if any sacrifices which they could make might promote the triumph of the cause they loved. More than this, the uprising of North and South in '61 marked a stupendous moral achievement on both sides. Whatever our judgment about the merits of the opposing creeds, North and South alike offered themselves on the altar of principles which they held dearer than themselves. In spite of the wonderful change of

attitude in recent months in the United States, we have yet to prove whether the American people of today are capable of like renunciation. As a people, we are all in confusion as to whether spiritual conquests remain for which we are willing to make the necessary physical sacrifice.

Pass with me then to the actual present world-crisis which has forced Americans to commit themselves upon this paramount issue of national character. But indulge me first in one more strictly personal reference.

The longer I live, the more am I humbled by the conviction of how little I know about anything. The one subject upon which my study has pivoted for a generation has been German theory and practice about human relations. My knowledge is still inadequate enough of this enormous bulk of fact and reasoning. Yet the range of knowledge within which my information is a little less superficial than in any other is that filled by the records of what German publicists have said and done since 1555 about human affairs, as they have been, as they are, as they should be. Men in similar lines of work have often charged that my chief purpose in life is to smuggle German ways into America. I confess that for twenty-five years I have done my best to convince my students that Americans have more to learn from the Germans than from any other people, past or present. This is as true now as it was before the Germans burst into the open with that decisive vice of their civilization which has now become the central challenge to the rest of the world. Simply because there are towering merits and abysmal defects in German civilization, the latter at least, and in certain respects the former, irreconcilable with our standards, we may profit more from understanding the Germans than from knowing any other people. The present war has not yet changed the German people or the German state. It has simply revealed both. I venture these allusions to my own more intimate knowledge of these German traits than of anything else, as guaranty that whatever I may say more is at least not extemporaneous. I am expressing merely present applications of judgments that have been maturing in the course of my professional work for nearly forty years.

Since August, 1914, the nations have been groping in darkness about the meaning of the world-crisis. At first the unsophisticated saw in it only a local European quarrel. Then it relentlessly engulfed the world. The stars in their courses have meanwhile merged into illuminators of the crisis. Slowly but surely the truth has dawned, even upon the reluctant mind of the patriotic but incredulous President of the United States. Never in history has the moral principle at issue in a war been clearer than in the present struggle. We have only to disregard details and to look straight at the substance of the whole matter. *The question which dwarfs and ought to silence all the rest is whether this generation will doom coming generations to live in a world in which might has reconquered right, or whether this generation will endow coming generations with a heritage of right controlling might.*

It is not necessary to find a convincing answer to the question, What caused the war? Whether we have a formula which suits ourselves in reply to that question or not, a much more important question is now foremost. Whatever the complex of causes and effects which literally released the forces at present beyond control, that complex is not identical with the group of problems involved in the task of restoring control. On the contrary, granting that the explosion of 1914 was a resultant of all the racial, commercial, dynastic, and political rivalries which have been charged with the responsibility; granting that neither of the combatants is guiltless of some share of the wrong which entered into the catastrophe; granting that each nation stands convicted of its own portion of these epic guilts; granting that neither of the powers, our own country not excepted, can conceal its Macbeth hands by historic misdeeds deep-stained enough the multitudinous seas to incarnadine—the present crisis is none of these nor all combined. It is not primarily a struggle of race against race, of ruler against ruler, of trader against trader, of war lord against war lord, of this form of government against that form of government; although each of these antitheses is many times implicated. Least of all is it a purgatory out of which any nation will emerge absolved of any or all past sins. If we try to see with the eyes of future historians, and if we borrow a term from the vocabulary of the psychologists,

we may reduce the situation to a trial of strength between two irreconcilable national psychoses. For convenience we may as well adopt the manner of Herbert Spencer and designate the conflicting forces as a militant versus a moral psychosis.

I will not apologize for this dangerous way of speaking. Always, of course, human affairs are matters, not of impersonal forces, but of intensely personal people. It especially behooves everyone who interprets the present crisis as I do to give this literal fact full force. For safety's sake, therefore, I will translate this convenient academic manner of speaking, to which I shall revert, into less convenient, but also less misleading, literal form: The world is divided today between a group of nations whose units have delivered themselves over to the dictation of an artificial, arbitrary, anti-moral, militaristically imposed code, according to which force is the arbiter of right, and another group of nations driven by the instinct of self-preservation into championship of a morality which makes its appeal to justice as its standard—to the level of which appeal I freely admit they might not have risen for many generations if they had not confronted the alternative of choosing between a self-assertion better than their previous best selves and consent that the foundations of all international morality should be destroyed.

Among the most indelible memory-pictures in my mind is a series reproducing incidents, trifling in themselves, but eloquent as reflections of popular feeling, which occurred in Bangor, Maine, on the day and the following days after the message had come over the wire: "A madman has murdered Abraham Lincoln."

Suppose the message had read instead: "Abraham Lincoln has become violently insane." Suppose the malady had taken the form of acute mania, in the name of freedom, to force the conduct, not only of Lincoln's immediate associates, but of the whole world. The emotions of the people would not have been converted into hate toward Lincoln. Quite likely the latent love and veneration of the loyal states would have responded with pity more intense than the sorrow that surrounded his death. Nevertheless, after recovery from the first shock there would have been little difference of opinion in principle about the duty of taking all necessary measures to restrain the sufferer from violence to himself and others, of

adopting every known means of restoration, and, above all, of reorganizing the administration in closest possible conformity with the fundamental law and with the most unequivocal devotion to the public good.

There are instructive analogies between the moral demands which would have challenged Americans if this fictitious reconstruction of the historical incident had been the reality, and the demands of the present world-crisis upon all people who believe in the rule of right rather than the rule of force.

Since August, 1914, it has been said countless times, all over the world, that Germany is a nation gone mad. As the Germans have committed themselves deeper and deeper, month after month, to detail after detail of the preposterous implications of their national prepossession, the rest of the world has been forced to the conclusion, often against almost invincible preconceptions, that the diagnosis is not a figure of speech but stark truth.

Did you ever have a dear friend, of gentle heart, of brilliant mind, of refined tastes, of sensitive conscience, of high purpose—but suddenly bereft of reason? Instead of becoming demented, did that rarely gifted friend re-enlist all his disordered powers in pathologically energized pursuit of an uncannily perverted purpose? Did that friend betray those enviable traits into unrestricted service of a ruthlessly destructive idea? If you have such a picture as that in mind, it is also symbolically a veracious miniature of present Germany. Never was more impressive unity than the Germans have been displaying for the past three years. Yet it is a unity that is terrific—appalling—because it is splendid physical, mental, and moral strength misdirected by a Satanic obsession. This aberration has resulted from the most deliberate, the most insidious, the most methodical, the most mentally and morally stultifying, program of national self-intoxication that human imagination has ever conceived.

The book which on the whole has impressed me as the most astonishing literary betrayal of the present German state of mind was written, not from the soldier's standpoint at all, but by a man who speaks primarily for Germany's colonizing and missionizing—Paul Rohrbach. The title of the book is *Der deutsche Gedanke in der*

Welt. Since the war began, an English translation has appeared. I have not seen a copy, but if literally rendered the title would be: *The German Idea in the World*. According to the author's explicit declaration, the "German idea" is conviction of the duty of the Germans to impose upon the rest of the world their superior ethical standard! Not content to let the absurdity of this self-righteousness stand by itself, the author actually makes the body of his book an argument to his fellow-Germans to realize this aim, *for the reason that thus far they have failed in every essential quality which is necessary to ethical superiority!*

In its large features, standing forth in results rather than demonstrable in terms of the precise details of cause and effect, the process which has culminated in the present perverted condition of German political consciousness is one of the most open secrets in history. In the main it has been an interplay of two reciprocating factors, each in turn stimulating and stimulated by the other, and even at times merely phases of each other. These factors have not conformed in minutiae to a discoverable scheme of rhythm, or of logical or chronological sequence. On the whole, each in itself and both in co-operation have been accumulating influence for more than two hundred years.

The first of these factors of the present German psychosis has been the increasing success of Prussia as a military machine. From the moment in 1713 when Frederick William the First began his drill-sergeanting of his Prussians, followed by the forty-six years in which his son more than satisfied the military conditions for his honorary title "The Great," through the vacillating reigns of Frederick William Second, Third, Fourth, and even of William the First of the present Empire—a period in which all the artificialities of political, literary, and moral sycophancy had to be under sleepless mobilization to guard the Prussian people from discovering from what mediocre stuff the mythology of the Hohenzollern House was being constructed—to the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles in 1871, on the whole there was cumulative cogency in the militarists' appeal to fact: "Remember what a helpless folk the Germans were from the beginnings of the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, and behold what the Prussian monarchy and the

Prussian army have achieved!" At our remove from the facts it is easy to remember that the epitaph of most military states might well be, "He that taketh the sword shall perish by the sword." Yet, if we can imagine ourselves open to conviction that a single case, and that a case which has not yet run its full course, may be generalized into a valid historical law, we are in a position to understand how the Germans yielded to the lure of the fallacy that military aggression is the sole assurance of national greatness.

The second factor is primarily subjective and schematic. It is the factor in which the deeds of Prussian men of action reappear, "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought"—the reconstruction of German deeds in the form of German political philosophy and political pedagogy. We may get at the truth central to our immediate needs, though only a fraction of the whole truth, if we disregard all the ramifications of this philosophy and confine ourselves to three of its taproots.

In the first place, early in the nineteenth century, while dread of Napoleonism still dogged German minds, Hegel, the most abstract of all German philosophers, crystallized a conception which had been in flux in German thought for many generations, and made it the keystone of his political system: "The State is reason at its highest power."

In spite of the limitation just prescribed, there is strong temptation to widen the discussion into a display of how Kant's noble though critically unconvincing ethical system, with its impressive emphasis upon "the oughtness of the ought," interplayed with the Hegelian idea in forming German minds. The reason, in brief, why the Germans of this generation are not to be explained by Kant is that they now retain only a mechanical pantomime of his veneration for moral authority, while they have forgotten the essential content of his ethics—respect for persons as ends.

If Hegel meant that his dictum veraciously summarizes historical fact, it would be a weakling candidate for the Doctor's degree in history who could not make out a good case for the contradictory thesis: "As we have had it thus far in human experimentation, the state is unreason at its highest power." No matter. This

Hegelian dogma has not been uncontested in Germany, of course, but it has steadily acted as a magnet upon philosophical and unphilosophical Germans alike, and it has attracted them into arrangement around itself as a focus.

If, on the other hand, Hegel meant that when reason displays itself at its highest power and when the state reaches its highest development the two will coincide, the dictum is an unscientific impertinence. Who knows? It is at least conceivable, it begins to affect increasing numbers as probable, that reason, when it is finished, will have brought forth internationalism. In this conceivable internationalism, whatever else may be true of it, the state, as we have it thus far, may be reduced to a merely subaltern rank. At all events, the Hegelian doctrine: "The State is reason at its highest power," turns out to be, not a logical absolute, but merely a precarious opinion.

Yet an acquaintance far short of exhaustive with German publicistic literature since 1812 might assemble ample evidence that this Hegelian conception has been a cardinal factor in molding the present dominant type of German thinking—this, both directly and by diffusion. In particular, it has served to create a spiritual soil in which has flourished the second taproot of German political theory—I hope the confusion of metaphors will not obscure the facts—namely, the increasing concurrence of the formers of public opinion in Germany since 1871 in propaganda of the faith which might as well have been officially codified in this form: *The Prussianized State of the Germans is reason at its highest power.* I have rejected the word "connivance," which volunteered for service in the last sentence, and have conscripted "concurrence" in its place. At this point I am referring not to the whole self-hypnotizing policy which has been in operation among the Germans for two centuries, and which I have referred to as deliberate. My reference now is to a portion of the involved process which has played its part in recent years. In what ratio the actual agents of the school-mastering, first of Prussia, then of Germany, and, finally, in some measure even of the German portions of Austria, have been carrying out a deliberate program of glorifying Prussia and the Prussianized Empire may never be known.

I venture the prediction, however, that some time there will come a school of American historians who will reconsider the records of German leading opinion between 1871 and 1914, and will find in them astonishing resemblances to the political callowness which marked the professions of American political leaders of both parties during that stage of our development indexed by the phrase, "the worship of the Constitution." While it is impossible to make out the proportion in which this public pedagogy was official, or semiofficial, or in any way perfunctory, and in what proportion it was spontaneous, our present concern is chiefly with results. As I intimated earlier, the sooner Americans understand that the Germans believe in their form of government with an intensity that may never have been equaled in a great state, the sooner shall we be able to emerge from the rest of our visionary attitude toward the whole crisis. If limits permitted, evidence in any desired quantity might be exhibited in support of my previous hint that this admiration of the Prussianized system extends, with nonessential reservations, even to the great body of the Social Democrats. Their support of the war is sufficient corroboration for our present purposes. It would be still easier to show that since 1871 the German groups which the majority of Americans would classify as the most reliably progressive have been consistent and impassioned in proclaiming their belief that one of the indispensable conditions of continued German progress must ever be the strengthening of the foundations of the Hohenzollern monarchy. One might begin with Gustav Schmoller of Berlin, whose name probably commands the respect of a larger circle of American students of the social sciences than that of any other living German; and one might continue through the membership of the *Verein für Socialpolitik*, unquestionably since 1874 the most influential extra-governmental body of social theorists in the world. No matter how radical the measures advocated by these men, either as individuals or as a group, the weight of their influence has always counted toward increase of the prestige of the Prussian monarchy. More than this, whatever jealousy of Prussia and the Prussians survives in the lesser German states—speaking always in terms of the situation as it was before the war made inferences about later

developments unreliable—it is as grotesque for Americans to suppose that non-Prussian Germany wants to undo the fusing process completed in 1871 as it was for certain Germans a few years ago to speculate that, if our government were drawn into a foreign war, our southern states would make it the psychological moment for another secession!

All in all, among the Germans since 1871 these two elements have been growing more evident, as attitude if not as explicit creed—first, conscious or unconscious deference toward the Hegelian superstition: “The State is reason at its highest power,” secondly, inclination to accept the Prussianized Empire as the only extant specimen of that state which is reason at its highest power.

But with these two cardinal positions in the German reaction we have not yet brought to light the third and decisive factor on the mental side of German influence in the world-crisis. That factor turns out to be merely the German militarists' version of naïve savagery which began to function uncounted ages before people were capable of political thought at all—when they frankly did whatever their brutish strength permitted. It is the attitude, merely varying in detail, of the ancient military chieftains, of the later Caesars, and of the more subtle mediaeval benevolent despots.

All through the ages two contradictory conceptions of national life have urged for expression and for mastery. The more elemental of these tendencies has held its ground in more or less disguised form most of the time, in most of the world, down to the present moment. However concrete the visible symbols in which this tendency has been embodied, from the single chief, who got or kept his prestige by superior prowess with his club, down to the latest autocracy of *Kultur*, all the cases of this type of which we have been able to find out very much have buttressed themselves upon the notion, implicit or explicit, that the state is a mysterious, impersonal, superior something, predestined to dominate over the people, and to make the people mere counters in its game. In its more evolved and plausible forms, this theory of the state has always enlisted the devilishly resourceful cunning of a few in getting this mystically impersonal conception of the state identified with themselves. As we look back upon it now, or as we look

around, wherever in the world this view still holds, and if we poke underneath its disguises and find what the reality is that remains, it is evident that this supernaturalistic supposition, the "State," has usually been in actuality a very concrete, and self-conscious, and self-asserting person, or bunch of persons, masquerading as the "State" and compelling or cajoling the masses of the people into pulling their chestnuts out of the fire, instead of leading that kind of co-operation which would make most for the general good. Historically, with few exceptions, the actual state has been some tyrant, some oriental despot, some man on horseback, some commercial oligarchy, as in Venice under the Doges, some military caste, as in Germany today. In each case, with qualifications few or many, weak or strong, in numberless varieties, the aims of a usurping faction, rather than the general welfare, have controlled the destinies of the whole. Tradition has put in the mouth of Louis XIV the symbolic words: "The State? I am the State!" Whether the "Great Monarch" ever uttered the formula or not, the sentiment is the breath of life of the actual ruler or rulers in every state still controlled by any subspecies whatsoever of the primitive paganism of force.

The German military caste has enthroned the same old paganism, but it has furnished it with the frankest creed it has ever confessed since the earliest naïve creeds of deeds began to "clothe their naked shame" with creeds of words. The national obsession of the Germans has betrayed itself at its ghastliest in the most fanatical surrender to this pagan creed that has been exhibited on a large scale since the most sanguinary period of Islam. Bernhardi and Treitschke have been merely the best advertised among the countless acolytes of this archaeological paganism in its German revival: "The State is power!" *Der Staat ist Macht!*

Now, as I have just pointed out, this creed of the resuscitated paganism to which the Germans have become unresisting perverts accurately indicates the character of a majority of the states that have actually occurred thus far in the moral evolution of society. As a mere matter of logic, however, the psychosis through which this generalization of fact has become domiciled in the minds of the Germans as the supreme imperative of their national religion

is a case of one of the most elementary fallacies. It is as though one should reason: *Man is an animal; therefore, the supreme privilege and duty of man is to imitate the beasts of prey.* Ever since Aristotle it has been a part of the world's common sense that the whole story about anything is told, not by its beginnings, but by its beginnings plus its completions.

Simple as is the logical refutation of the German creed of power, the ethical refutation is still more decisive. Both in its academic expositions and in its applications in the conduct of the German government toward other governments and peoples, the creed, "*The State is power,*" turns out to be insolent denial of every ancient or modern ethical or religious faith which has followed instinct or vision of the evolving sovereignty of the spirit. "The State is power" turns out to mean: If a weaker people possess anything that the rulers of a stronger people want, those rulers of the stronger people need only plead "military necessity," and no law of man or God may stay any hideous use of force which might enable the stronger to work their will. For three years the Germans have been proving their faith by works of ruthlessness more ferocious than the world has seen since the madness of the Inquisition.

Nevertheless, for the same time, some of the best men and women in America have done what they could to make a mistaken conception of righteousness embarrass the vindication of righteousness. They have talked of "compromise" or something equally inconceivable. Between morality and physical power there can be no more compromise than between assertion and denial of the multiplication table. One must rule. The other must submit.

Let me interject the explanation that by "morality" I do not mean my code of conduct, nor yours; not a set of rules which Americans or Englishmen might desire to impose upon other peoples. By "morality" I mean, now, simply that irreducible minimum for the security of which we must fight to a finish against the Germans, namely, *the principle that whenever their enterprises visibly affect the interests of other men or other nations, civilized men, whether individuals or groups, are bound to prefer legal and rational to violent means of promoting their interests.*

Our national folklore has joined the name of an American naval officer, whose loyalty was less dubious than his ethics, with the unfortunate attempt at a patriotic aphorism: "My Country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she ever be right, but, right or wrong, my country!" In their zeal for a more defensible patriotism honest pacifists have gone to the other extreme with a doctrine which practically means: Our country can never be right if, in the name of all its moral and physical force, it halts another nation that is violently wrong with the ultimatum, "Thus far and no farther."

At this moment the German cause reduces to the desperation of those militarists to vindicate themselves who for years have advertised the shameless creed that morality has no rights against the power of the state. For no one knows precisely how many years the German government has been a conspiracy to disfranchise morality in the conduct of nation toward nation, and to establish the military power of Germany in its place. So soon as we Americans take in this ugly fact, those of us with the rudiments of a conscience must realize that, until the Germans repudiate this military caste and the creed it imposes, to be at peace with Germany would make our nation a moral monstrosity.

In practice, the German system works out in two aspects which to outward appearance are contradictory. Whether at bottom they are contradictory or complementary is a question too involved for profitable discussion here. Let us glance at each aspect in certain of its distinctive manifestations.

We may refer to these two obvious aspects of the German system as the *domestic* and the *foreign*, or the *national* and the *international*. Not only Americans, but Germans themselves, have been queered in their judgment of the German government by the fact that one and the same system presents appearances so contradictory that they cannot be reconciled. Both Germans and Americans have reasoned, in effect: "The domestic aspect of the German system reaches such benign results that the alleged badness of the German foreign policy cannot be real." It is one of the humors of our immature intellectuality that the most sophisticated of us still hunt for mental and moral consistency behind human actions!

For brevity let us call upon parable to picture the quality of the German domestic system.

My attention was first called to the town of Pullman by descriptions of it as a "model community." It was alleged that everything which intelligent benevolence could devise had been done to furnish the employees in the Pullman works with all the living conditions necessary for their comfort and happiness. Not long after, my lot was cast in such a way that only half an hour separated my home from Pullman. Very soon there were labor disturbances at Pullman, and, with others, I was called upon to investigate. I found that the descriptions which I had read of the physical equipment of the town had not been too highly colored. At the same time, I found the most discontented and bitter inhabitants that I had ever met. The burden of their complaints was not expressed in terms of wages, nor labor hours, nor any other physical standards of living. The worst-felt grievance seemed to be voiced in the assertion that they were treated like children, not like men and women. The most telltale bit of evidence that I discovered was the current sneer: "We are born in a Pullman house, cradled in a Pullman crib, fed from a Pullman store, taught in a Pullman school, confirmed in a Pullman church, exploited in a Pullman shop, and when we die we'll be buried in a Pullman grave and go to a Pullman hell."

It would be contrary to the evidence to doubt that, in motive, George M. Pullman was a conscientious philanthropist. His mistake was in principle that of all the genuinely benevolent despots. He confounded philanthropy with patronage. He had not found out that the best way for men to help men is not to do things for them, but to do things with them, and perhaps better still to remove removable hindrances to their doing things for themselves.

When I became a citizen of Waterville, in 1881, and wished to walk abroad of a night when the moon was not in session, I always carried a lantern. There was not a street light in town. Neither was there a street car, nor a water-main, nor a sewer. Not a lawnmower had ever been in commission. The yards looked like pastures that had strayed in from the farms. The two most sightly spots for the landscape gardener in the center of the town

were dumping places for débris. There was not a public school-house which any of the prosperous citizens would have consented to use as a stable, and a little later I built the second, possibly the third, house in the town that contained a bathroom.

As I have looked about in Waterville at intervals during the past forty-eight hours, it has seemed to me that some mightier Aladdin had meanwhile been conjuring. I can see room for improvement still. You cannot control the rain, for instance, but some day you will control the mud. And many other kinds of progress will doubtless mark the next thirty years. As it is, the contrast between Waterville as I first knew it and the Waterville of today is the outward sign of a generation's advance in civilization. And you have done it yourselves! It has not been handed down to you from above! You would not have taken it as a gift; you would even go back a generation and do it all over again, if the alternative were to accept it out of hand, even from the most masterful of the public-spirited men who have lived among you in the course of these years. Rather than be policed in every detail of life outside of your domicile, and in many details within it, by the most magnanimous human beings you have ever known, you would elect a return to primitive conditions, and to the adventure of working out that salvation of personality which can be achieved only in the exercise of responsible self-direction.

In miniature, the contrast between the town of Pullman and the town of Waterville reflects the difference between German and American civic conditions, with the single difference that the Germans are proud of their kind and despise ours, while we hold to our kind and abhor theirs.

Now, the case is by no means as one-sided as either people think. If the worthy way through life for a moral being were a greater Cook's personally conducted tour, our American method would be a hopeless competitor with the German. In sheer bodily comfort and security and in certain guaranties of spiritual liberty, regardless of possible not completely stifled scruples about abdication of one's selfhood, the average German during the past generation has undoubtedly got more for what he paid than the average American. But there's the rub! The unreckoned part of

the price which the Germans pay is their aborted personality. Von Buelow knew his Germans when he said, in his volume *Imperial Germany*, published not long before the war, that the Germans are not political beings, that they are incapable of parliamentary government. I began to find that out in my first contacts with Germans in 1879. As a deliberate experiment, I have many times, then and since, led conversations with casual acquaintances up to some political subject. Almost invariably, unless I happened to have met a member of the political class, although there had been no hesitation about expression of opinion upon all previous topics, the stereotyped answer would be: "O! That's a matter for the government!" We may not boast that the output of average individual American opinion upon political questions is impressive; but this is impressive, namely, the consciousness of every American that it is a part of his personality to exert his own unrestricted share in creating political standards and in shaping political policies.

As long as I live, I shall not cease to grieve that these two conceptions of what is best in civic life could not have worked side by side to their limit in peace. It may well be that there is more in each of these conceptions than those who can see good in only one of them are able to understand. It may be that civilization might have been served best in the long run if these two types of civic experiment could have developed in parallel columns, until the advantages and the disadvantages of each had demonstrated themselves to both.

However that may be, Americans have always reckoned liberty of political self-expression and self-realization among the choicest of human goods; while since 1848 the Germans have made no formidable demand for individual self-expression in politics. Nearly twenty-five years ago Pastor Frommel, who had been frozen out of his position as Court Preacher at Berlin because of his pernicious sympathy with the wage-earning classes, told me that, when he began to get into personal touch with factory operatives, he was astonished at the nature of their demands. He said that regularly, in reply to his question, "What do you want?" the answer, from men and women alike, would be, "We want recognition" (*Wir wünschen Anerkennung*). Which, being inter-

puted, meant that they wanted to be met by their employers on the level of human beings and to be accorded the rights of human beings in representing their own interests. Up to the present moment there has been in Germany neither an effective concerted movement to gain similar recognition in politics, nor evidence that there is enough latent demand for such recognition among the Germans to make such a movement respectable.

Worse than this, domineering militarism has kept civil life in Germany in a cowering menial attitude toward the army, and it has put official premiums upon an overbearing attitude of the army toward civilians.

One morning, ten or fifteen years ago, I happened to be in Potsdam when the order of the day included presentation of the colors to a regiment of new troops. The guard of honor was drawn up on one side of a square of which a church formed the second side, the spectators the third, while the fourth side was to be occupied by the approaching regiment. The Kaiser had returned that day from a vacation, and in the corner by the church he was chatting with members of his staff. I was near enough to see every detail in pantomime, without hearing a word. The Kaiser had said something flattering to a big handsome officer, who stood in his bravery of gala uniform and decorations preening himself after the Kaiser had passed on to the next in line. Just then a little girl of perhaps five or six years appeared through a narrow archway in the wall near the church. She looked searchingly in every direction, then stretched her hand above her head, and I saw that she had been sent to post a letter in a box behind the tall officer. It was too high. The little girl raised herself on tip-toes, but could not reach the opening. She turned and stood irresolute for a moment, her disappointed, bewildered look perfectly legible from my point of observation. Then she took notice of the big strong man, and her face lighted up with a glad smile at the instinctive feeling that he was the solution of her difficulty. She lifted the letter toward him. He took it mechanically, with one or two glances back and forth between it and her. His intellect was evidently less brilliant than his uniform. Presently the idea took shape in his brain that this slip of a girl had called on him for help.

With an arrogant toss of his head and a contemptuous snap of his wrist, he threw the letter to the ground.

Volumes might be written on German militarism without telling more about its essential spirit than this incident revealed. It was merely a mannerism, too matter-of-course to be questioned by Germans, of the same civilization in which public-school programs were suspended and pupils were coached to celebrate the murder of women and children on the *Lusitania*. I repeat that, whatever the other excellencies of the Germans, a national sentiment which tolerates an army with that spirit toward the people is demonstration of pitifully aborted personality.

But it is in the other aspect, in its attitude toward other nations, that the soulless paganism which the Germans have accepted from their militarists as the national religion most immediately appears. Again I forbear generalities and testify from my own experience.

In the summer of 1903 I was in Germany on business which gave me occasion to sample the opinions about our country of more different classes of Germans than I had ever interviewed before. The itinerary scheduled stops at Cologne, Lucerne, Vienna, Budapest, Munich, Dresden, Berlin, and thence an excursion into Russia. At each of these points, and in the intermediate travel, I had opportunities to talk with many men of prominence and with as many more whom I could classify merely as ordinary specimens of their various types. I soon became aware that, quite aside from the direct purpose of my trip, I was gathering from these sources a collection of significant and cumulative evidence. Over and over again Germans of different social positions, living in as many different parts of Germany and neighboring countries, volunteered the same opinion in almost the same words: "You Yankees are all right, but it is only a question of time when we Germans will have to fight you, not with trade regulations, but with cannon." And my question "Why?" invariably brought the stereotyped answer: "Because you are trying to get some of the world's foreign commerce."

Up to that time I had firmly believed in the pacific intentions of Germany. I had regarded the pan-German agitation as a joke. I had interpreted the familiar grandiose utterances of Kaiser, and

professor, and editor, and Reichstag orator as the harmless word-painting of an imaginative people who delight in setting national commonplaces in a heroic light. But these coincidences started my reflections in a new direction. It was incredible that so many men, of such different kinds, from such widely separated places, could have arrived independently at such an astonishing consensus. Such a state of mind must have been the result of some central influence or influences. A captain of infantry, whom I met in the home of a friend in Berlin, strengthened this inference when he gave me a book which contained the same sentiment in almost the same words, with the comment which afterward proved to carry accrued interest: "It is the most popular book of the year among German officers." Then I began to pick up other threads of association. I recalled a lecture which I had heard during my student days by Professor Gneist, of Berlin, who at the time was reputed to be the foremost continental expositor of the British constitution. The argument expanded these propositions: "The United States of America has no sovereign. Therefore it has no sovereignty. Therefore it is not in the proper sense of the term a state. Therefore it is not entitled to the full rights of a state among states." I had listened with amusement to the exposition and had scarcely thought of it meanwhile, because I had taken it as a choice specimen of academic pedantry, with no practical bearing. Presently I began to recall, however, that in my reading since my student days I had come across many German expressions of the same idea, with the implication that it was something to be taken for granted.

On my return to Chicago, I reported my experience in a newspaper interview, with the conclusion that we Americans would be living in a fool's paradise until we provided ourselves with a navy so strong that, even if the creed which I had heard should proselyte all Germany, it would be too unsafe to follow it into practice. For two or three weeks following publication of the interview, at a signal from Consul Wever, of Chicago—one of the most efficient promoters of German interests that has ever represented that country in the United States—the German-language press of America and not a few publications in English bristled with

abuse of the ignorant American tourist who had insulted Germany by drawing such an inference from such data.

Up to the present hour the Germans have pursued the same policy of denying the significance of any and every fact which tended to fix on them the stigma of militarism in general or responsibility for the present war in particular. No matter what German has indorsed the creed of force, or of terrorization as the technique of the creed, even the Kaiser, or the Crown Prince, or the chancellor, or authors with readers by the hundred thousands, the professional German apologists have always given the cue for a world-wide claque to shout the repudiation: "That particular utterance, or that particular man, cuts no figure in Germany."

We have always had a few men in American politics who waxed great in their own eyes by declamation of the manifest destiny of the United States to be "bounded on the north by the Aurora Borealis, on the south by the Southern Cross." Usually the saving sense of the people, ably aided and abetted by the obduracy of things, has rendered such politicians innocuous. But suppose the present Speaker of the House of Representatives had received the presidential nomination from the Baltimore convention of 1912, and suppose he had been elected. Very few Americans realize by what a narrow margin that calamity was averted. Suppose he had made good his maudlin threat of committing this country to the annexation of Canada. Suppose we had made it a test of loyalty to support his administration in waging a war for the conquest of the Dominion. Suppose we had persisted in accepting without question the administration's fiction—"The war was forced upon us!" Suppose we had refused to cast in our lot with any peace movement which might involve overthrow of the administration or of the party that had seduced the country into its immoral course. In that case our deeds would have spoken louder than our words. American character would consequently have to be known, not by what Americans had denied in terms, but by what we had actually done.

The outstanding fact, to which the Germans have been delivering themselves with accelerated motion till the incredible culmination of 1914, and since, is that all the Germans have adopted as their own the cause of those leaders who have advertised their trust in war as the foremost means of satisfying national ambitions.

I have said that all through the ages two contradictory conceptions of national life have urged for expression and mastery. We have been reviewing the form in which the one conception has taken its latest shape in German word and deed. Time remains for only the briefest allusion to the alternative tendency. A part of the next great constructive task of mankind is to give distinctness and reality to the opposite conception.

In spite of those ancient states to which history has given the name "republic," it is not certain that the antithesis of the present dominating German idea of the state ever began to be articulate in the voice of a great public until more confident than convincing expressions of it were heard in the American and the French revolutions. Today we are trying to symbolize the whole truth by the slogan: "Democracy against Autocracy!" While that watchword may be suggestive enough for rallying purposes, a nation which accepted that antithesis as either precise or exhaustive would soon resolve itself into a wholesale case of the blind leading the blind. We have the task of finding the crystal truth in contradiction of the turgid lie: "The State is power."

I venture the opinion that we shall never separate the truth from vitiating error until we have broken utterly with all our traditional doctrines of the state in terms of that plausible philosophical conception, "sovereignty." The real truth, and the whole truth, will be found only after we have taken our departure from the homely fact that a state is essentially like any other human group—a bridge club, a philharmonic society, a merchandizing firm, a banking corporation, a charity organization, a religious community, a counterfeiters' gang, an artists' guild—a *state is a company of persons behaving themselves in a certain way*. Whatever distance in comprehension or in character may separate a group which we call a state from each and every other type of human group, a state continues its identity with each and every other human group, at least in this: it is composed of human beings, with all the moral liabilities of human beings. By forming themselves into, or by finding themselves in, any sort of grouping whatsoever, human beings cannot release themselves from the universal obligation of human beings to respect the humanity of one another. They cannot exempt themselves from a jot or a tittle of

one of the laws of physical or mental or moral cause and effect, which are bound to assert themselves sooner or later as the inexorable conditions of the human lot.

The central, supreme, paramount issue of this war is whether civilization is to instal the principle of aggression as its highest law; whether for a defiant epoch morality is to be suspended; whether, during an era of the most cynical apostasy that the record of mankind will have registered, that nation is to be greatest which can mobilize the most terrific force and use it in the most savage way.

In his zeal to reassure the American people and to convince all other peoples that the United States does not want anybody's goods, or chattels, or lands, or anything that is our neighbors', President Wilson has made it possible for the stupid and the designing to assert that Americans are fighting for nothing.

On the contrary, those Americans who are morally awake are fighting for everything above the mercenary level that makes life worth the living. We are fighting for the decision that henceforth this world shall be a place in which physical power shall be, not the standard of right, but the servant of right. No other generation in history has had an equal opportunity to promote the moral achievements of mankind. The remaining catastrophe most to be feared is not that more thousands of lives may have to be offered upon the altar of this century's high decision. If coming generations could look down upon us, their anxiety would be, first and chiefest, lest we should stay our hands before we had secured the primacy of morals in the affairs of nations.

No state since the days of the Decalogue has committed itself to a loftier political ideal than that which our country professes. Citizenship of the United States involves loyalty or treason to that ideal. Coined into terms of today, that ideal requires that progressive sense of justice shall enact the laws; and that law shall control force, not force the law, both in domestic and in foreign relations. No other people ever received so rich an endowment of physical resources as we have inherited. Are we to squander that endowment upon our physical and moral softnesses, or shall we use it to support the prodigious moral experiment to which we are committed? The world being what it is, Americans of this gener-

ation can neither improve nor retain their birthright unless they are resolved to continue instalment payments of the same price of suffering with which our fathers bought our birthright.

Few native Americans have more or weightier reasons for gratitude to Germany than I have been accumulating for nearly forty years. None can be more willing in every possible way to acknowledge the debt which can never be discharged. And yet! And yet! This will be an intolerable world until the Germans have once and forever recanted, with all it involves, that most hellish heresy that has ever menaced civilization: **THERE IS NO GOD BUT POWER, AND PRUSSIA IS ITS PROPHET!**

The Germans are still so unsuspecting of their rulers that they do not want to be disillusioned. President Wilson never uttered more literal truth than when he told us that in fighting with the Germans we shall prove in the end to have been fighting for the Germans as well as for ourselves, just as our fight with the English in '76 proved to be a fight, not for our own liberty alone, but for the enfranchisement of every subject of the British crown.

With the most cordial hopes that in the days to come the Germans may enjoy all the prosperity of every sort which they can win on their merits, without violating the equal rights of any other people, we should be numbered among the betrayers of mankind if we did not now exert our utmost physical and spiritual strength to convince the Germans that their Baal is asleep, never more to wake, or on a journey, never again to return.

Now is our nation's Gethsemane. In the beginnings of our agony and bloody sweat we are still praying, "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me!" God grant that the generations to come may forever cherish the memory of the cross which we shall bear, as the symbol of their redemption unto spiritualized political life!

SOCIOLOGY BEFORE COMTE:
A SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LITERATURE¹

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I. INTRODUCTION

The social philosophy of ancient, mediaeval, and early modern writers must be gleaned from the larger mass of philosophical, theological, economic, political, and legal doctrines, for, as might be expected, in no period or writer is there to be found any strict differentiation between the social philosophy, on the one hand, and the religious, moral, economic, or political theories, on the other hand. Nor is there found in many cases a serious attempt to build up a definite or well-balanced system of social philosophy.

At the same time, the recognition of these facts furnishes no adequate justification for refusing to go back of Comte for the sources of sociological thought. It is hoped that even this brief survey of the pre-Comtian period will substantiate the truth of the statement that, from the time of Plato onward, thinkers were approaching, and to a certain extent successfully formulating, the chief problems of sociology. Indeed, as Professor Small has pointed out, only the most mediocre writer can be adequately described simply by classifying him as a sociologist, historian, economist, or political scientist. The aim and purpose of the writer constitute the most valid basis for organizing his contributions to social science.² One is therefore justified in seeking the origins of sociology as far in the past as there can be discovered a conscious attempt on the part of any writer to record or to explain the fundamental problems of social organization and development.

¹This article has profited by the critical comments of Professors William A. Dunning and Alvan A. Tenney, who kindly consented to read it in manuscript and proof.

²Small, *The Cameralists*, chap. i; *The Meaning of Social Science*, *passim*.

In any attempt, however cursory, to trace the development of sociological thought, it is necessary to keep in mind the fundamental truth so well expressed by Professor Giddings¹ and Professor Small,² that the doctrines of any writer lose most of their significance unless their relation to the prevailing social environment is pointed out and the purposes of his work are clearly indicated. While in the present article the treatment of these important phases of the general topic must, like the summary of doctrines, be extremely condensed, the attempt will be made to indicate the general conditions out of which the sociological thought of each period developed.

Anything like a systematic discussion of social phenomena began with the Greeks. The writers of oriental antiquity were prevented by the general conditions of their social environment from advancing any strikingly original generalizations concerning the origin and nature of social institutions. A rural economy, caste, superstition, an inflexible religious system, and sumptuary legislation, begotten of the passion of the antique mind for homogeneity, tended to give social conditions a fixity and sanctity which discouraged any extensive speculation as to their origin, nature, or possible means of improvement. When social institutions were fixed by a tyrannical customary code and confirmed by an inscrutable Providence, there could be no "science" of society. Consequently, in oriental antiquity most of the thinking upon social problems consisted in formulating elaborate schemes of justification for the existence of the given régime, these mainly centering about the sanctions of a unique revealed religion or the superior wisdom of ancestors.³

To be sure, there are to be found moral and social precepts in the works of the Egyptian scribes;⁴ valuable bits of applied and descriptive sociology may be gleaned from the Babylonian records,

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1904, pp. 169-70.

² *The Cameralists*, chap. 1.

³ Cf. Marvin, *The Living Past*, chap. iii; Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 283 ff.; Taylor, *Ancient Ideals*, I, chaps. ii-iv.

⁴ Cf. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt; Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, particularly pp. 199 ff.

particularly from the Code of Hammurapi;¹ much of sociological interest may be found in the ancient books of the Aryans of India;² the Hebrew legal codes and prophetic teachings are replete with sociological and anthropological interest;³ and most of the Chinese religious and moral doctrines come from a more remote antiquity than those of the great philosophers of Greece;⁴ but the definite and coherent analysis of social phenomena and processes, as far as extant records may furnish the basis for a judgment, originated with the Greek philosophers of the post-Socratic period.⁵

II. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AMONG THE GREEKS

While it is impossible to account for Greek originality and freedom of thought entirely upon the basis of the surrounding conditions,⁶ it is nevertheless true that the characteristic trends in the sociological thinking of the Greeks can be traced back to the social environment.

In the first place, the lack of an extensive or highly centralized political organization, bringing together in one unified state many different peoples, allowed the tribal spirit of localism and provincialism to have free play, and it pervaded most of Greek thinking upon social phenomena. With the exception of the Stoics, the contrast of Greek and barbarian stands out clearly in all of the great Greek studies of social institutions. But if the Greek city-state fostered a rather narrow local conceit, it also rendered possible a high degree of like-mindedness on the part of the citizens. This led to that group self-consciousness which lies at the basis of those

¹ C. H. W. Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters*, 1904; see Professor Vincent's article in *American Journal of Sociology*, IX, 737-54.

² Cf. Frazer, *Indian Thought, Past and Present*.

³ Cf. Kent, *Israel's Laws and Legal Precedents*; *The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus*; Wallis, *A Sociological Study of the Bible*; Day, *Social Life of the Hebrews*.

⁴ Cf. Giles, *Confucianism and Its Rivals and Ancient Religions of China*; DeGroot, *The Religious Systems of China*; and Suzuki, *A Brief History of Ancient Chinese Philosophy*.

⁵ For the period of antiquity in general, see Willoughby, *Political Theories of the Ancient World*, pp. 3-30; Janet, *Histoire de la science politique*, I, 1-51.

⁶ Cf. Bury, *The History of the Freedom of Thought*, pp. 22 ff.

utopian or idealistic theories of society which appear in the *Republic* of Plato and the *Politics* of Aristotle. Again, the freedom and liberty of the democratic city-state and the absence of a coercive state religion made for that critical philosophy which first appeared on any considerable scale among the Attic Greeks. In spite of the pretensions of Athens as a commercial empire, Greek civilization was primarily based upon an agricultural economy, which, through its routine and repetition, invariably begets a static outlook upon the social process. Consequently, one is not surprised to find Aristotle setting up stability as the most perfect test of the excellence of a state. In spite of their intellectual activity, there was little inductive study of social phenomena among the Greeks. Aristotle furnishes the only notable exception to this statement. While the dependence of Greek civilization upon slavery has doubtless been exaggerated,¹ the Greeks despised the humble and commonplace methods of natural science and preferred the freer ranges of a priori generalization. The possibilities of deductive thinking about the social process were accordingly exhausted by the Greeks. It was not until natural science had established the inductive methods in social science that the *Politics* of Aristotle and the *Republic* and *Laws* of Plato were surpassed as analyses of social phenomena by the works of Comte, Quételet, Spencer, and Ward.²

The period of Greek thought before Plato has left no voluminous remains, but from the sources available several interesting suggestions and developments may be discovered. Hesiod (eighth century B.C.) had outlined the culture ages from the conventional viewpoint of a descent from a "golden age," and had voiced his protest against existing social and economic conditions.³ Anaximander (610-546 B.C.) had antedated John Fiske by twenty-four centuries in his discussion of the prolongation of human infancy

¹ Cf. Zimmern, *Sociological Review*, 1909, pp. 1 ff., 159 ff.

² This scanty survey of the social environment of Greek social philosophy may be supplemented by Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*; Botsford and Sihler, *Hellenic Civilization*, pp. 210-54, 303-48, 423-526, 657-708; and Marvin, *op. cit.*, chap. iv.

³ Hesiod, *Works and Days*, trans. by A. W. Main (Oxford, 1908), pp. 4 ff.

in its relation to human society.¹ Theognis (ca. 550 B.C.) had clearly perceived the principles of eugenics as applied to the human race.² Aeschylus (525-456 B.C.) had anticipated Lucretius by more than four centuries in his highly interesting account of the general evolution of civilization.³ Herodotus (d. after 430 B.C.), by his acute observations and striking descriptions of the manners, customs, and physical characteristics of foreign peoples, had earned the title of the first great "descriptive sociologist."⁴ The Sophists had apparently advanced the conception of a primordial state of nature and a subsequent social, or at least a governmental, compact.⁵ Hippocrates (ca. 460-370 B.C.), in his work on *Airs, Waters, and Places*, presented the first serious analysis of the influence of physical environment upon human society. He described the effect of climate and topography upon the peoples of Asia in regard to political institutions and physical characteristics with an accuracy and detail not equaled before Ibn Khaldun, Aquinas, and Bodin. His work constituted the point of departure for all treatments of the influence of physical environment till the time of Ritter.⁶ Finally, Socrates (471-399 B.C.) had presented the doctrine of a law of nature, as contrasted with human law, and had attempted to reduce ethics to something like a science.⁷

Plato (427-347 B.C.), in his search after an adequate definition of justice, was led into making an analysis of society and of the state.⁸

¹ Nicholas Murray Butler, "Anaximander on the Prolongation of Infancy in Man," in *Classical Studies in Honor of Henry Drisler*, pp. 8-10.

² *The Works of Hesiod, Callimachus, and Theognis*, trans. by Banks in Bohn's Classical Library, 1856, pp. 227-28.

³ Botsford and Sihler, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

⁴ *History of Herodotus*, trans. by George Rawlinson, 4 vols., 1850-60; see Myres, in *Anthropology and the Classics*, edited by Marett, chap. v, "Herodotus and Anthropology."

⁵ Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79; Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, pp. 28-46.

⁶ *The Genuine Works of Hippocrates*, translated by Adams, London, 1849, Vol. I, pp. 190-222.

⁷ Janet, *Histoire de la science politique*, I, 84-94; Dunning, *A History of Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval*, pp. 21-23; Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-60. For the pre-Socratic period in general, see Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 30 ff.; Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-46; Janet, *op. cit.*, I, 51-103; Zeller, *Greek Philosophy to the Time of Socrates*, 2 vols.

He outlined the organic theory of society and found not only the economic but also the ethical basis of society to be embodied in the functional division of labor.¹ In this respect he contributed what is probably the most satisfactory analysis of the economic foundations of society which is to be found in the works of any writer of antiquity.

He recognized the existence and importance of the organization of the social mind, though he wrongly considered it as merely the sum of the individual minds in the social group.² Adopting the premises that man can control his own social relations and that concerted volition would be the necessary result of similar external surroundings and stimuli, he constructed one of the most complete of the utopian plans for an ideal society of which history bears any record.³ It is interesting to note that, aside from its communistic aspects, this utopia of Plato provided for the first comprehensive scheme of eugenics in the history of social or biological philosophy.⁴

Especially interesting is Plato's contribution to historical sociology. With almost the perspective of a nineteenth century evolutionist, he discerned something of the true nature of social evolution and the time requisite for its consummation, and presented his own theories on the subject, which were exceedingly accurate for one possessed of his scanty data.⁵ Finally, in decided contrast to his predecessors and to many of his successors, Plato tried to comprehend and analyze society as a unity and in its entirety.⁶

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the most influential of all writers on social philosophy, both on account of the profundity of his insight

¹ *Republic*, in Jowett's *Dialogues of Plato*, II, 369; IV, 433; Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

² *Republic*, v, 462, and Introduction by Jowett, pp. cxcviii-cxcix.

³ *Republic*, iii, 412-17; v, 458-62.

⁴ *Ibid.*, v, 458-62.

⁵ *Laws* (Jowett), iii, 676-84.

⁶ For one of the best discussions of Plato's social and political philosophy to be found in any language, see Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-207; for a history of the later influence of the *Republic*, *ibid.*, pp. 525-30; cf. also Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*; and Loos, *Studies in the Politics of Aristotle and the Republic of Plato*, pp. 182-291.

into social processes, and because of his peculiar relation to mediæval thought,¹ made many advances over Plato in his investigation of the basis and justification of political and social relationships. In the first place, Aristotle introduced the inductive method of studying social phenomena, while Plato had relied almost entirely upon the far less scientific deductive line of approach.² But probably more important than this was his direct and clean-cut assertion that man is by nature a social being.³ This dictum, had it been heeded by later writers, would have precluded any possibility of the erroneous interpretations of society, such as that of an original social contract, which were based upon the doctrine of conscious self-interest. As a deduction from this dogma of man's inherent sociability, he pointed out the necessity of social relations for the complete development of the human personality, and made plain the abnormality of the non-social being.⁴

Aristotle presented an explanation of social evolution in terms of utility, an expansion of the social nature, and the scope of the desire for, and need of, society.⁵ In this respect he made a considerable advance over Plato, who had adopted the utilitarian and economic explanation, almost to the exclusion of the instinctive basis. However, while Aristotle's interpretation was more inclusive and well-balanced, he fell far short of the thoroughness of Plato in his analysis of the economic foundations of society.

In his criticism of Plato's communistic scheme he advanced arguments against communism, which for completeness and scientific accuracy leave little to be said upon the subject.⁶ But his own project for an ideal commonwealth was not much more satisfactory than that of Plato, for both were permeated with the Greek ideals of exclusiveness, provincialism, and localism, and with the notions that social stability was the end most to be sought in the institutions of society,⁷ and that society was prior to the individual in importance.⁸

¹ Cf. Robinson, *History of Western Europe*, p. 272.

² Cf. Pollock, *A History of the Science of Politics*, p. 16.

³ *Politics*, Jowett's translation, i, 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, i, 1-2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i, 1-2; iii, 6, 9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ii, 2-7.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vii, 4-15; Bury, *History of Greece*, p. 835; Loos, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-76.

⁸ *Politics*, i, 2; *Republic*, v, 310.

The subjective basis of society Aristotle believed to be embodied in friendship, in the analysis of which he approached Professor Giddings' theory of the "consciousness of kind."¹

Finally, Aristotle gave a more complete statement than Plato of the organic analogy² and of the influence of physical environment upon society. In his theory of the effect of the physical environment Aristotle revived and adapted the theories of Hippocrates, so as to furnish a geographical basis for the alleged superiority of the Greeks. He held that by their intermediate geographical situation the Greeks were able to combine the superior mental attainments of southern peoples with the greater bravery of the northerners, and at the same time to escape the fickleness of the inhabitants of warm regions and the stupidity of the people of the north.³ The common ancient and mediaeval doctrine of the general superiority of the inhabitants of the temperate climates was, in all probability, but the statement of an observed fact. Their explanation of this fact, however, was hardly as satisfactory, being based upon the fantastic astrological doctrine of planetary influences and the equally grotesque Greek physical philosophy, with its physiological chemistry founded on the theory of the four elements and the four humors.

The distinctive sociological characteristics of the Stoic and Epicurean social philosophy are not difficult to account for on the basis of the conditions of the time. The swallowing up of the Greek city-states in the imperial system of Alexander and the disorder which followed the disintegration of his empire naturally led, on the one hand, to the cosmopolitan serenity and resignation of the Stoics, and, on the other, to the individualistic and materialistic doctrines of the Epicureans who valued society and the state solely for their aid in securing a superior degree of convenience and safety.⁴

¹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. by Peters, VIII, i, ix, xiv; IX, xii.

² *Politics*, iv, 4.

³ *Ibid.*, vii, 7. For Barker's excellent analysis of Aristotle's political and social theories, see *op. cit.*, pp. 208-496, and for the later influence of the *Politics*, *ibid.*, pp. 497-524. Cf. also Duprat, "Rapport des doctrines politiques anciennes avec la sociologie et la politique contemporaines," in *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, 1901, pp. 818 ff., and Loos, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-176.

⁴ Cf. Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, chap. ii.

The Stoics, who constituted that school of philosophy founded by Zeno (ca. 350-ca. 260 B.C.) in the latter half of the fourth century B.C., and which lasted until the close of the period of the domination of the Western Roman Empire, interpreted society in terms of rational thought and held with Aristotle that all men must be social, both for the development of their own personality and for the proper discharge of their duties toward their fellow-beings. Their conception of society was far broader than that of the other schools of Greek philosophy, to whom the world was either Greek or barbarian, and the cosmopolitan Stoic conception of a world-society and citizenship did much to develop the idea of the essential brotherhood of mankind. Especially important in their ethical doctrines was their emphasis upon the law of nature as the proper guide for moral conduct.¹

The Epicureans, founded by Epicurus (342-270 B.C.), presented a conception of society diametrically opposed to that held by the Stoics, maintaining that it had its only basis in conscious self-interest, which led to the institution of social relations in order to escape the evils and inconveniences of a non-social and isolated condition. Such a theory, it will easily be perceived, was based on that fallacious conception of society which opened the way for the later development of the doctrine of the presocial state of nature and the foundation of social relations in a contract based upon the perception of the utility of such an arrangement. With the possible exception of the Sophists² and Plato,³ Epicurus was the first to premise an original contract, though it was more after the nature of the governmental than the social contract.⁴ Thus, as compared with the cosmopolitan and idealistic Stoics, the Epicureans were marked individualists and evolutionary materialists, though they were by no means advocates of sensuality, as is often asserted.⁵

¹ Janet, *op. cit.*, I, 239-50; Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, 1891, pp. 311-40; Scherger, *The Evolution of Modern Liberty*, pp. 18-22; Stein, *Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*, pp. 218-28; and the extracts given in Bakewell, *A Source-Book of Ancient Philosophy*, pp. 269-89.

² *Supra*, pp. 178.

³ *Laws*, iii, 683-84.

⁴ The significant passages from Epicurus are preserved in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, Book X, chap. xxxi, secs. 33-35.

⁵ Bakewell, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-304; Zeller, *op. cit.*, pp. 490-98; Stein, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-30; Janet, *op. cit.*, pp. 235 f.; Giddings, *Sociology, a Lecture*, p. 17.

Polybius (203-121 B.C.), the Greek student of Roman history, is usually overlooked by students of the history of social philosophy, but he is, nevertheless, one of the most important figures in the development of that subject. His conception of social evolution—was in the main accurate. He premised the aggregation and association of primitive men as resulting from a sense of weakness and a perception of likeness. Government, he believed, arose in force and was rendered permanent by the increasing reflective action of the social mind as it gradually perceived more clearly the utility of political relations.¹ This was the argument advanced by Hume nineteen centuries later in his assault upon the doctrine of a social contract.² Polybius also made an important contribution in assigning the origin of morality and justice to the group approval or disapproval of certain practices and modes of conduct.³ In this he suggested a line of treatment exploited by writers like Bagehot and Sumner. Polybius put forth the first clear statement of the theory of reflective sympathy later developed by Spinoza, Hume, and Adam Smith.⁴ Again, he was the first writer on political science who proposed to secure liberty and governmental stability through a system of checks and balances in political organization.⁵ Finally, Polybius presented one of the clearest statements of the prevalent classical conception of the cyclical nature of the historical process—a view taken up by Machiavelli and recently revived by Le Bon and Gumplowicz.⁶

III. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AMONG THE ROMANS

Polybius was the last great Greek social philosopher.⁷ The minds of the Romans were of a legal and practical character, little given to constructive speculative philosophy. Their contribution was to advance political organization and legal development, not to formulate theories of the state and of society.⁸ The Romans, in

¹ *History of Rome*, trans. by Schuckburgh, vi, 5-6. See the selections in Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, pp. 106-17.

² *Infra*, pp. 231 f. ³ *History*, *ibid.* ⁴ *Ibid.* ⁵ *History*, vi, 11-15.

⁶ Cf. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, pp. 205 ff.; 248.

⁷ One might call attention in passing to the Greek geographer Strabo, whose contributions to descriptive sociology and the theory of physical environment were by no means insignificant.

⁸ Cf. Pollock, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

building up a world-empire, came into contact with many different legal codes, and this stimulating "contact of cultures" led to the formulation of theories of the origin and nature of laws in general.¹

While the Romans contributed little to social philosophy in the way of original theories, it is among the Roman followers of the later Greek schools of philosophy, such as the Stoics and Epicureans, that one must look for the most complete statement of those doctrines that has been preserved, since several of the Roman writers "adapted Greek principles with considerable ingenuity."²

The chief Roman representative of the Epicurean school was the great philosophic poet Lucretius (99-55 B.C.), the most original mind that Rome produced.³ Acknowledging with pride his obligations to Epicurus, he justified, by his original presentation of the course of human and social development, the title of the first great evolutionary sociologist.⁴ Correlating the current written and spoken accounts of the customs of primitive peoples with the previous theories of poets and philosophers, he produced a theory of social evolution in all its aspects which was infinitely superior to anything which was presented by any other writer down to the critical period of eighteenth-century philosophy. The struggle for existence; the survival of the fittest; the mode of life among primitive peoples; the origin of language, fire, industry, religion, domestic relations, and the arts of pleasure; the sequence of the culture ages, and the development of commercial relations are set forth with a clearness, accuracy, and modernity which precludes the possibility of entire conjecture or of the complete reading into his writings of later ideas which did not occur to him.⁵

But, powerful a thinker as was Lucretius, he had little influence upon posterity, Horace being the only later Roman writer who was much affected by Epicurean principles. The Epicurean theories

¹ Marvin, *op. cit.*, chap. v.

² Cf. Teuffel and Schwabe, *A History of Roman Literature*, I, pp. 1-2, 77-87.

³ On Lucretius, see the pretentious commentary of Masson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet* (London, 1907-9, 2 vols.).

⁴ Haddon, *History of Anthropology*, pp. 122-24.

⁵ Lucretius, *De rerum natura*, trans. by Munro, Bohn's Library, v, 325 ff; 778 ff.

were too rationalistic and dynamic for the Roman mind to grasp and were even more repugnant to the Christian writers, owing to their denunciation of "religio" as the chief cause of human misery. So it is to Cicero, a would-be eclectic with strong Stoic leanings, and to Seneca, an avowed Stoic, that one must turn for an exposition of the general political and social philosophy of the Romans.

Cicero (106-43 B.C.) followed Plato in attempting to describe an ideal commonwealth, but he did not feel the need of constructing a plan for a utopian society, since he considered that the Roman commonwealth possessed all the essential characteristics of a perfect state. He accepted Aristotle's dictum of the natural sociability of man rather than the Epicurean doctrine that society results from a sense of weakness in isolation or a perception of the utility of association, but he did emphasize the advantages of associated life while denying that they furnish the basic cause of society.¹ He also agreed with Aristotle as to the value of friendship and like-mindedness as the psychological basis of association.² From the Stoics he derived his doctrine of the brotherhood of man, and from Polybius he appropriated the theories regarding the classification and cycles of government and the value of checks and balances.³ In short, it was the summing up of the various contemporary social theories into a coherent body of thought that constituted Cicero's main achievement.

Seneca (3 B.C.-65 A.D.) is the next systematic social philosopher after Cicero among the Romans. The chief difference between the two, as far as social philosophy is concerned, was Seneca's revival of the ancient Greek conception of the primitive stage of society as a golden age⁴ which was followed by the period of the origin of the conventional institutions of society as a remedy for the evils which crept in and brought the golden age to an end. In this age of "golden innocence" mankind lived without coercive authority,

¹ *De officiis*, trans. by Edmonds, Bohn's Library, I, xvii, xliv; *De republica*, trans. by Yonge, Bohn's Library, I, xxv-xxvi. For the effect of Cicero's position on this point on mediaeval political theory cf. Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, trans. by Maitland, n. 306.

² *De officiis*, I, xvii.

³ *De republica*, I, xiv.

⁴ Cf. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, p. 187.

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gladly obeying the wise, and without any distinctions of property or caste. The main cause for the breakdown of this primitive arrangement was the origin of private property. The people became dissatisfied with common ownership, and the resulting lust after wealth and authority rendered necessary the institution of political authority to curb these growing evil propensities.¹ The importance of this doctrine is not its enunciation by Seneca, but its adoption by the Christian Fathers. They identified it with the state of man before the "Fall," and thus reinforced the already extremely retrospective character of Christian social philosophy which rendered any dynamic conception of human progress impossible.²

The Stoic doctrines among the Romans reached their highest development in Epictetus³ (about 90 A.D.) and in the emperor Marcus Aurelius⁴ (121-180 A.D.). In fact, the loss of the Greek originals have made these two writers the main sources for the Stoic doctrines of society which were presented above.

Another philosophic development among the Romans which had important consequences in the history of sociology was neo-Platonism, which found its main representative in Plotinus (204-270 A.D.) With its renunciation of the world of sense and its tendencies toward unlimited credulity and hostility to rationalism or skepticism, it furnished the general intellectual setting which was adopted by patristic and mediaeval theology and thus militated strongly against any movement toward a rational conception of social processes and institutions. Neo-Platonism, the conception of a former golden age, and the eschatological view of society, which was drawn as much from the pagan mysteries as from Christian texts, all combined to make up the unhealthy mental environment in which Christian theology and social philosophy flourished.⁵

¹ *Epistularum Moralium ad Lucilium*, ed. by Haase, xiv, 2; *The Epistles of Lucius Annaeus Seneca*, trans. by Morell (London, 1786, 2 vols.), II, 115-36, Letter XC.

² Cf. Carlyle, *A History of Medieval Political Theory*, I, 24-25, 117, 127-28.

³ *Enchiridion et Dissertationes*, trans. by Long in Bohn's Library.

⁴ *Meditations*, also translated by Long; some significant selections from these writers are given by Bakewell, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-39.

⁵ Cf. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, Appendix, 336 ff.; and Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*; for selections from Plotinus, see Bakewell, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-93.

Julius Caesar in his *Commentaries*¹ and Tacitus² in his description of the Germans presented studies in descriptive sociology and ethnology which were hardly surpassed until the very recent studies of primitive culture areas by trained ethnologists. As is the case with Herodotus, recent critical historical investigations have tended to confirm rather than to question the main contentions of both Caesar and Tacitus.

Cicero³ and Vitruvius⁴ revived the environmental theories of Hippocrates and Aristotle and restated them so as to utilize the arguments to support the contention that the gods had favored the location of Rome beyond all other places. This doctrine of the general superiority of peoples situated in middle latitudes was handed down through the Middle Ages in the writings of Vegetius, Paul the Deacon, Aquinas, and Ibn Khaldun and received a systematic exposition in the *Republique* of Bodin.

Finally, there must be noted the important conception developed by the Roman lawyers regarding the origin and nature of political authority. It is the opinion of recent and reliable authorities that from the second to the sixth centuries A.D. there was but one legal theory of the origin of this authority, and that was that it had its foundation in the consent of the people. However remote from popular consent might be the method by which the emperor at any time arose to power, the theory remained the same. That this conception had a very great influence upon the later developments of the theory of a social, and especially of a governmental, contract, and popular sovereignty, is beyond doubt.⁵

IV. THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF EARLY AND PATRISTIC CHRISTIANITY

The view of the founders of Christianity in regard to the nature of society was not fundamentally different from that of the Stoics, namely, the brotherhood of man in the spirit of God. However, the Christians were a little more universal and democratic in their

¹ Cf. Holmes, *Julius Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*.

² Cf. Boissier, *Tacitus*, trans. by Hutchison.

³ Cicero *De republica* i. 3.

⁴ *The Ten Books on Architecture*, trans. by Morgan, Book VI, chap. i.

⁵ Cf. Carlyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-77; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-44; Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-29.

doctrine, since the Stoics had in reality meant the brotherhood of the wise or of those who could participate through their reason in the divine logos. Christianity tended to break down this useful distinction between the wise and the ignorant and to emphasize the possibility of participation in universal brotherhood through the medium of faith and belief rather than through the exercise of reason.¹

The social doctrines of Jesus were embodied in the highly idealistic and plastic exhortations to love, service, and recognition of human brotherhood, and were not reduced, or intended to be reduced, to any rigid scheme of dogmas or ritual, and were on that account all the more valuable and adjustable to changing conditions.² It was inevitable, however, that, when the attempt was made to put these lofty ideals into operation on a large scale and to perfect an ecclesiastical organization, they would be compressed into the narrow bounds of dogmatic interpretation and ritualistic expression from which they have not yet escaped, and which through a greater part of the history of Christendom have been perverted from a means to an end into an end in themselves.

The first, and perhaps the greatest, figure in this movement was St. Paul. He proclaimed the doctrine of love, the organic nature of society, and the necessity of civil government to repress evil; but at the same time he was busy instructing the "brethren" in matters of creed and organization, and had instituted that greatest of Christian rites—the Eucharist.³ St. Paul initiated the movement, which was carried on by the Fathers until, by the fifth century A.D., the doctrines of Jesus had been perverted from a few plastic ideals to that rigid, dogmatic, ritualistic, and eschatological system of creed and organization known as mediaeval Christianity.⁴

¹ Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, p. 239; Scherger, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-22; Carlyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-85; Janet, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 278-79; Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 360.

² Shailer Matthews, *The Social Teachings of Jesus*, pp. 16, 115, 151; Stevens, *The Teachings of Jesus*, pp. 117-18. For opinions and alignment of authorities upon the much-discussed problem of whether the Kingdom of God was an earthly social conception or eschatological, see Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*, pp. 32, 296 ff.; Stevens, *op. cit.*, pp. 65, 166.

³ Carlyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90, 97-98; Conybeare, *Myth, Magic, and Morals*, chaps. i, xiv.

⁴ Cf. Bury, *A History of the Freedom of Thought*, chap. iii.

Yet, in spite of its crudities and misconceptions, the modern writer must not fail to recognize the very great importance and significance of the Roman Catholic church in mediaeval life. Through its elaborate sacramental system it provided the primitive European mind with an effective instrument for meeting and successfully dealing with the dangers, mysteries, and perplexities of existence.¹

The Christian Fathers, as a source of religious dogma and authority hardly second to the Scriptures, are most important in the history of social philosophy. While their doctrines cover some six centuries, nevertheless their thoughts possess sufficient coherence to allow the patristic period to be discussed as a whole.² The fundamental doctrines of the Fathers upon the origin, nature, and end of society may be summarized under the following propositions: (1) Mankind is by nature social; society thus being a natural product in agreement with the ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. (2) Seneca's "golden" state of nature, with an absence of coercive government, was identified with the state of man before the "Fall." (3) Civil government was rendered necessary by that "Fall" as a remedy for the crimes and vices of mankind. (4) While government was thus rendered necessary by the "Fall," nevertheless it was a divine institution devised to curb further evil, and hence the rulers derived their power from God, were the agents of God, and rebellion was a sin. (5) Whatever practical value social institutions might have in rendering more endurable this earthly life, their service was only fleeting and, at best, immeasurably less important than preparation for the institutions of the heavenly kingdom. Thus social reform or progress was regarded as relatively unimportant, and it was held that one might better endure social inconveniences than to jeopardize his salvation by dissipating his energy in attempting to improve earthly conditions.³ Their theory that the poor were a part of the divine order, provided as a means to advance the spiritual welfare of alms-givers,

¹ J. T. Shotwell, *Unpublished Lectures on Paganism and Christianity*.

² Carlyle, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

³ Justin Martyr, "First Apology," in *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. I, chap. xvii; Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," *ibid.*, Vol. I, Book V, chap. xxiv, sec. 1; Lactantius,

dominated the methods of charity and relief until the English Poor Law of 1834.

The eschatological conception, with its disregard for earthly values and institutions, found its highest development in Augustine's *City of God* (written 413-426). Here the doctrine was set forth with great vigor, and the only criterion set up for measuring the excellence of human institutions was the aid or hindrance which they offered to the attainment of heavenly salvation.¹

V. MEDIAEVAL SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

The social philosophy of the mediaeval period grew naturally out of the elements which were fused in the development of mediæval civilization. From the Romans there came the conception, most clearly expressed by Seneca, of the conventional or artificial nature of social institutions as a result of the descent from a primitive golden age; and the doctrines of the lawyers upholding the idea of popular sovereignty and popular consent as the basis of imperial power. From Christianity came the notion of the "Fall," which harmonized well with the pagan conception of the descent from a golden age; the doctrine of the divine character of political authority; and the dogma of the independence or autonomy of the spiritual or religious life. The new states of Northern Europe contributed the notion that political authority was but the delegated authority of the whole community, thus agreeing with, and giving added emphasis to, the legal theory of the Roman lawyers in regard to popular sovereignty.² Again, the Christian conception of the

"Divine Institutes," *ibid.*, Vol. VII, Book VI, chap. x; "The Workmanship of God," *ibid.*, Vol. VII, chap. iv; Tertullian, "Scorpiace," *ibid.*, Vol. III, chap. xiv; "Apology," Vol. III, chap. xxiv; Athanasius, "Against the Heathen," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. IV, sec. 2; Ambrose, "De officiis," *ibid.*, Vol. X, Book I, chap. xxviii; Augustine, "On the Good of Marriage," *ibid.*, Vol. III, sec. 1; "The City of God," *ibid.*, Vol. II, Book V, chap. xix, Book XIX, chaps. v, xv; St. Jerome, letter quoted in Robinson, *Readings in European History*, I, 86-87; Gregory the Great, "Pastoral Rule," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. XII, Book I, chap. iii; Isadore of Seville, *Etymologies*, XV, 2; Carlyle, *op. cit.*, chaps. viii-xv; Gierke, *op. cit.*, notes, 16-18, 137.

¹ See especially Book XIX, chap. xvii.

² These diverse sources of mediæval political theory are admirably summarized by Carlyle, "The Sources of Medieval Political Theory," in the *American Historical Review*, October 1913, pp. 1-12; and more elaborately analyzed in his *History of Medieval Political Theory*, Vol. I, *passim*, and Vol. III, Introduction.

brotherhood of man and the organic unity of Christendom, together with the sharp differentiation of classes in the mediaeval period into ecclesiastics, princes, warriors, and laborers, tended to revive the platonic view of the organic unity of society as based upon the division of labor.¹ The revival of Aristotle by the Scholastics in the later Middle Ages introduced Aristotle's emphasis upon the natural sociability of man and led to that final harmony and synthesis of the mediaeval period which maintained that, while society was a natural product, government was also necessary and natural in order to lend safety and stability to society. These are the chief tendencies in mediaeval social philosophy. Attention may now be turned to the individual presentation of these doctrines and to a consideration of their variations in different periods.²

There was little advance in social philosophy from the sixth to the ninth century. While the term Middle Ages has now been relegated to the field of rhetoric, there can be no doubt of the reality of the term Dark Ages, which applies to the period between the beginning of the barbarian invasions and the intellectual revival of the ninth century, represented by such men as Agobard of Lyons, Rhabanus Maurus, Hincmar of Rheims, and John Scotus Erigena.³

As far as there was any interest in the subject of social and political philosophy, the views of the Fathers were adopted without question in the encyclopedic compilations of the time; the chief authority of the period being Isadore of Seville (d. 636), who was a transitional figure between the patristic period and the Dark Ages. The chief practical political problem was the adjustment of the

¹ This fundamental, but often overlooked, phase of mediaeval social philosophy is ably presented by Ernest Barker in his article on "Medieval Ideas of Unity," in *The Unity of Western Civilization*, ed. by F. S. Marvin (Oxford, 1915), pp. 91-212.

² Marvin, *The Living Past*, chap. vi. To get a proper conception of the mental atmosphere of the Middle Ages, which is essential to any comprehension of the social philosophy of the period, one should consult Taylor, *The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*, pp. 18-56; Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Empire*, Book V; Taylor, *The Medieval Mind*, Vol. I, chaps. iii-v; and Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought*. The chief sources of mediaeval social philosophy are tabulated by Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, pp. lxii-lxxvii.

³ See Shotwell article, "Middle Ages," in 11th edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*; Taylor, *The Medieval Mind*, I, chap. x.

division of power between state and church. The Fathers had prepared the ground for this struggle by their acceptance of St. Paul's doctrine that government was a divine institution. But the church was also divine, and thus arose the problem of deciding the primacy of the claims of two institutions, each with divine and hence infinite powers. The adjustment of the relations between these "two powers" absorbed also the main interest of the writers of this period and later culminated in the extreme theocratic view of the state as presented in the *Polycraticus* of John of Salisbury, and in the defense of imperial authority by Peter DuBois and Marsiglio of Padua.¹

Even the intellectual awakening of the ninth century contributed little to social theory. The writers accepted the common tradition of a primitive state of nature, full of disorder and inconveniences, to remedy which political authority was instituted.²

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, however, there were interesting new developments. The revival of Roman law brought with it theories of popular sovereignty, and the canon law revived the patristic conception of a primitive golden age followed by the "Fall," which rendered political organization essential for the preservation of order.³

The fiery priest Manegold of Lautenbach (d. after 1085), in his defence of Gregory VII, clearly enunciated the principle of a governmental compact as the basis of political authority, apparently for the first time in the history of Western Europe, though his statement was but the definite formulation of the general theory of the time.⁴ Tyranny was defined as the breaking of the original contract by which the ruler was appointed, and it constituted a valid basis for rebellion.⁵

¹ For this period, see Littlejohn, *The Political Theory of the Schoolmen and Grotius* (1896), Part I, pp. 11-48; though somewhat diffuse, this work is the most complete exposition in English of the scholastic political and social theory.

² Cf. Carlyle, *History of Medieval Political Theory*, I, 211-12; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-33.

³ Cf. *Ibid.*, II, 56-74; 143-44.

⁴ Carlyle, *American Historical Review*, October, 1913, p. 8, and *History of Medieval Political Theory*, III, 160-69.

⁵ Poole, *op. cit.*, p. 232; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, p. 33; Gierke, *op. cit.*, nn. 130, 138.

The theocratic doctrine of the state received its fullest exposition in the *Polycraticus* of John of Salisbury (1120-82), an English churchman who had studied under Abelard. The inferiority of the prince to the priest is emphasized at great length, tyranny is defined, and tyrannicide is justified. In addition to this he outlined the most detailed analogy between the individual organism and the state that had yet been produced.¹

The period of Scholastic political philosophy began in its true sense in the thirteenth century, with the work of Albertus Magnus (1193-1280). It had its origin in the introduction of the works of Aristotle through the medium of the Arab civilization of Spain and in the desire to give the Christian theology a systematic philosophical expression, for which purpose the philosophy of Aristotle was admirably adapted. Albertus incorporated the *Politics* of Aristotle in his commentary upon political problems and opened the way for the work of his greater pupil, St. Thomas Aquinas, the most noted of the Scholastic writers.²

While Aquinas (1227-74) died at the early age of forty-six, he left a tremendous mass of writings, of which his *De regimine principum* (completed by Aegidius Romanus) was one of the most suggestive and systematic of the treatises on social and political philosophy that appeared during mediaeval times. As a scholastic philosopher he naturally accepted the dictum of Aristotle regarding the inherent sociability of man. Civil society comprehends three ideas: first, that man is by nature social; secondly, that in society there is a community of purpose and interest, since only through social relations can man realize his own best interests; and, thirdly,

¹ Carlyle, *History of Medieval Political Theory*, III, 126 f., 136 ff.; Gierke, *op. cit.*, p. 24, and n. 76; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-47. It must be borne in mind that these mediaeval analogies were purely anthropomorphic and not genetically related to the later biological analogies.

What was, perhaps, an even more extreme statement of the ecclesiastical claim for the primacy of the church over the civil power was embodied in the *Summa de potestate ecclesiastica* of Augustinus Triumphus, written in the fourteenth century during the papal "captivity" at Avignon. However, this had little practical significance, for, as Professor Dunning has well remarked, the papal pretensions increased about in proportion to the decline of their actual powers.

² Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-42.

that a superior power is necessary in society to direct it for the common good, and that the ruler may thus utilize his superior talent for the benefit of the community.¹ The state had its origin primarily in the natural patriarchal rule of the heads of families, but in order to form extensive and efficient political organizations it was necessary to delegate this power to a common superior through a governmental compact.² But Aquinas proceeded to prove his true scholastic spirit by blending with the primarily Aristotelian theory the dogmas of the church that political authority came ultimately from God alone, though he might confer it through the medium of the people, and its corollary that political power was inferior to the spiritual.³ Again, he denied that the city-state was the ideal political organization and made a step in the direction of Machiavelli in declaring his preference for a province made up of several cities.⁴ He also followed John of Salisbury in outlining the organic analogy in the state,⁵ and his theories regarding the influences of climate and environment upon society embodied the tradition common to classical times and handed down in the works of Aristotle and Vegetius, with some original comments by himself.⁶ Finally, Aquinas achieved rather questionable fame by his influence in formulating the rigid rules for economic transactions which were highly obstructive to mediæval trade and industry.⁷

✓ Dante (1265-1321) offered some interesting suggestions in his plan for a universal monarchy, co-ordinate in authority with the church, and designed to put an end to international strife, to the

¹ *De regimine principum*, I, i; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-74; 84-87; 104-8; Crahay, *La Politique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (1896), chaps. i-ii. See the selections given by Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, pp. 123-35, particularly pp. 129-33.

² Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85; Coker, *op. cit.*, pp. 129 ff.

³ Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 117, 144 ff.; Gierke, *op. cit.*, nn. 98, 100; Crahay, *op. cit.*, chaps. iii, v.

⁴ *De regimine*, I, i; Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-98; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-103; Crahay, *op. cit.*, chap. iv.

⁵ Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, p. 90; Gierke, *op. cit.*, p. 25, n. 81.

⁶ *De regimine*, II, i-iv; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-96.

⁷ Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-94; Hancy, *A History of Economic Thought*, pp. 75-78.

end "that society might realize its function of unhampered exercise of the intellectual faculties of man in speculation and action."¹ Further, in *The Banquet*, Dante presents an interesting interpretation of the process of imitation. In discussing how fame and notoriety develop, he illustrates how imitation develops in a geometric ratio and is refracted by its media.²

Dante, with his co-ordination of state and church, in his doctrines was midway between Aquinas and Peter DuBois (1255-1321) and Marsiglio of Padua (1270-1342).

Peter DuBois, in his *De recuperatione terre sancte*, defended Philip the Fair in his struggle with Boniface VIII and warned the Pope not to meddle with temporal affairs, since such interference in the past had cost the Christians the possession of the Holy Land. He outlined a general program of social reform in which, among other enlightening suggestions, he advocated international arbitration to settle disputes between nations.³

Marsiglio in his *Defensor pacis*, the most modern and original work produced during the mediaeval period, attacked the church with something of the spirit and modernity of Voltaire. He declared that the priests were merely the ministers of salvation, and denied that they possessed the power of forgiving sins or the right to interfere in temporal matters.⁴

In his strictly social and political philosophy Marsiglio was also highly original. He accounted for the origin of society on a utilitarian basis. Society was essential to mankind for the carrying on of those co-operative activities necessary to existence and comfort. But unregulated society was likely to degenerate into disorder, and hence civil government was indispensable. This political authority

¹ *De monarchia*, ed. and trans. by Henry (1904); Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-28.

² *The Banquet*, trans. by Hillard (1889), Book I, chap. iii, sec. 2. For an excellent summary of the mediaeval ideas of the organic unity of society which culminated in Aquinas and Dante, see Barker, "Medieval Ideas of Unity," in *The Unity of Western Civilization*, ed. by F. S. Marvin, pp. 91-121.

³ F. M. Powicke, "Pierre DuBois, a Medieval Radical," in *Historical Essays of Owens College, Manchester*, ed. by Tout and Tait (1907), pp. 169-91; Figgis, *From Gerson to Grotius* (1916 ed.), pp. 31-32.

⁴ Cf. selections from the *Defensor pacis*, given in Robinson, *Readings in European History*, I, 495-97; Gierke, *op. cit.*, p. 51 and n. 182.

was merely delegated by the people, in whose hands reposed sovereign power.¹ Marsiglio also emphasized the unity of society by outlining the organic analogy in an original way in which the six estates or professions were made to correspond to the organs in the individual organism.² Further, by his separation of politics from theology, Marsiglio made an advance toward Machiavelli's separation of ethics from politics.

Finally, Nicholas of Cues (1401-64) and Aeneas Sylvius (1404-64) fittingly closed the mediaeval period by presenting the most perfect development of two of its most characteristic social and political doctrines.

The former in his *De concordatio catholica* presented the most elaborate development of the analogy between the organism and the state that had yet appeared. He also introduced the conception of political pathology and, reviving the platonic figure, designated the ruler as the physician-in-chief to the sick state, prescribing for its ills according to the best advice of political philosophers, past and present.³ In the more strictly political aspects of his theories Nicholas emphasized the doctrine of consent as the basis of political authority and outlined an original scheme of representation in government.⁴

Aeneas Sylvius (1405-64), in his *De ortu et auctoritate imperii Romani*, advanced the clearest distinction between the social and the governmental contracts that is to be found in the writings of a mediaeval author.⁵

VI. EARLY MODERN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

The social philosophy of the early modern period had its definite environmental basis. The travels and explorations in the Old and New Worlds had provided an even more extensive field for the contact of cultures than had existed at the time of the

¹ *Defensor pacis*, Book I; see selections in Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, pp. 160-67; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-36; Gierke, *op. cit.*, pp. 47 f., and nn. 155, 170, 267.

² Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, p. 230; Gierke, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29, nn. 99, 302.

³ Gierke, *op. cit.*, p. 24, n. 79.

⁴ Gierke, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 66, nn. 171, 234, 238.

⁵ *De ortu*, chaps. i-ii; Gierke, *op. cit.*, n. 306; Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-83.

expansion of Rome and introduced a large number of new ideas and customs. The Commercial Revolution, which brought in on a moderate scale the dynamic force of capital, tended to disintegrate the stability, routine, and provincialism of the mediaeval rural economy. The new stock of capital enabled the rulers to command a paid officialdom and army and thus to reduce to subjection the recalcitrant feudal lords and to establish the first centralized and unified national states. Hence the theories of two men so different in many ways as Machiavelli and Sir Thomas More have a common social background. One reflected the "conspiratorial" society, which grew out of an already disintegrated mediaeval social order, and presented a practical plan for its reconstruction; the other wrote as a critic of the process whereby the new order was being established and suggested a more equitable and humane method. In the theories of Bodin, who wrote as a citizen of the most perfectly unified of the new national states, one finds an investigation of the origin, nature, and justification of the new political and social order. *In this respect Bodin pointed the way for the main center of orientation of social philosophy for the next two centuries.* The most important fact to bear in mind in regard to the social background of the theory of this period is that the more progressive historians have unquestionably demonstrated that it was the Commercial Revolution, rather than the Renaissance or the Reformation, which destroyed the mediaeval order and laid the foundations of the modern era.²

It is perhaps typical of the process whereby mediaeval civilization was disintegrated by the intrusion of elements from without, to find that the first writer to possess the modern dynamic ideas of progress and the unity of the social process was the Arab historian and statesman *Ibn Khaldun* (1332-1406). At the outset in his *Prolegomena to Universal History*, which is the systematic exposition of his theoretical views, he draws a sharp distinction between the popular episodical history and history as he conceives of it—namely,

² Marvin, *The Living Past*, chap. vii; Cunningham, *Western Civilization*, II, 162-224; Hayes, *Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, I, 27-73.

as a science tracing the origin and development of civilization.¹ Man, he maintains, is by nature social, since his wants are so varied and extensive that they can be supplied only through co-operative effort. But the conflict of desires produces quarrels and leads to the necessity of instituting government to insure order and stability.² With almost the emphasis of Professor Giddings, he insists upon the necessity of homogeneity for the existence of a stable state.³ His analysis of the tribal society of the Arabs was probably unsurpassed as a study of this period of human society until the time of Morgan.⁴ Again, his analysis of the influence of physical environment upon society was more thorough than any other study of this subject until the time of Bodin, if not until that of Montesquieu.⁵ But the most important of the innovations of this interesting writer was his grasp of the unity and continuity of the historical process. In sharp contrast to the static conceptions of the prevailing Christian historiography, he grasped that fundamental conception that the stages of civilization are in a constant process of change, like the life of the individual. He pointed out clearly the co-operation of psychic and environmental factors in this process of historical development.⁶ All in all, Khaldun rather than Vico has the best claim to the honor of having founded the philosophy of history, and his view of the factors involved in the historical process was sounder and more modern than that of the Italian of three centuries later.⁷

The greatest social philosopher of the period conventionally known as the Renaissance, but which has been superseded in the terminology of the more progressive historians by idea of the Commercial Revolution, was Nicolo Machiavelli (1469-1527). He

¹ *Prolégomènes historiques d'Ibn Khaldun*, trans. by M.G. De Slane, in *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la bibliothèque impériale*, Vols. XIX-XXI (Paris, 1862-68), XIX, 4.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 86-90, 291 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 270 ff., 291 ff., 318 ff. ⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 90 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 254-317.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59, 90 ff., 270 ff., 324 ff.

⁷ Convenient summaries of the contributions of Khaldun are to be found in Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, pp. 158 ff.; and DeGreef, *Le Transformisme social*, pp. 115-18.

advanced beyond Plato and Aristotle in separating ethics from politics and proceeded to make one of the most acute analyses of human nature which is to be found in the history of social philosophy. A perfect child of the conspiritual society which formed his political environment,¹ his analysis was frankly based upon the premise of man's intriguing self-interest and the insatiability of human desire as the mainsprings of all human activity. He further maintained that material prosperity is amply sufficient to satisfy this desire in so far as it can be quenched.² In his *Prince* and *Discourses* (the latter is the less well known, but by far the most valuable work) he logically deduced from these pessimistic views of human nature the methods which are to be followed by a successful ruler of a monarchy and of a republic, respectively. The former was the greatest sociological study of the phenomena of leadership and impression that had been made.³ Again, there was a beginning of a conception of social dynamics in his criticism of the ideals of social stability and localism as expressed by Plato and Aristotle, and in his dictum that a state must expand and develop or decay.⁴ Finally, Machiavelli took social philosophy out of the realm of abstract speculation and made a beginning toward putting it on the firm foundation of historical induction.⁵ But in spite of these contributions, Machiavelli's analysis of society was not synthetic

¹ Cf. Giddings, *Historical and Descriptive Sociology*, pp. 13, 52-54. Mention might be made here of Professor Giddings' ingenious attempt at a correlation between the different varieties of social and political theories and the type of population, which latter is in turn dependent upon the environmental conditions in which it develops. He thus finds a very definite environmental basis for not only the Machiavellian type of social theory but also for the group-conflict, legal-sovereignty, contract, natural-right, evolutionary, idealistic, and utopian theories, in fact, for all of the great historic attempts to interpret social and political processes; see his "A Theory of Social Causation," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 3d series, Vol. V, No. 2, pp. 172-74; his article on "Sociology" in the *New International Encyclopedia*; and "The Concepts and Methods of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1904, pp. 169-70.

² *Discourses*, trans. by Detmold, Book I, chap. xxxvii.

³ The best summary of Machiavelli's doctrines in this regard is to be found in Giddings, *Sociology, a Lecture*, pp. 18-19.

⁴ *Discourses*, Book I, chap. vi.

⁵ Cf. John Morley, "Machiavelli," in *Critical Miscellanies*, 4th series, pp. 1-53; and Fueter, *Histoire de l'historiographic moderne*, pp. 75-83.

or well balanced, and his work was rather a handbook of political motives and a guide for the self-seeking despot or an imperialistic republic than a systematic theory of society.¹

— Sir Thomas More (1478-1535) was the leading North European social philosopher of the period of Machiavelli. He is noted for his incisive indictment of the political, economic, and social evils of his time, and more particularly for the ideal commonwealth which he outlined as a remedy for these evils. Though More's *Utopia* left more freedom to the individual than Plato's scheme, it seems that he regarded his plan as practicable, while Plato has admitted that his communistic ideal was not possible of realization in the present stage of human enlightenment. While the lofty moral tone of More is in sharp contrast with the cynicism of Machiavelli, the latter more faithfully reflected the tendencies of the period.²

The Protestant Reformation gave little impulse to a more critical or synthetic investigation of social phenomena. While the defection of the Protestants from the ecclesiastical organization of the church of Rome gave them a less effective organization for the crushing of the spirit and practice of free inquiry and generalization as to the basis of the social order, the Reformation was intellectually as retrogressive as Catholic Christianity. In fact, the "predestinarian anthropology" of Calvin was even more depressing than the older idea of the "Fall of Man," for it not only proclaimed the unspeakable depravity of man, but also emphasized the essential ineffectiveness of individual effort at improvement. Reason was denounced by Luther as seductive and dangerous and as incompatible with the proper exercise of religion. On the other hand, it is possible that the secession of the Protestant princes from the Empire made for individualism in political theory; and it is certain that the revival by the Protestants of the law of nature as a

¹ Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 293 ff. For an extremely critical analysis of Machiavelli, see Novicow, "Machiavel et la politique moderne," *Rev. Internat. Soc.* (1910), pp. 720-54.

² More's "Utopia," in Henry Morley's *Ideal Commonwealths* (1885), pp. 53-167; cf. Guthrie, *Socialism before the French Revolution*, chaps. ii-iii.

substitute for the ecclesiastical power as a check upon tyranny, had an important influence upon the later development of the theories of the state of nature and natural rights.¹

The French publicist and philosopher Jean Bodin (1530-96) presented a peculiar mixture of blind obscurantism and brilliant contributions to political and social philosophy. His work in support of the witchcraft persecutions is as sorry a piece of bigotry and superstition as could well be imagined,² while his *A Method for the Easy Understanding of History*, and his *Six Books concerning the State* (*De republica libri sex*) were two of the most suggestive works on history and political theory that were written before the present period.

Bodin approached nearer to a synthetic exposition of the social process than any other writer had done since the time of Aristotle. He traced the genesis of society from an original family which expanded and dispersed, but in time was reunited through the operation of the social instinct and a perception of the utility of co-operative activity. Society, according to Bodin, was essentially a union of lesser constituent groups organized for the purpose of carrying on trade, worship, and similar activities. But while society itself might have had this peaceful origin, the state and sovereign power developed in force through the conquest of one group by another.³

It is not difficult to discern the similarity between Bodin's conception of the origin of the state and that held by Gumpłowicz and his school, and his definition of sovereignty as the "supreme power in a state unrestrained by law" is the starting-point of modern political science.⁴ In his doctrine of the single-family origin of society he followed Aristotle and anticipated Blackstone

¹ Cf. Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 117-18, and the article "Reformation" in the 11th ed. of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*; Dunning, *Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, chap. i.

² Cf. Lecky, *History of Rationalism*, Vol. I, chap. i.

³ Bodin, *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale*, done into English by Richard Knolles (London, 1606), pp. 47 ff., 262 ff.

⁴ Coker, *op. cit.*, pp. 230 ff.; cf. Merriam, *A History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau*, pp. 13-17; Figgis, *op. cit.*, pp. 143 f.

and Maine. His theory of the group basis of civil society gave Althusius the suggestions which he developed to that extreme now characteristic of the writings of Gumplowicz and most German sociologists. In co-ordinating ethics and politics, he paved the way for Grotius, and his suggestions as to the influence of sympathy in society were in line with the later developments of this doctrine by Spinoza, Hume, Ferguson, Adam Smith, and Sutherland. By premising a lawless state of primitive freedom, he gave an impetus to that old tradition which received its fullest elaboration a century later in the writings of the Contract School, with its assumption of an unregulated state of nature.

In his work on historical interpretation he presented one of the first attempts at a philosophy of history, a line of investigation earlier attempted by Ibn Khaldun and later exploited by Vico, Voltaire, Turgot, Herder, Condorcet, Comte, and Buckle, and which still awaits a satisfactory completion.¹ Finally, his analysis of the influence of physical environment upon society and politics was the most elaborate and systematic that had yet appeared, though not as original as is usually affirmed; and it may have furnished Montesquieu with many suggestions. He interpreted the conventional doctrine of the superiority of the peoples of the temperate climates so as to establish the pre-eminence of the French.²

VII. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DURING THE GENERAL DOMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF A SOCIAL CONTRACT

The formulation and well-nigh universal prevalence of the social contract theory of the origin of organized society from 1600 to 1800 are somewhat more difficult definitely to account for on the basis of the existing political and social environment than any of the preceding type of social and political theory. Professor Carlyle has made clear the general diffusion of the doctrine of a

¹ Cf. Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-200.

² On Bodin, see Meuten, *Bodin's Theorie von der Beeinflussung des politischen Lebens durch ihre geographische Lage* (1904); Baudrillart, *Jean Bodin et son temps* (1853); Fournol, *Bodin, prédecesseur de Montesquieu* (1896); Dunning, *A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, pp. 81-123; Figgis, *op. cit.*, pp. 143 ff.; and Chauviré, *Jean Bodin, auteur de la République* (1914).

governmental compact throughout the mediaeval period,¹ and it has already been pointed out that Aeneas Sylvius had apparently made the important distinction between the governmental and the later or social compact. Professor Giddings has insisted that the social contract theory grows up naturally out of a society where political relations have long been based on parliamentary procedure and sound legal foundations, and where there is a considerable degree of homogeneity in the population.² The fact that the first definite instances of the enunciation of the social contract theory may be assigned to churchmen, who had been under the sway of the long-established legal systems of the Catholic church and the Church of England, lends plausibility to this theory. Again, Professor Ritchie has pointed out the prevalence of actual contractual associations in the seventeenth century, such as the Mayflower Compact, the Solemn League and Covenant, and the associations of the Commonwealth period, and has further indicated the value of the contract doctrine to those writers who were seriously concerned with establishing the basis and justification of political liberty.³ Finally, it needs to be noted that the contract theory bore a definite relation to the economic and political conditions of the period. The growth of capital had made possible the existence of strong national states and had emphasized the importance of contracts in the sphere of economic activities. The origin and justification of these powerful political organizations offered an attractive problem to the social and political philosophers, and the doctrine of a social contract was the first important modern philosophical solution of this problem. It should always be borne in mind that the majority of the exponents of the contract theory did not advance that theory as a historical explanation of the origin of the state, but rather as an analytical interpretation of its existence. Many eager critics have made undeserved capital out of a misunderstanding of this important aspect of the contract theory,

¹ *American Historical Review*, October, 1913, pp. 6-8; *A History of Medieval Political Theory*, III, 168, 185.

² *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1904, pp. 169-70.

³ "Contributions to the History of the Social Contract Theory," in the *Political Science Quarterly*, 1891, pp. 665-67.

though Hume showed that its analytical foundations were as weak as its historical basis.¹

The work of the English churchman Richard Hooker (1552-1600) was almost as suggestive as that of Bodin.² While his great treatise, *The Laws of an Ecclesiastical Polity* (references are to the edition of 1821), dealt primarily with the defense of the Anglican church, he devoted a portion of the first book to a discussion of society and government in general.

Hooker emphasized the fact that government originated in the consent of the governed and must be administered according to law, and thus agreed with the previous doctrines of a governmental compact and popular sovereignty.³ This doctrine of a contract as the origin of government was an old one; it had appeared in the writings of the Sophists, of Epicurus, Lucretius, the Roman lawyers, Manegold of Lautenbach, Aquinas, Marsiglio, William of Ockam, Nicholas of Cues, and the Monarchomachs of the sixteenth century, such as Hotman, Languet, Knox, and Buchanan, but no previous writer, with the possible exception of Aeneas Sylvius, had advanced the doctrine of a social contract, namely, that society arose by the deliberate agreement of men to escape from the evils of a presocial condition.⁴ Hooker, however, explicitly states this doctrine of a social contract, and it seems certain that he may be accorded the rather questionable honor of having originated the theory as far as practical results are concerned.⁵ However, Hooker did not go so far as Hobbes and claim that man in the state of nature was unsociable. He agreed with Aristotle on this point,

¹ For the fullest discussion of the environmental background of the social contract theory, see F. Atger, *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social*, pp. 44-49, 91-94, 134-55, 226-52.

² Cf. Scherger, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

³ *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book I, chap. x.

⁴ For a good discussion of the difference between these concepts, see Willoughby, *The Nature of the State*, pp. 55-56; for the best historical treatment of the social contract theory, see F. Atger, *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social* (Paris, 1906).

⁵ *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book I, chap. x; cf. Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63; Tozer, *Rousseau's Social Contract*, Introduction, p. 10; Ritchie, "Contributions to the History of the Social Contract Theory," *Political Science Quarterly*, VI (1891), 666.

but asserted that sociability must be supplemented by a covenant which embodies the rules according to which association is to be guided and restrained.¹ Many other suggestions of interest were advanced by Hooker, but especially important was his reliance upon reason rather than authority, which marked a break with scholasticism.²

Another churchman of this time, the Spanish Jesuit Francis Suarez (1548-1617), in his *Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore*, expanded the doctrines of Aquinas by devoting especial attention to the function of law as a regulating principle in human association. To Suarez, man was almost a "legal animal," so minutely did he analyze his dependence upon law.³ In this respect he made his chief advances beyond Aristotle and Aquinas, for he accepted their dictum that man is by nature social.

Another important element in the work of Suarez was his harmonizing of the doctrine of popular sovereignty with the theory that monarchy is the best type of government. While the supreme power resides in the people, they may alienate it from themselves and confer it upon the ruler by an act of popular will, but once this power is delegated, it is irrevocable, except in case of tyranny on the part of the monarch.⁴

Suarez' contemporary and fellow-Jesuit, the Spanish writer Mariana (1536-1624), offered an interesting interpretation of the early history of human society. In the beginning men had lived like animals, without authority, guided only by instinct, but free from the greed and immoralities of civilization. However, man had greater wants than other animals, his offspring was less rapid in developing maturity, and he was less protected from dangers by his natural equipment. Therefore, to live in safety and comfort men had to group themselves together and submit to the authority of some capable leader who was able to direct the group for the general

¹ *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book I, chap. x.

² *Ibid.*, Book I, chaps. v-vii; Dunning, *A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, p. 210.

³ *Op. cit.*, Book I, "On Law in General."

⁴ Cf. Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-96; Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-49.

welfare.¹ Thus, Mariana, while premising a pre-political state of nature, did not support the doctrine of the social contract, but rather declared for the instinctive sociability of man and the necessity for human co-operation. Mariana's picture of the state of nature probably approached nearer to that advanced by Rousseau in his famous second *Discourse* than that of any writer of the period. Again, his theory of the influence of the prolongation of infancy is directly in line with that elaborated by John Fiske.²

The German jurist Althusius (1557-1638), who was the first writer after Aeneas Sylvius on the continent of Europe to enunciate the doctrine of a social contract, also greatly elaborated the concept. He claimed that society was nothing but a contractual union of the various ascending grades of social groups, from the family to the state, and that the only foundation for the unity of any of these groups lay in a contract which embodied the rules of conduct and the regulation of the relation of command and obedience between the different members of the association. Althusius thus ignored the individual as a member of the state and submerged him in the constituent groups which went to make up civil society.³ Althusius thus is the precursor of the idea of a federal state and of the juristic concept of group personality as elaborated by Gierke and his English disciples, Maitland and Figgis. Another obvious resemblance, if not a genetic relationship, is to the theory of Gumpłowicz and Bentley, which is based upon the assumed group composition of the state. He thus carried to an extreme both the social contract ideas and the theory of Bodin that society and the state were primarily composed of lesser constituent groups and not of individuals as such. In addition he adopted Bodin's conception of the nature of sovereignty, but went beyond him in declaring that it must

¹ *De rege et regis institutione*, ed. of 1605, chap. i, "Homo natura est animal sociabile."

² Nothing could be more ridiculous than to assign the origin of this idea to Fiske, as it had been perceived by Anaximander and was the common property of all writers who discussed social origins for two centuries before the time of Fiske; Locke, Hume, Montesquieu, and Comte, among others, discussed the doctrine at considerable length.

³ *Politica Methodice digesta*, chaps. i, v-ix, xix.

always repose in the hands of the whole body of the citizens, as organized in the series of groups which constituted the state.¹

The famous Dutch scholar and statesman Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) may for all practical purposes be regarded as the founder of international law, though Peter DuBois, Gentilis, and Hooker had earlier made valuable suggestions; and he is most noted for his work in this field, which was embodied mainly in the *De jure belli et pacis*. However, in his "Prolegomena" to this work he advanced important doctrines regarding the origin and foundation of social institutions. While he interpreted society in its most general sense as being the natural requirement of human nature with its "appetite for society," he was convinced, on the other hand, that the state had its origin in a contract.² In his work on international law Grotius endeavored to promote that like-mindedness in regard to the essentials of international policy which Professors Giddings and Tenney have lately insisted is the indispensable factor in any possible hope for the future peace of mankind.³ While Grotius' work in international law was an innovation, his confusing and inconsistent theory of sovereignty and his denial of popular sovereignty were retrogressive.⁴

In the general period of Grotius and Hobbes there appeared a number of interesting developments centering mainly around the names of Campanella, Bacon, Filmer, Milton, Harrington, and the political documents of the Commonwealth.

The *City of the Sun*, written by the Italian friar Thomas Campanella (1568-1639), presented an imaginary utopian

¹ Althusius' work, *Politica Methodice digesta*, apparently is available in this country only through the copy recently acquired by the New York Public Library; the best treatment is by Gierke, who rescued Althusius from oblivion in his *Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien* (1880), Vol. VII of his *Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats- und Rechts Geschichte*, see particularly chaps. i-iii; also see Figgis, *op. cit.*, pp. 229 ff; Merriam, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-21; and Atger, *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social*, pp. 121-27.

² *De jure belli et pacis*, abridged translation by Whewell, "Prolegomena," particularly secs. 5-9, 15-16; Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-62.

³ Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-61, 171 ff., 188.

⁴ Cf. Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-87; Merriam, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-24.

society, which, aside from the communistic tendencies which it advocated, was mainly interesting as offering a crude psychological interpretation of society and the state. In a way strikingly similar to that later developed by Comte he maintained that society was based upon the principles of power, love, and intelligence and could function successfully only when these had received proper distribution and recognition in the organs of political and social administration.¹

Bacon (1561-1626) is noteworthy as the philosophic herald of the approaching age of experimental science. He railed against the domination of custom and tradition in political and social usages, as well as in the field of scientific enterprise. However, he was equally inconsistent in both fields. In the same way that he rejected the scientific discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, his own works on social and political philosophy were hopelessly antiquated and obscurantist, the only exception being his unfinished utopia, *The New Atlantis*.²

The *Patriarcha* of Filmer (d. 1653) was a severe attack upon the doctrine of the contractual origin of government, and, while Filmer appealed to reason rather than to authority and made a good case against the contract doctrine, his own substitute, namely, patriarchal authority bestowed upon Adam by God, was infinitely less valid than the contract doctrine.³

The chief contributions of the Commonwealth period to social and political philosophy were the individualizing of the conception of a social contract by assuming that every citizen must be a

¹ "City of the Sun," in Henry Morley's *Ideal Commonwealths* (1885), pp. 217-63; cf. Guthrie, *op. cit.*, chaps. iv-v.

² "The New Atlantis," in Morley, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-213; cf. Gooch, *Political Thought from Bacon to Halifax*, pp. 22-34.

³ The contrary view is maintained by J. N. Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings*, pp. 1-2. Dr. Figgis points out the important fact that Filmer's "patriarchal conception of society is far from being the essence of the theory of the Divine Right of Kings; it is merely the best argument by which it is supported" (*op. cit.* p. 150). For Filmer, see pp. 8, 148 ff., 252.

Dr. Figgis' above-mentioned work contains what is incomparably the ablest and most sympathetic interpretation of the divine-right theory. While few are likely to be converted to Dr. Figgis' view, there can be no question but that one who has not read his exposition is disqualified to discuss the subject.

party to the contract; the appeal to the law of nature to establish the rights of men; and the formulation of the doctrine of popular sovereignty.¹ It was the contribution of John Milton (1608-74) to work over these doctrines into a philosophical statement and to promulgate them with sufficient coherence to secure their recognition.²

Harrington (1611-77), in his *Oceana*, presented, under the disguise of a utopia, a constitution for the Commonwealth government. His chief contributions were the doctrines that society must be organized according to psychological principles, so as to make certain the leadership of the intellectually élite, and in accordance with the economic system of any period. Political organization must be so constructed as to secure a predominating influence of the property-holding classes and the intellectual aristocracy.³ This theory has received its fullest modern exposition in the works of Loria, Novicow, and LeBon.

In spite of the previous developments of the social contract doctrine, it remained for the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) to give that conception its first classic statement. Going far beyond any of the previous writers in the detail and "remorseless logic" with which he analyzed the situation, he premised a presocial state of nature which was a "state of war of all men against all men," in which the life of man was "poor, nasty, brutish, and short."⁴ He flatly denied the dictum of Aristotle that man is by nature social, and maintained that all society is for gain or glory, and that any permanent social group must originate in the mutual fear which all men have toward each other.⁵ He was

¹ Cf. Dunning, *A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, chap. vii.

² Cf. Masson, *Life of Milton*; Gooch, *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 177-83, 241-45, 314-19.

³ *Oceana*, ed. by Henry Morley, 1887; selections in Coker, *op. cit.*, pp. 356-78; Gooch, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-304; cf. the recent work of Russell Smith, *Harrington and his Oceana*; and T. W. Dwight, "Harrington" in *Political Science Quarterly*, II (March, 1887), 1-44.

⁴ *Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society*, Molesworth's ed., chap. i, secs. 11-12; *Leviathan*, chap. xiii.

⁵ *Philosophical Rudiments*, chap. i, sec. 2.

as pessimistic as Machiavelli in his analysis of human nature and agreed with the latter that all human activity springs from man's insatiable desires.¹ To escape the miseries of the turbulent and unregulated state of nature, Hobbes held that all men agreed to unite into a civil society for their mutual protection and that, in doing so, they made an inalienable transfer of their individual powers to the general governing agent or sovereign.² He did not, however, hold that either the state of nature or the contract were necessarily true in a historic sense. His analysis was psychological, and he has been correctly called the "father of social psychology."³ It was the irrevocable nature of the contract and the conception of unlimited sovereign power which distinguished the doctrines of Hobbes from those of the majority of the other members of the contract school. Besides this voluntary contract, Hobbes contended that there might be another type based upon force where a conqueror compelled submission on the pain of death.⁴ In this latter version Hobbes is in line with the vital principle of the school represented by Gumplowicz. Hobbes's conception of the nature and attributes of sovereignty was a valuable contribution, but by confusing the state and the government, he erroneously ascribed sovereign power to the latter.⁵

The German statesman and philosopher Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94) attempted a reconciliation of the doctrines of Grotius and Hobbes in his *De jure naturae et gentium*. His ethics were primarily those of Grotius, while his political doctrines were mainly Hobbesian.⁶ He held that the social instinct in man would account for the existence of the family and lesser social groups, but that a contract was necessary to bring into being the state and government. While Pufendorf began his analysis of the state of nature with the assumption that it was a state of peace, he ended with practically the same conclusion as that arrived at by Hobbes.

¹ *Leviathan*, chap. xi.

² Wallis, *The Great Society*, p. 191.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. xvii.

⁴ *Leviathan*, chap. xvii.

⁵ Atger's analysis of Hobbes's theory of the social contract is found in *op. cit.*, pp. 162-84; cf. also Leslie Stephens, *Hobbes*; and Graham, *English Political Philosophy*, pp. 1-49.

⁶ Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 318-19.

His conception of the contract was twofold. First, there was a social contract which embodied the agreement to unite; then a vote was taken to determine the form of government desired; and, second, the arrangement was ended by a contract between the government and the governed regarding the principles and limits of administration. Pufendorf thus united more clearly than Hooker the concepts of a social and a governmental contract.² His conception of sovereignty was as confusing as that of Grotius, for, while defining it as supreme power in the state, he held that it must be limited to what a sane man would term "just action."³

The Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) was, in his political theory, a member of the contract school. He agreed with Hobbes in the existence of a presocial state of nature which was one of war and universal enmity.⁴ Society, he maintained, had a purely utilitarian basis in the advantages of mutual aid and the division of labor.⁵ To render this advantageous association secure, however, it was necessary that its utilitarian basis be supplemented by a contract to give it a legal foundation and thus to guarantee to each individual in the society the rights which he possessed as an individual prior to the contract. He claimed that the contract was rendered valid only by the superior advantages which it offered, and that the sovereign was such only as long as he could maintain his authority. This justification of rebellion Spinoza considered to be the only safe guarantee of just rule and individual liberty.⁶ Spinoza was mainly interested in using the contract as a buttress for liberty, while Hobbes had been chiefly concerned in utilizing it to justify absolutism.⁶

² *The Law of Nature and of Nations*, trans. by Basil Kennett and annotated by Barbeyrac (London, 1729), Book I, chap. ii, pp. 102 ff.; Book VII, chap. i, pp. 629 ff.

³ Merriam, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-30.

⁴ *A Theological-Political Treatise*, Elwes trans., chap. xvi.

⁵ *Ibid.*, chaps. v, xvi; *A Political Treatise*, chap. ii, sec. 15.

⁶ *Theological-Political Treatise*, chap. xvi.

⁶ Cf. Pollock, *Spinoza*; Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-93; Dunning, *A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, pp. 309-17.

In his *Ethics* Spinoza gave a clear statement to the theory of reflective sympathy, earlier hinted at by Aristotle and Polybius, and later revived and developed by Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith, and which occupies a prominent position in Professor Giddings' system of sociology (*Ethics*, Part III, prop. xxvii).

The *Patriarcha* of Filmer called forth two better-known works in refutation of its thesis. The first was Algernon Sydney's (1622-83) *Discourses concerning Government*. He criticized Filmer's work in detail and declared for the origin of government in the consent of the governed and for the indefeasible sovereignty of the people.¹

The second refutation of the *Patriarcha* constituted the first of John Locke's (1632-1704) *Two Treatises of Government*, but the second treatise was far more epoch-making in its doctrines, for Locke here set forth his important conception of the social contract and his justification of revolution. In his views on the state of nature, Locke differed radically from Hobbes, Spinoza, and even Pufendorf, in that he denied that it was by any means a condition of war or disorder. It was not even a presocial state, but was rather a prepolitical situation in which every man had the right to execute the laws of nature. The very social nature of man, Locke contended, would prevent the state of nature from being one of isolation and unsociability. The serious deficiency in the state of nature was an impartial judge who could settle all disputes in an equitable manner and take the power of executing the laws from the hands of each individual.² The chief and immediate cause of man's leaving the state of nature was the increase of property and the desire to use and preserve it in safety.³ This emphasis upon the safety of property might have been expected from the apologist of the bourgeois revolution of 1688.

Locke made the most direct claim of any writer of the school for the historicity of the social contract as the agent for initiating

¹ *Discourses concerning Government*, 3d ed. (1751), chap. ii, sec. v, particularly pp. 75 ff.; Scherger, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-47.

² *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. by Morley, Book II, chap. ii, secs. 6-7; chap. iii, sec. 19; chap. vii, secs. 77, 87.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. ix, secs. 123-24, 127; chap. xi, secs. 135, 138.

civil society and maintained that it must be assumed to lie at the basis of all civil societies in existence.¹

He differentiated clearly between the society formed by the contract and the government to which it delegated the functions of political control. By so doing he was able to show how the government might be dissolved without destroying the society itself.² This dissolution of the government, or revolution, was justifiable when the terms or purposes of the contract were violated by those in power, and the majority of the citizens were the only ones qualified to judge when the infractions had become sufficient to warrant revolution.³ Locke thus laid the foundation for the American and French Revolutions, as well as apologizing for the English Revolution of 1688.⁴

The work of the French churchman, Bishop Bossuet (1627-1704), may be taken as marking the last serious and important attempt to maintain in Western Europe the more crude theological interpretations of society and history that had been transmitted from the Dark Ages. In his *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* he repeated that extreme theological view of the philosophy of history which had become the heritage of, as well as the chief blight upon, historical study in Europe since the days of Augustine and Orosius.

His chief work on social and political philosophy was equally marked by obscurantism. He repeated the dogmas of the Fathers that man was by nature social, but, being also inherently evil, required governmental restraint to keep his lusts within bounds; and that this governmental restraint was best exercised by a paternal monarchy possessed of divine and absolute powers. As the title of this work, *Politique tirée des propres paroles d'Écriture sainte*, indicates, all of his points were reinforced by copious quotations from the Bible. But even such a prince of obscurantists as Bossuet could not remain entirely immune from the rationalistic

¹ *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. by Morley, chap. viii, *passim*.

² *Ibid.*, chap. xix, secs. 211-21.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. xix, sec. 240.

⁴ Scherger, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-49; cf. Graham, *English Political Philosophy*, pp. 50-87; Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 204 ff.; and the exhaustive work of Bastide, *John Locke, ses théories politiques* (Paris, 1907).

tendencies of his time, and his terminology indicated that the categories of the Schoolmen had given way to those of the rationalists.¹

VIII. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DURING THE PERIOD OF ITS GRADUAL TRANSITION INTO SOCIOLOGY

About the beginning of the eighteenth century a new era seemed to be dawning in social philosophy. The old a priori speculation and interpretation of society in purely subjective terms was gradually abandoned, though there was a temporary recrudescence in the writings of Rousseau. Vico presented a theory of progress and a new attitude in studying primitive society. Berkeley and the Reformers showed the influence of Newtonian natural science. Montesquieu produced the first great objective and descriptive treatise on sociology. Voltaire partially crushed obscurantism. Turgot, Kant, and Condorcet were the first conspicuous advocates of the doctrines of continuity in history and the possibility of indefinite human progress, and, along with Herder and others, gave a great impetus to the philosophy of history. Hume presented the first great psychological interpretation of society and annihilated the social contract. Ferguson and Herder combined the objective and subjective methods of analyzing the social process. Economic influences were emphasized by the Physiocrats, Adam Smith, and the Classical Economists. The French Revolution emphasized to excess the doctrine of the amenability of social processes to rational and artificial direction. The scientific historical approach to the study of social institutions was manifested in Eichhorn, Savigny, Niebuhr, Ranke, and Guizot. Finally, Saint-Simon classified the sciences and pointed out the need of a synthetic science of society to furnish a basis for reconstructing the social order. Thus, the various lines of approach to the interpretation of social processes which were to converge in sociology were all in process of development during the eighteenth century and the first quarter of the nineteenth, and when one reflects upon the situation it appears neither strange nor miraculous that Comte was able to conceive of, and partially formulate, the laws of a synthetic system of sociology.)

¹ Cf. Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-27; Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-204; and Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-34.

At the best, he simply combined a part of the interpretations which were current at his time.

The environmental origins of social philosophy during the period of its transition into sociology are not difficult to discover.

The older tendencies, centering about the perfection of the national state, furnished the center of orientation for the doctrines of the Mercantilists and the Cameralists, whose influence lasted well into the eighteenth century. The reaction against their excessive emphasis upon the paramount importance of the interests of the state and upon the value of state activity found expression in the *laissez-faire* doctrines of the Physiocrats and the English Classical Economists.

Natural science, which had received its highest expression in Newton, reacted powerfully upon eighteenth century political and social philosophy. If Galileo and Newton had been able to interpret the physical universe in terms of such simple formulas as the laws of "falling bodies" and "inverse squares," it seemed probable to the social philosophers that equally simple formulas could be found to explain and to furnish the means of controlling social and political phenomena. Whether or not this tendency had any influence upon the development of the contract theory it is difficult to determine, but it is certain that it was a foundation of the prevalent eighteenth-century doctrine that a few "self-evident dictates of pure reason" were adequate to interpret and to adjust social and political relations.

The critical spirit of the eighteenth century, which found its ablest representatives in Voltaire, the Encyclopedists, Hume, and Kant, can be traced to a number of sources. Bacon and Descartes, in the previous century, had proclaimed the futility of dependence upon the past. The development of natural science had contributed to a general spirit of scepticism and curiosity. The increasing geographical discoveries and explorations had kept up that process of the contact of cultures which is the most potent agency in awakening a criticism of prevailing institutions. The Deists had emphasized the necessity of introducing reason into religion, the very possibility of which had been denied by Luther.

All these forces and tendencies gave rise to that destructive criticism of old theories and institutions which was necessary to clear the ground for a new synthetic and dynamic study of society.

Shaftsbury, Pope, and the Deists attacked the current depressing theological view of the inherent depravity and hopeless wickedness of man and made possible the conception of man as a worthy and noble subject for scientific analysis.

The critical spirit, the Deistic conception of the reasonable decency of man, and the dynamic type of mind created by the further development of science, commerce, and industry made possible the idea of the future progress of the race so admirably expressed by Turgot, Kant, and Condorcet.

The Industrial Revolution, the greatest transformation in the history of humanity, broke down the foundations of the older social system even more completely than the Commercial Revolution had destroyed the mediaeval order. Out of the confusion, as an aid in solving the newly created social problems, there came a further development and differentiation of special social sciences. It was as a result of the necessity of providing a synthetic and systematic science of society to criticize the validity of the multitude of schemes presented as a means of reconstructing the disintegrated social order that sociology in its present connotation had its origin.¹

Not only were the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries a period of great importance for the development of sociology, as marking its gradual development out of social philosophy, but also at this time the writings of a distinctly sociological character were becoming numerous enough so that it is both possible and desirable to group and to treat the chief writers by nationalities, though certain general currents in European thought permeated all nations.

1. *Italy and France.*—Among the Italian writers of this period Vico and Beccaria were the most important for sociology. The first was one of the founders of the modern phase of the philosophy of history and the other was a leading theorist in the reform group.

—In France, Montesquieu introduced the comparative and inductive method of studying social phenomena. Voltaire attempted a vast rationalistic history of civilization. The Physio-

¹ Cf. Small, *General Sociology*, chap. iii; Marvin, *The Living Past*, chaps. viii-x.

crats and Turgot investigated the economic basis of society. Rousseau gave the last classic statement to the social contract doctrine. Sièyes and Condorcet reflected the best tendencies of the Revolution, and Saint-Simon indicated the need of a systematic science of society to serve as a guide for reconstructing the social order.

Vastly different from the doctrines of his contemporaries of the contract school were the theories advanced by the Italian historian, jurist, and philosopher Vico (1668-1744), whose work, *La Scienza nuova*, is frequently regarded as the starting-point of historical philology, ethnology, and the modern idea of historical progress, and is often, but erroneously, described as the first treatise on sociology.

Vico rejected the notion of a social contract and expressed his belief in the natural sociability of man and the necessity of social relationships to produce the perfect human personality. He regarded religion as the constitutive principle of society and thus foreshadowed the doctrines of Hegel and Kidd.¹ By making highly original studies in the mental life of primitive man he opened the way for the modern school of philology, mythology, and comparative religion. He advanced a theory of progress which stated that development does not take place in a straight line, nor through perfectly identical recurring circles, but rather in a sort of spiral movement in which every turn is a degree higher and more advanced than its predecessor.² Finally, by discussing the relativity of the excellence of different social institutions, as determined by different external conditions, he led up to Montesquieu's elaborate discussion of this subject.³ The importance of this dynamic element, which pervaded practically all of Vico's theories, can hardly be overestimated, but Vico was seriously restricted by his failure to free himself from the crudities of the theological view of history and the social process.⁴

¹ *La Science nouvelle*, trans. by Trivulzi, pp. 97-98; 103, 168.

² Flint, *Vico*, p. 228; Delvaille, *Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de progrès*, pp. 261-74.

³ *La Science nouvelle*, pp. 387-90.

⁴ The best edition of Vico's works is that edited by Ferrari in 6 vols., Milan, 1835-37. Michelet's *Œuvres choisies de Vico*, 2 vols., Paris, 1835, contain an abridged

The French philosopher Montesquieu (1689-1755) made important contributions to social philosophy, both in general method and in specific analysis of various aspects of the social process. His general method was objective and descriptive, and his work was, perhaps, the first conspicuous example of this line of approach to social and political problems since Aristotle's collection of his 158 constitutions on which to base his analysis of society as it appeared in the *Politics*.¹ There had been plenty of descriptive matter in the works of earlier writers, but it had been mainly a study of biblical and classical mythology and history, in which the exploits of Seth and Enoch and the heroes of Homer and Livy had been much more conspicuous than an analysis of contemporary societies. Montesquieu showed the influence of the geographic discoveries of the two previous centuries by turning his attention to every type of existing societies and seeking his "natural man" among the savages of his own time rather than in the period before the "Fall of Man."²

His specific contributions were equally important. While still adopting the term "state of nature," he attacked the idea that the natural state of man was one of war and insisted that the tendency toward association was strong enough to be designated as a law of nature.³

translation of the *Scienza nuova*, and of some minor works. A complete French translation of Vico's major work by Trivulzi, Paris, 1844, exists under the title *La Science nouvelle, par Vico*. There is no English translation with the exception of an abridgment of the section dealing with Homer. The best commentary is the recent translation by Collingwood of the Italian work by Croce, *The Philosophy of Vico*, London, 1913, Appendix iv of which contains an excellent critical bibliography of the Vico literature. A better-known exposition is Flint's *Vico*, 1884; and there is a short article by Swinny on "Vico and Sociology" in the *Sociological Review* for 1914, pp. 50-57; see also Cosentini, "La Sociologie et Vico," *Revue internat. de sociologie* (1898), pp. 430 ff. For Vico's theory of progress as well as for the history of that subject through the whole of the eighteenth century, see the exhaustive work by Delvaile, *Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de progrès jusqu'à la fin du XVIIIème siècle* (1910), pp. 261-74 for Vico's doctrines.

¹ Cf. Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 394, 429.

² For a historical discussion of the entry of ethnological methods into the historical study of political theory and institutions, see an article by Professor J. L. Myres, "The Influence of Anthropology upon the Course of Political Science," *Publications of the University of California*, IV, No. 1, 1916.

³ *The Spirit of Laws*, Nugent's trans., Book I, chap. ii.

The main purpose of his work being to discover and indicate the relative excellence of the different forms of law and political organization among the diverse peoples of the earth, according to their relation to the various conditions of physical environment and national customs, he was led into the most comprehensive inductive and descriptive study of political and social phenomena that had ever been attempted. As a result of this study, he presented a far more complete and accurate interpretation of social processes in terms of environmental influences than had yet been developed by any other writer. Especially exhaustive was his treatment of the influence of climate upon social institutions.¹ This attention of Montesquieu to the relation of man to his environment gave added impetus to that school of geographic interpreters of historical and social processes which has found its most notable expressions in the writings of Buffon, Herder, Ritter, Guyot, Peschel, Buckle, Ratzel, Reclus, LePlay, Metchnikoff, Demolins, Semple, Ripley, and Huntington.

But the fame of Montesquieu in the past and his notoriety at present have been due more than anything else to his widely adopted theory that political liberty can best be secured in a governmental system in which the three departments of government were sharply differentiated and perfectly co-ordinated.²

Montesquieu's contemporary and fellow-countryman Voltaire (1694-1778) devoted a lifetime to a vigorous and successful attack upon the obscurantist tendencies of the theologians of his time.³ In addition to this, his *Essai sur les mœurs* was one of the earliest rationalistic attempts at a philosophy of history and a theory of progress and has been designated by a modern critic as the first real history of civilization.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, Books XIV, XVII. Montesquieu has received an unwarranted degree of credit for the originality of his theory of climatic influences. It was not original, having been taken mainly from Dr. Arbuthnot's *Essay on the Effects of Air on Human Bodies*, 1733, and Chardin's *Travels in Persia*; cf. Dedieu, *Montesquieu et la tradition politique anglaise en France* (1909), pp. 209-25.

² *The Spirit of Laws*, Book XI, chap. 5.

³ Cf. Morley, *Voltaire*.

⁴ Fueter, *Histoire de l'historiographie moderne*, pp. 443-45; Delvaille, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-46.

The school of French economists founded by Quesnay and called the Physiocrats (flourished from 1750 to 1785) from the title of the work of Dupont de Nemours, one of their number, besides being the founders of modern political economy, made numerous contributions to social philosophy in general. In the first place, they believed in a *natural order* in all the affairs of the universe, extending, of course, to social processes. That order was "natural" which was the most beneficial. The conception of the natural order as equivalent to the normal or the best, rather than as identical with primitive conditions, was a considerable advance. They held agriculture to be the only productive industry and interpreted progress in terms of the amount of the net product from this industry. They advised an attitude of *laissez-faire* on the part of the government in order that the natural and beneficial order of things might not be disturbed.¹

The French economist Turgot (1727-81), the friend and defender of the Physiocrats, produced an interesting and original interpretation of progress and historical development. In his two discourses, delivered at the Sorbonne in 1750 on the *Advantages to the Human Race from the Establishment of Christianity* and *The Successive Advances of the Human Mind*, he set forth in clear and unmistakable language the doctrine of continuity in history, the cumulative nature of evolution and progress, and the causal sequence between the different periods of history. He also doubtless furnished Comte with the suggestions which grew into the latter's laws of the three stages of intellectual progress. While he described progress as primarily a process of intellectual improvement, the conception of continuity in development and the essential unity of the historic process was a brilliant contribution.²

¹ Cf. Mercier de la Rivière, *L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques*, 1767; Dupont de Nemours, *Physiocratie*, 1767; and the recent commentaries of Higgs, *The Physiocrats*; Cheinisse, *Les Idées politiques des physiocrats*, 1914; Guntzberg, *Die gesellschaft und staatslehre der Physiokraten*, 1907; Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-14.

² Stephens, *The Life and Writings of Turgot*, pp. 159 ff.; Schelle, *Oeuvres de Turgot* (2 vols. Paris, 1913), I, 194 ff.; Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, pp. 280-88; Morley, *Critical Miscellanies*, II, 78 ff.; and, most important of all commentaries, Delvaile, *op. cit.*, pp. 389-405.

The erratic and romantic Rousseau (1712-78) was the last of the classical contract school. In his earlier writings he took the position, in opposition to Hobbes, that the condition of man in the state of nature was almost ideal in its rude simplicity, and that the state of war was unknown in those idyllic days. The whole progress of civilization, while bringing increasing enlightenment, had but contributed to the physical and moral degeneration of the race and to the growth of inequality and corruption.¹

In his later writings he abandoned his praise of the natural state of man and took practically the same position as Locke, namely, that while this condition was not one of war, its uncertainties and inconveniences rendered the institution of civil society imperative.² The only way in which civil society could be instituted, and united power and general protection could be secured, was through the medium of a social contract.³ This contract gave rise to the state or civil community and not to the government.⁴ Rousseau thus distinguished between the state and government, making sovereign power the prerogative of the state and governmental power purely delegated. His definition of sovereignty as the absolute power in the state, growing out of an expression of the general will, was probably his greatest contribution to political philosophy.⁵

While the importance of Rousseau's conception of popular sovereignty is generally conceded, historians now tend to ascribe less importance to Rousseau's dogmas as direct causal influences in the French Revolution than was formerly the case.⁶

Finally, Rousseau's important contributions to educational theory in his *Émile* should be mentioned. He here laid especial emphasis upon the value of a spontaneous development of the whole inner personality rather than the mere acquirement of knowledge and also tended to infuse a democratic tendency in

¹ *Si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à épurer les mœurs*, 1750; *Sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*, 1755. For a translation see Cole, *Rousseau's Social Contract and Discourses*, pp. 129-238.

² *Social Contract*, trans. by Tozer, Book I, chap. vi.

³ *Ibid.*, Book I, chap. vi.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Book III, chap. xvi.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Book I, chap. vi; Book II, chaps. iii-iv; Green, *The Principles of Political Obligation*, p. 90.

⁶ Cf. Scherger, *op. cit.*, Preface, chap. vii, and Part IV.

education by declaring it to be the right of every child to have a proper education.¹

The Italian reformer Beccaria (1735-1794), in his *Crimes and Punishments* (1764), developed the plea for a rational reform of criminal procedure which Montesquieu had suggested in his *Lettres Persanes* and his *Spirit of Laws*. He was the chief literary figure in that movement for criminal reform in which men like Romilly and Howard were the leading practical workers. He proposed the slogan of "the greatest good for the greatest number" as the basis of legislation.² He accepted the social contract as the basis of civil society and individual self-interest as the main motive in government.³ But, while his general social and political philosophy was rather commonplace, his plea for the abolition of the barbarous methods of trial and punishment then in vogue is one of the bright spots in the history of a subject which has been peculiarly depressing.⁴

The Prerevolutionary and Revolutionary literature in France produced some interesting contributions to social philosophy. Socialistic tendencies appeared in Morelly's *Basiliade*, 1753, and his *Code de la nature*, 1755; in Mably's *De la Legislation*, 1776, and in Babeuf's *La Doctrine des Egaux*, 1793.⁵

¹ The best recent collection of Rousseau's social and political philosophy in French is Vaughn's edition of *The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau*, 1915; the *Discourses* and the *Social Contract* appear now in an excellent translation by Cole in the "Everyman's" series, the introduction of which contains a good bibliographic note; Tozer's translation of the *Social Contract* is a classic, as well as his excellent introduction; the *Émile* also appears in an English translation in the "Everyman's" series; Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State*, contains one of the best critical analyses of Rousseau's political theories. Another excellent critical analysis is Professor Dunning's "The Political Theories of Jean Jacques Rousseau" in the *Political Science Quarterly*, 1909. Atger's analysis of Rousseau's version of the social contract is to be found in *op. cit.*, pp. 252-304. Morley's *Rousseau* remains the best biography.

² English translation of 1778, Introduction, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, chaps. i-iv.

⁴ Cf. Parmelee, *Anthropology and Sociology in Their Relation to Criminal Procedure*, pp. 10-14.

⁵ On these writers, see Guthrie, *op. cit.*, chaps. vi-viii.

The best example of Revolutionary philosophy is to be found in the works of the Abbé Siéyes (1748-1836) and Condorcet (1743-94). The former is typical of the period through his defense of the third estate in *Qu'est ce que le tiers état?*, his attack upon the privileged classes, and his proficiency in drafting constitutions founded on a few self-evident dictates of pure reason.¹

Condorcet is representative of that group who looked upon the Revolution as the climax of a long period of preparation for a new era of civilization. Comte pronounced him as much the best student of "social dynamics" in the eighteenth century, as Montesquieu had been of "social statics." His *Tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, 1793 (an English translation appeared in 1795), was one of the most optimistic and original of the writings of the period. His review of the stages of previous history led him to believe that civilization was rapidly advancing and that the French Revolution might be regarded as the culmination of this process. He developed a theory of historical progress which was far in advance of the earlier doctrines of Vico or Turgot, and which he expressed mainly in terms of increase of knowledge and scientific achievement.²

His hope for the future of humanity was not less optimistic than his interpretation of the past. He made many remarkably accurate, as well as some extravagant, predictions as to what science would be able to accomplish for the race. He was thus one of the first writers to combine the scientific and utopian theories of society. All in all, his work is most refreshing in contrast to that depressing conception of a descent from a "golden age" which was first expressed by Hesiod and had largely dominated European thought from that time to the nineteenth century, especially after the classical conception had been reinforced by the Hebrew myth of a primal Paradise, which had come into the current of European thought with the introduction of Christianity.³

¹ Cf. Clapham, *The Abbé Siéyes; An Essay in the Politics of the French Revolution*, 1912.

² See especially English ed., pp. 1-40.

³ Cf. Branford, "The Founders of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1904, pp. 110-20; Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, pp. 325-39; Morley, *Critical Miscellanies*, Vol. II; and especially Delvaille's treatment, *op. cit.*, pp. 670-707.

Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) anticipated the main theoretical positions in the sociological system of Auguste Comte. If one substitutes the word "Sociology" for the term "science politique," used by Saint-Simon with practically the same connotation that Comte gave to sociology, then Saint-Simon may be said to have formulated Comte's chief theses, though even he but collected and systematized the doctrines current at the time.

After a critical examination of his works, M. Alengry enumerates the following as the fundamental doctrines advanced by Saint-Simon: Science must be distinguished from art in all departments of knowledge. The sciences must be classified in the order of their increasing complexity, and a new science—*la science politique*—should be put at the head of the hierarchy. This *science politique* must be based on the solid inductions of history and observation and must be animated by the conception of development and progress. The general law of progress is that formulated by Turgot and Burdin, namely, the law of the three stages of the psychological evolution of the race: the conjectural, the "miconjectural," and the positive. All sociological theories of progress must be founded upon this fundamental law. The practical conditions of social life, and not supernatural sanctions, must be made the basis of the new morality; and the improvement of the happiness of the race must be realized through a transformation of the present social order rather than in heaven. This transformation requires a new industrial organization, a new social and political system, and a union of Europe in a new fraternity, *Le Nouveau Christianisme*.¹ One who is familiar with Comte's system need not be told that all that remained was for him to expand and to systematize the outlines laid down by Saint-Simon, and the best critics agree that such was the primary contribution of Comte to sociology.²

¹ Alengry, *La Sociologie chez Auguste Comte*, pp. 435-74, particularly, pp. 466-68; cf. Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, pp. 56-57; Friedrich Muckle, *Henri de Saint-Simon, die Persönlichkeit und ihr Werk*, pp. 252-78.

² Alengry, *op. cit.*, p. 476; Defourny, *La Sociologie positiviste*, pp. 350-54; cf. Gide and Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines*, pp. 198-231; Muckle, *op. cit.*, p. 278. Saint-Simon published an early outline of his system as *Lettres d'un habitant de Genève*, 1802

2. *Germany*.—In Germany the Cameralists put forward a constructive criticism of the methods to be employed in raising and in expending the revenues of a successful state. Idealism was represented by Kant, Hegel, and Fichte. Romanticism received its greatest impulse from Herder, and both Idealists and Romantists offered appropriate philosophies of history. Nationalism was extolled by Fichte and Hegel, and the historical approach to the study of legal institutions received a great impulse in the writings of Savigny.¹

The chief trend in German thought in the first half of the eighteenth century, as far as it was related to the development of sociological thinking, is to be found in the writings of the Cameralists, of whom Justi and Sonnenfels were the most important. They were a group of technological writers, rather than social philosophers, and, like the English Mercantilists, were mainly concerned with providing the national treasury with ample means to maintain its domestic policy and to defend itself against enemies from without. As Professor Small has very clearly pointed out, their chief significance in the development of sociological thought lies in the fact that they furnish perhaps the best example in the whole history of the subject of a group of writers whose writings were sharply oriented and co-ordinated by the definite purpose they had in mind.²

or 1803. This preliminary and incomplete sketch he filled out in a number of subsequent works, the most important of which are *Mémoire sur la science de l'homme*, 1811; *De la Réorganisation de la société Européenne*, 1814; *L'Industrie*, 1817; *Du Système industriel*, 1821-22; and *Le Nouveau Christianisme*, 1825. The best exposition of Saint-Simon's doctrines is the above-mentioned work of Muckle. Other valuable brief treatments are A. J. Booth, *Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonism*; and Paul Janet, *Saint-Simon, et le Saint-Simonisme*. The best edition of Saint-Simon's works is the Paris edition of 1865-78, *Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, 47 vols.

¹ The contributions of German writers on social philosophy to the tendency toward a transition from social philosophy to sociology during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is an obscure subject. Those who are interested in the development of sociological thought are awaiting the authoritative treatment of this period which has been promised by Professor Small as a continuation of his work on *The Cameralists*.

² Small, *The Cameralists*, chap. i.

The renowned German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) formally posed as the prophet of international peace, though later critics, like Professor Dewey in his *German Philosophy and Politics*, have attempted to show that the Kantian ethics, with their sharp distinction between the world of sense and necessity and the supersensible world of moral freedom and duty, are probably at the bottom of the German militaristic and nationalistic philosophy of the present age. He conceived of history as the record of the working out or unfolding of the plan of nature, which was the perfect development of all the latent capacities of man.¹ He claimed that the motive power in this process of development was the struggle within the individual and society between the forces of communism and competition.² Consequently, this process would move most rapidly in that country which allowed the greatest freedom to this struggle and yet secured individual liberty, protection, and the equitable administration of law. Such a condition, he asserted, cannot be attained until the external relations between societies have been put on a firm, stable, and peaceful basis and the resources of the nations set free to undertake the great program of progress and enlightenment.³ The only way to arrive at such a state of international peace is to establish a universal federation of nations.⁴ Looking back over history, Kant thought that he could see in its events the gradual working out of this very plan of federation and peace.⁵ Kant was an optimist and believed that progress was continually going on, and explained the criticisms of contemporary conditions as simply manifestations of a more refined moral conscience.⁶

Like Blackstone, he believed in the social contract as the philosophical basis of political obligations, though he denied its historicity and declared, with Burke, for the perpetuity of the contract.⁷

¹ *Idea of a Universal Cosmo-political History*, trans. by Hastie in his *Kant's Principles of Politics*, pp. 5-9; cf. Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany* (1874), pp. 388-405.

² Hastie, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11. ⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-25.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-23.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-29. ⁶ Delvaille, *op. cit.*, pp. 576-93.

⁷ "On the Common Saying," trans. in part by Hastie, *op. cit.*, as "The Principles of Political Right"; see also Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant*, pp. 46-47, 348; and Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 335-45.

Herder (1744-1803), in his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, was producing the most comprehensive philosophy of history that had yet appeared, though Bury¹ errs in declaring him the founder of that subject. While Herder was an environmentalist to a certain extent and tried to work out a theory of history on the basis of the modification of man's own powers by the conditions of his physical environment, he did not neglect the psychological factors embodied in customs and ideals. His treatment of primitive life was so suggestive as to make him regarded by many as the founder of comparative ethnology, but his treatment of the oriental and classical peoples was less valuable.²

The want created by Herder's weakness in treating the history of antiquity was supplied by the work of Heeren (1760-1842), whose masterpiece, *Ideen über die Politik, den Verkehr, and den Handel der vornehmsten Völker der Allen Welt*, was the first great work which exploited what is now being recognized as a most fertile field of historical investigation, namely, the influence of commerce and industry upon the course of historical development. His line of approach received an impetus with the work of Marx and is now being developed by the most progressive historians on both sides of the Atlantic.³

The post-Kantian German idealists Fichte (1762-1814) and Hegel (1770-1831) had an important influence upon the development of social philosophy and political thinking. Fichte is noted mainly for three contributions. In the first place, he carried the theory of a social contract to a greater extreme than any other adherent of that doctrine.⁴ Secondly, his *Der Geschlossene Handelsstaat* was one of the earliest presentations of a doctrine of state socialism, though the basis of Fichte's conception was idealistic and not economic, as in the case of Marx. Finally, in his *Reden an*

¹ *Ancient Greek Historians*, p. 240.

² An English translation of Herder's work by Churchill appeared in 1800; cf. Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany* (1874), pp. 375-87.

³ An English translation of the 4th edition of Heeren's work by Tolboys appeared in 1833.

⁴ Cf. Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 346-57.

die deutsche Nation he set forth the highly patriotic but equally exaggerated and chauvinistic conception of the superior quality and mission of the German people, which was absorbed and transmitted with greater effect by Hegel, and in turn taken up and elaborated by the great German historians of the nineteenth century—Ranke, Droysen, von Sybel, and Treitschke. The influence of this line of thought upon the growth of the spirit of nationalism, which lies at the basis of the modern militaristic system, can scarcely be overestimated.¹

The ponderous dialectician Hegel took up the work of Fichte in educating the German people as to their superior mission in the world. He conceived of society as the means of developing and setting free the human will and personality. He believed that this freedom was progressively realized, not only in the different stages of society from the family through civil society to the state, but also in the different periods of history. In the stages of society the family is the reproductive organ; civil society the economic aspect of social organization; and, finally, the state, the highest and most perfect of the grades of society, is almost an ineffable entity—the synthesis of universal and individual will, of objective and subjective freedom—something for unrestrained adulation. As the state is the philosophical realization of this perfected rationality and freedom, so in the German people is to be found its historical manifestation. The *Weltgeist*, after having temporarily sojourned among the oriental and classical nations, had seen fit to take up its abode among the Germans, whose mission it was to bring to the world the conception that freedom is the prerogative of every man.² One has only to reflect upon Hegel's philosophic pre-eminence in Germany and the significance of his conceptions to understand his overwhelming influence upon the nationalistic tendency of nineteenth-century thought in Germany.³ Aside

¹ On this point, see the brilliant work of Guiland, *Modern Germany and Her Historians*; and Rose, *Nationality in Modern History* (1916), Lectures III and VII; Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, pp. 68-80, 99-107.

² Cf. Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany*, pp. 496-541; Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-20.

³ Cf. Clarke, "Bismarck," in *Contemporary Review*, January, 1899, pp. 1-17; Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 119, 119-20.

from this phase of his influence, his emphasis upon society as a *process* of realization has been important in German sociology and is particularly evident in the work of Ratzenhofer, the greatest of German sociologists.¹

Savigny (1779-1861) was the true founder of historical jurisprudence in Germany. He emphasized the necessity of observing the principle of historical development in the formation of law, maintaining that it develops unconsciously out of the genius of a people. As a living organic thing it cannot be codified.² In his memorable controversy with Thibaut in 1814 he vigorously opposed the proposition to prepare a code of law for Germany. Like Burke, then, his grasp of history was more apparent than real, and both were equally blind to the practical value of new legislation. That a later generation has upheld the judgment of Thibaut is seen by the formation of the magnificent German Imperial Code, which was framed between 1874 and 1900.³

3. *England*.—Among the English, conservative tendencies were manifested in Berkeley, Bolingbroke, Blackstone, and Burke. The critical spirit was imbibed by Hume and Paine. Ferguson and Smith went deep into the sociological foundations of society. Godwin reflected the optimism of Kant and Condorcet. Malthus

¹ The most convenient, if not the most trustworthy, place to find Hegel's social philosophy is in Morris' paraphrase of his *Philosophy of Right and History*, though both appear in full English translations. The best treatment of the sociological importance of the German Idealists in the stimulation of nationalistic and militaristic doctrines is Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics*. A brilliant analysis of their political doctrines is to be found in the work of their English disciple, Bosanquet, *op. cit.*; while their political theories are best summarized by Professor Dunning in his articles "The Political Theories of the German Idealists" in the *Political Science Quarterly* for 1913. The classic exposition of Hegel's philosophy is to be found in Kuno Fischer's *Hegel's Leben, Werke und Lehre*.

² "Law to him was a creation of the collective national mind, intimately interwoven with national life and character, and with the permanent conditions of the national civilization. . . . The work of many generations, it was beyond the absolute control of any particular age."—Ernst Freund, in *Political Science Quarterly*, V, 474.

³ On Savigny, see Ernst Freund, "German Historical Jurisprudence," in *Political Science Quarterly*, V (1890), 468-86; Georges Bonnet, "La Philosophie du droit chez Savigny," *Rev. Internat. Soc.*, 1913, pp. 145 ff., 232 ff., 302 ff.; and Kantorowicz, "Qu'est pour nous Savigny?" *ibid.*, 1914, pp. 537-65.

called attention to the practical obstacles in the way of indefinite progress. Finally, the Utilitarians offered a constructive criticism of the social order.

The work of the brilliant Irish prelate George Berkeley (1685-1753) was as important for sociology as for philosophy. In his *Sermon on Passive Obedience*, which is largely devoted to a criticism of Locke's theory of revolution, he does not commit himself to the belief in a social contract, but holds that, if such a process be assumed, then its terms must be binding in perpetuity. He assumes the natural sociability of man and the necessity of government to regulate society; from these premises he concludes that obedience to established authority must be regarded as a law of nature.¹

More important than this bit of reactionary theory is a generally neglected essay on *The Principles of Moral Attraction*, which is one of the most suggestive essays in the whole history of social philosophy. This is probably the first attempt to interpret social processes in terms of the Newtonian laws of mechanics. Assuming that the social instinct is analogous in society to the principle of gravitation in the physical world, he worked out in an ingenious manner the ways in which this force operates in society to create the different social forms and institutions. As masses attract each other more strongly in proportion as their distance of separation is diminished, so the attraction of different individuals in society for each other increases in proportion to the degree of resemblance which they bear to each other. Again, as the tendency toward sociability and co-operation is the centripetal force in society, so human selfishness and individualistic traits are the centrifugal forces, and stable society can only exist when the former is in excess of the latter. The similarity between these conceptions and certain vital portions of the sociological systems of Mr. Spencer and Professor Giddings is apparent.²

In England at this time Bolingbroke (1678-1751), though never producing any coherent body of social philosophy, ranged over the

¹ Berkeley's *Works*, ed. by Frazer, 4 vols., IV (1901), 111-18.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 186-190.

whole field with great suggestiveness in his various essays, and one must hesitate to assign absolute originality to any doctrine in social and political philosophy put forward in England during the middle of the eighteenth century without having previously made sure that it is not to be found in one of Bolingbroke's essays.¹

However, suggestive as Bolingbroke may have been, there can be little doubt that the contributions of David Hume (1711-76) to social philosophy are the most important that any Englishman advanced before the time of Ferguson and Adam Smith. As Montesquieu had been the herald of descriptive sociology, so Hume came nearer to modern psychological sociology than any other man of his age.

In the first place, he totally destroyed the historical and philosophical foundations for the doctrine of a social contract, and the fact that Rousseau and others later dared to advance this theory is either a serious reflection upon their intelligence or an indication of their ignorance of Hume's destructive criticism. Society, according to Hume, had its origin in instinct and not in intelligent self-interest. Man is by nature a social being; the state of nature is only the creation of the imagination of a priori philosophy; and the social contract theory assumes the impossible condition of knowledge prior to experience.²

As a substitute for this rejected doctrine, Hume offered a psychological interpretation of society of the utmost importance. Society originates in the sex-instinct, which is the ultimate social fact. This gives rise to the family, which is held together by that sympathy which always springs among those who are alike and dwell in contiguity. Sympathetic bonds are soon supported by custom and habit, which gradually make the group conscious of the advantages of association. This genetic group expands and is held together

¹ See the *Works of Bolingbroke*, 8 vols., London, 1809; particularly important are the "Dissertation on Parties," III, 3-312; and "The Idea of a Patriot King," IV, 225-334. In his *A Collection of Political Tracts*, 1748, especially significant is the essay on "Liberty and the Original Compact between the Prince and the People," pp. 284-94.

² *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by Green and Grose, II, 183, 259-73; *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. by Green and Grose, I, Part I, Essay V; Part II, Essay XII.

at first by the influence of sympathy and mutual aid, but human selfishness renders this sympathetic and functional basis of association inadequate, and efficient social control is found only in the institution of government. Government originates in force and develops its authority and stability from a growing sense of common interest on the part of the group. Thus the social process starts in instinct, develops through the agency of feeling and emotion, and, finally, comes under the control of the intellect.¹

Especially important in Hume's psychological interpretation of society was his emphasis upon sympathy as the chief factor in social assimilation² and upon imitation as the cause of "type-conforming" groups. His analysis of imitation as the force which reduces social groups to cultural homogeneity was an attack upon the environmental theories of Montesquieu and is a direct anticipation of Bagehot and Tarde.³ In addition, Hume was probably the first writer to develop a real psychological interpretation of religion.⁴ Finally, his emphasis upon utility as the criterion by which to justify the desirability of any institution was the starting-point for the social philosophy and ethics of the English utilitarians.⁵

The jurist Blackstone (1723-80), in discussing the origin of society and government,⁶ refused to accept the doctrine of a state of nature and a subsequent social contract as a historic fact, but, nevertheless, claimed that it was man's weakness in isolation which was the primary motive for association, and that contractual relations must be implied as the philosophic foundation of society and government. Like Sir Henry Maine, he considered that the primary social group was the patriarchal family, and held that larger societies were but reunited offshoots of the original family

¹ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, II, 111, 114, 140, 155, 183, 259-65; *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, I, 113-14, 450; II, 197 f., 204.

² *Treatise of Human Nature*, II, 111 ff.; 349 ff.; *Essays*, II, 214 f.

³ *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, I, 244 ff.

⁴ *Treatise of Human Nature*, II, 435, 460 ff.; *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, II, 309-10, 334 f., 364.

⁵ *Essays*, II, 202 ff.; cf. Leslie Stephen, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, II, 86-104.

⁶ *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, ed. by Cooley (1878), I, 46-47.

that had dispersed because they had become too large for a single habitation. Blackstone's view of the attributes of sovereignty as supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled power in the state greatly resembles the definitions of Professor Burgess, and it is generally agreed that the theories of these men stand in a direct line of descent. While Blackstone's doctrines were fiercely attacked by Bentham, they are erroneous in matters of detail rather than in principle.¹

The fundamental contribution of the political philosopher and orator Edmund Burke (1729-97) was his eloquent and commanding statement of the corporate unity of society. He ruthlessly criticized the a priori and rationalistic political philosophy of his time and declared that the construction of governments was not a matter of reason, but of historic growth and long experience. Burke's view of history, however, was not dynamic; it was to him merely an instrument to support or to defend existing institutions and to combat change. While accepting a modified version of the contractual basis of society, he maintained that this contract was universal in scope and application and binding in perpetuity, and he bitterly assailed the version which justified revolution.² In his essay on *The Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*³ he presented a brief but highly suggestive analysis of the influence of sympathy, imitation, and ambition in the social process.

Burke's rabid criticism of the French Revolution was effectively answered by Tom Paine (1737-1809) in his *Rights of Man* and his *Dissertation on the First Principles of Government*. According to Paine, man was by nature social, owing to his social instinct and the necessity of co-operative activities. The state of nature was not presocial, but one in which men possessed the natural rights of liberty and equality. This had to be abandoned and governmental

¹ Cf. Pollock, *A History of the Science of Politics*, pp. 84-85.

² *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Vol. IV of his *Works*, London ed. (1852), pp. 199-201, 229-30.

³ *Works*, II, 588 ff. On Burke, see MacCunn, *The Political Philosophy of Burke*; Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-173; and Rogers, "The Social Philosophy of Burke," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1912.

authority established because of human imperfections which made unregulated existence intolerable. Government was created by a contract between the members of society and not between the governed and the governors. Man did not give up his natural rights when government was established, but merely added civil rights to them. Paine recognized that general social relations, customs, cooperation, and the like were infinitely more important to the individual than government, and regarded the latter as at best artificial and a necessary evil. His criticism of monarchy was an admirable antidote to Bossuet, and he was one of the most ardent advocates of democracy and popular sovereignty in the eighteenth century. Especially important was his doctrine that the minority must be protected by constitutional checks on absolute majority rule.¹

The contributions of the Scotch philosopher Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) to the history of sociology have not been sufficiently acknowledged. French and German writers, like Comte, Gumplowicz, and Ludwig Stein, have recognized his importance, but English and American students of the subject have generally minimized or entirely overlooked the genuine worth of his work. If anyone before Saint-Simon and Comte has the right to be designated as the "father of sociology," it is not Adam Smith, but Ferguson. Indeed, aside from certain formal distinctions, laws, and terminology originated by Saint-Simon and Comte, Ferguson's *History of Civil Society*, which appeared in 1765, is quite as much a treatise on sociology as Comte's treatment of "social physics" in his *Positive Philosophy*.

That Ferguson was moving in the right direction may be seen by the fact that he combined the descriptive and historical method of Montesquieu with the psychological and critical procedure of Hume. His treatment was thus both concrete and analytical. He rejected all a priori methods, as well as the ideas of a state of nature or a social contract.² He insisted on studying society as it

¹ Paine's *Works* are edited by Conway in 4 vols., 1894-96. His political theories are admirably analyzed by Merriam in the *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1899; Coker's *Readings*, pp. 18-32, give important selections from his works; cf. also Giddings, "Sovereignty and Government," *Political Science Quarterly*, XXI, 19 ff.

² *History of Civil Society*, Part I, sec. i.

is, and from such study he found that the primary social fact is the inherent sociability of the human species resulting from instinct supported by convenience.

The dynamic element was very strong in the work of Ferguson, and he ridiculed the ideas of Aristotle and Hobbes that social stability and peace were the chief ends in society,¹ and laid such stress upon the value of competition and conflict in social development that Gumpłowicz has claimed him as the first great apostle of the "group-struggle" theory of social development.² Ferguson's contribution to sociology is a neglected subject that would amply repay an exhaustive analysis.

In the writings of the distinguished classical economist and philosopher Adam Smith (1723-90) are to be found the starting-points for two of the modern schools of sociology. His elaboration of Hume's theory of generic sympathy furnishes the basis for the type of theory of which Professor Giddings is the most distinguished exponent,³ and his development of the theory of mutual aid, division of labor, and of the social influence of economic interests in general, is one of the important premises of the system of the socio-economic school of sociologists which prevails in Germany and of which Professor Small is the most prominent spokesman in America.⁴ But any claim by either of these schools that Smith's treatment of these problems was sufficiently original to justify his designation as the most important precursor of sociology before Comte is very extravagant. All of his sociological ideas, and many of his economic principles, were the common intellectual property of the time, and, like Comte, Smith was an elaborator and a systematizer and not an innovator.⁵

¹ Delvaile, *op. cit.*, pp. 474-87.

² Gumpłowicz, *Die soziologische Staatsidee*, pp. 77-80.

³ Cf. Preface to his *Principles of Sociology*, 3d ed.

⁴ Cf. his *Adam Smith and Modern Sociology*.

⁵ Smith's major works, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *The Wealth of Nations*, are available in numerous editions. The recently recovered notes from his lectures delivered at the University of Glasgow have been edited by Cannan under the title, *Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms*, 1896. Rae's *Life of Adam Smith* is a good biography, and Huth has presented, with some far-fetched conclusions, the contributions of Ferguson and Smith to sociology in the work entitled, *Soziale und individualistische Auffassung im 18. Jahrhundert, vornehmlich bei Adam Smith und Adam Ferguson, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Soziologie*, 1907.

As optimistic as Kant or Condorcet, but far less sound in his doctrines, was Godwin (1756-1836), whose *Enquiry concerning Political Justice* created considerable excitement when it appeared in 1793. Believing that all human misery was the direct result of the restraining and warping influences of coercive human institutions, and that government, at its best, was an evil, he advised the abolition of government, of strict marriage regulations, and of all social groups larger than the parish, and declared for the equal distribution of property. He was, on the other hand, emphatic in his praise of the non-coercive and spontaneous forms of society and co-operative activity. He held that the growing influence of reason and enlightenment would be the means by which the ultimate perfection of the human race would be attained. His hopes for the future of mankind were only exceeded by those expressed by Condorcet.¹

Quite different from the dynamic optimism of Kant, Condorcet, and Godwin was the doctrine of Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834). He called a halt upon all the theories which predicted the speedy approach of the social millenium by showing that population tends to increase much more rapidly than does the means of subsistence, and by pointing out how misery must fall upon the poorer members of society as long as this increase of population went unchecked by anything except the ravages of poverty, distress, and disease.² He proposed a preventive check in the shape of moral restraint, namely, refraining from marriage until sufficient means were accumulated to maintain a family in comfort. Not until this check was generally adopted should the "perfectionists" prophesy the end of human misery and poverty. While Malthus' doctrine was nearer to the truth in the static society of the eighteenth century, before modern invention or colonization had begun on a large scale, than it is at the present time, it was based upon a principle of undoubted validity. The

¹ Delvaile, *op. cit.*, pp. 525, 683, n. The best edition of Godwin's work is the third, in 2 vols., 1798; see especially his summary of principles in the Introduction, and Books II, III, VIII, and Appendix 1.

² Cf. Delvaile, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

undeserved disrepute into which the Malthusian doctrine has fallen has been mainly due to the fact that, though it was essentially a sociological formula, it has been dealt with chiefly by economists, many of whom have failed to see more than the material and physiological aspects of the "level of subsistence" or the "standard of living" and have missed the deeper psychological and sociological truths involved. More profound analysis at the hands of sociological investigators has established the essential truth of the Malthusian doctrine when given the broader statement which takes into account, not only the material, but also the dynamic, psychic, and social factors.¹ The immediate effect of his work was to give a pessimistic color to the classical political economy of the first half of the nineteenth century.²

In England during the first half of the ^{nine}~~eight~~teenth century the most important development was the Utilitarian philosophy of society, which received its vital impulse from Hume and its first important formulation by Bentham (1748-1832). Bentham first attained prominence in his *Fragment on Government*, published in 1776, which was a relentless attack upon Blackstone's social and political philosophy. While it was essentially the rending asunder of a straw man that Bentham had erected, this work is important in social philosophy for its acute differentiation between natural and political society, its detailed criticism and rejection of the theory of a social contract or of natural rights, and its justification of all forms of government by the principle of their *utility*. As his slogan for Utilitarian ethics and practical reform he adopted the phrase, earlier used by Hutcheson, Beccaria, and Priestly, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," and his psychology was the crude hedonism which assumes that man is motivated by the desire

¹ Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 304-7; Thompson, *Population; a Study in Malthusianism*, pp. 156-65.

² The final statement of the Malthusian principle is to be found in the second edition of the *Essay on the Principle of Population*, published in 1803. The significant parts of the two editions are brought together in *Parallel Chapters from the Two Essays on Population by Malthus*, N.Y., 1909, "Economic Classics Series." For a recent study in this field, see Thompson, *Population; a Study in Malthusianism*, 1915.

to secure pleasurable, and to avoid painful, experiences.¹ Bentham was a prominent figure in the movement for social reform during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. In the field of jurisprudence he was mainly influential in suggesting a doctrine of sovereignty which was adopted and elaborated by his successor, Austin.²

The Utilitarian principles of Bentham were perpetuated in the writings of James Mill and his greater son John Stuart Mill (1806-73). Aside from his progressively waning Utilitarianism, Mill, in his *System of Logic*, presents in the sixth book a discussion of the methodology which should be followed in sociology which is still regarded as valid.³ Mill was greatly influenced by Comte in his earlier years, but his interest in sociology flagged as time went on, and he turned his attention more to the problems of political economy and social reform.

[Aside from specific doctrines, the great contribution of the Utilitarians was their emphasis on the value of concreteness and exactness in treating social phenomena, and in this they contrasted most favorably with the vague speculations and mystical fancies of idealists and obscurantists.⁴

IX. THE INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT OF COMTEAN SOCIOLOGY

In addition to the eighteenth-century antecedents, which have just been summarized, it might be of value, in concluding, to take a brief inventory of the tendencies and developments in social science during the period in which Comte was developing his system—a period characterized by new and remarkable activities in every phase of social science.

¹ His psychology was taken over from Helvetius and has been recently accepted with some modification by Professors Patten and Ward.

² For a criticism of Bentham's doctrines, see Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, chap. vii.

³ Cf. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 52-53.

⁴ For Utilitarianism in general, see Stephens, *The English Utilitarians*, 3 vols.; Albee, *A History of English Utilitarianism*; and an excellent brief treatment by Davidson, *Political Thought in England from Bentham to J. S. Mill*, in the "Home University Series." Montague's Introduction to Bentham's *Fragment on Government* gives an excellent analysis of Bentham's doctrines, and Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-347, analyzes the views of Bentham and Mill.

In the study of political theory and organization Bonald (1754-1840), Cousin (1792-1867), Constant (1767-1830), and Tocqueville (1805-59) in France; Hegel (1770-1831), Krause (1781-1832), Leo (1799-1878), Ahrens (1808-74), and von Mohl (1799-1875) in Germany; von Haller (1768-1854) in Switzerland; and Bentham (1748-1832) and Austin (1790-1859) in England were the chief figures.¹

In economics, the impetus given by the Physiocrats and Adam Smith was carried on by Sismondi (1773-1842) in France; Rau (1792-1870) and Thünen (1783-1850) in Germany; and Ricardo (1772-1823), McCulloch (1789-1864), and James and John Stuart Mill in England.²

Scientific historiography was taking form in the writings of Mignet (1796-1884) and Guizot (1787-1874) in France; Niebuhr (1776-1831) and Ranke (1795-1886) in Germany; and Hallam (1777-1859), Palgrave (1788-1861), and Grote (1794-1871) in England.³

The socialistic and social reform tendencies of early nineteenth-century thought were best reflected in the works of Robert Owen (1771-1858) in England; Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Cabet (1788-1856), Fourier (1772-1837), Louis Blanc (1811-82), and Proudhon (1809-65) in France; and Lassalle (1825-64) and Rodbertus (1805-75) in Germany. Their doctrines were in the main all motivated by the misery attendant upon the social transformation which followed the Industrial Revolution. While the earlier of these writers commonly advocated a refined type of utopian communism, Louis Blanc, Proudhon, Lassalle, and Rodbertus criticized any such visionary schemes and proposed more practical and immediate remedial measures. They may rightly be regarded as the main figures in the transition of socialism from the stage of utopian schemes to the scientific socialism of Marx (1818-83) and Engels (1820-1895). With the appearance of Marx's *Holy Family* in 1845 and his joint work with Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, in 1848, *scientific socialism*, with its basic premise that man can

¹ Cf. Merriam, *op. cit.*; Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, chaps. i-iii.

² Cf. Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*

³ Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*.

directly control his social relations and the social process, and its dogmas of the economic interpretation of history—the labor theory of value, the theory of surplus value, class struggle, ultimate economic revolution, and state control of industry—was formally launched.¹

In the same year that *The Communist Manifesto* was published there appeared another work which indicated a line of approach to sociological problems which is now considered by many to be the most promising of all methods. This was the *Du système sociale et des lois qui le régissent* of Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874). This work and his earlier *Sur l'homme*, 1835, and his later *Physique sociale*, 1869, were the first serious attempts to apply the statistical method to the interpretation of social phenomena. While his modern disciples are, no doubt, oversanguine in their anticipation of the amenability of social phenomena to statistical interpretation, there can be no doubt that it is destined to be the most effective means of bringing sociological generalization up to that level of certainty which is the mark of science.²

The biological foundations of modern sociology were systematized by Lamarck (1744-1829) in his *Philosophie Zoologique*, 1809, in which he stated his belief in the mutability of the species through the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The principle enunciated by Lamarck was further developed in the lectures of Sir William Lawrence (1783-1867); in Chamber's *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*, 1844; Spencer's early writings; and reached its first classic exposition in Darwin's *Origin of Species*, 1859, only to be modified by the later investigations of Mendel, Weismann, and De Vries.³

The geographic factors in social organization and evolution were analyzed with a thoroughness never before approached, by

¹ Cf. Kirkup's *History of Socialism*, 1913 ed., revised by Pease; and Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-264, 290-322, 407-83.

² Cf. Hankins, *Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician*; Giddings, *Sociology, A Lecture*, pp. 22 ff., 36 f. On the history of statistics, see Harald Westergaard, "The Scope and Method of Statistics," *Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association*, September, 1916, pp. 229-37; J. T. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, II, chap. xii.

³ Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin*, pp. 139 ff.; Judd, *The Coming of Evolution*.

Ritter (1779-1859) in his *Die Erdkunde im Verhältnis zur Natur und zur Geschichte der Menschen*, which first appeared in 1817-18 in Guyot's *Earth and Man*, and in Buckle's *History of Civilization in England*.¹

Finally, anthropology, ethnology, and prehistoric archeology were beginning to assume that form which renders them so valuable to sociology in the work of Blumenbach (1752-1840), Retzius, (1796-1860), Broca (1824-1880), Prichard (1786-1848), Bastian (1826-1905), and Boucher de Perthes (1788-1868).²

Auguste Comte (1798-1857) tried to work over and systematize a part of the leading tendencies in social science in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in order to form a comprehensive system of sociology. His indebtedness to Saint-Simon for his leading ideas has already been pointed out. Other influences may be discerned along with those of Saint-Simon. From Hume, Kant, and Gall³ he received his chief doctrines as to causation and positivism in method. Comte's peculiar view of history as a combination of the inevitable and the providential may be traced to the doctrines of Hume, Kant, and Turgot as to historical determinism and to the emphasis of Bossuet, Vico, and DeMaistre on the providential element in history. Montesquieu, Condorcet, and Saint-Simon had pointed out the need of a broad and fundamental science of society to act as a guide for political theory and practice. Finally, Montesquieu had introduced the modern conception of social law, Condorcet had elaborated the theory of progress, and Saint-Simon had insisted upon the necessity of transforming the social order.

There was thus extremely little that was original in the theoretical content of Comte's system of sociology; his main contribution was to give a comprehensive and systematic form to many of

¹ Ripley, "Geography as a Sociological Study," *Political Science Quarterly*, X (1895), 636-55.

² Haddon, *History of Anthropology*, pp. 28 ff., 35 ff., 38 ff., 84., 100 f., 135 ff.

³ Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828), the famous German phrenologist. While Gall's theories are now merely curiosities in the history of mental science, they were of great importance as regards their fundamental premises. To hold that the human mind has a definite physical basis which renders it amenable to scientific investigation was, at the time, rather revolutionary.

the most important of the somewhat detached and incoherent doctrines which were current in his time. In many ways Comte was greatly behind the scientific achievements of his age, and quite failed to absorb many of the most important developments and innovations of the period, which have since entered into the shaping of sociological thought. At the same time Comte cannot be denied the claim to a certain degree of genius, for there have been few minds which have been able to grasp in a more penetrating or comprehensive manner the unity of human society and the vast number of factors which are involved in its organization and development.¹

This cursory enumeration of the chief tendencies in the study of social phenomena in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, gives one a basis for testing the validity of the assertion of Professor Small that sociology did not have its origin in isolation from the special social sciences, but that the latter had faced and partially solved many of the most important problems of sociology, and of the apparently contrary thesis of Professor Giddings that a new type of approach to the study of social phenomena, which was definitely sociological, began in a systematic way with Auguste Comte and developed directly through the writings of Spencer, Ward, and the sociologists of the present generation.²

The reconciliation of these conflicting views of the matter is to be found in their respective opinions of the nature of sociology. If one accepts Professor Small's contention that sociology is the philosophical synthesis and organization of the results of the special social sciences, then his view of the origin of sociology in the nineteenth century may be regarded as valid. On the other hand, if one agrees with Professor Giddings that sociology is the elemental

¹ Alengry, *op. cit.*, pp. 474-76; Defourny, *op. cit.*, pp. 350-54; Waentig, *Auguste Comte und seine Bedeutung für Sozialwissenschaft*; W. H. Schoff in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, VIII (1896), 496 ff.

² Of course, this refers merely to sociology in its present connotation as a definite body of scientific knowledge dealing with an analysis of the social process. Both authorities are in perfect agreement as to the dependence of sociology in this sense upon the previous developments in social philosophy since the earliest Greek period. Cf. Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 40 f.; Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, chap. i; *Sociology, A Lecture, passim*.

and basic social science, distinguished by its investigation of society as a unity in its broadest and most fundamental aspects, then one must grant that the initial formal differentiation of sociology as a distinct science begins with the systematization of earlier doctrines by Auguste Comte. If, as Professor Ellwood¹ and Professor Vincent² contend, both views are tenable and mutually complementary, the conflict of opinions is more apparent than real, and one may seek the origin and development of sociology in the last century, both in the works of avowed sociologists and in the increasing tendency of the special social sciences to assume the broader sociological method of approach to their problems.

On the whole, this last solution of the problem seems the more accurate and satisfactory. The fundamental fact to be insisted upon is that the essence, if not the name, of sociology was an inevitable result of the necessity to provide an adequate science of society and an equally inevitable product of a gradually improving method of analyzing social phenomena, and that it was not the fortuitous and questionable invention of the mind of a single man nor the precarious and exotic product of a single age. It so happened that about the time when the general social, economic, and intellectual setting of Western Europe and the advances in positive knowledge and scientific methods had first made possible such a thing as a science of society, and when this possibility was already being exploited by a large number of writers, Auguste Comte, an enthusiastic thinker with a genius for assimilation and systematization, appeared upon the scene and gave a name and a systematic expression to an already powerful tendency. That sociology would not have come into existence in its present nature and strength, though perhaps under a different name, but for the work of Auguste Comte, is quite inconceivable to one who has read the previous works of Vico, Montesquieu, Turgot, Hume, Ferguson, Adam Smith, Herder, Condorcet, and Saint-Simon, or who has investigated the development of social science since 1850.³

¹ *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 30-31.

² *American Journal of Sociology*, X, 158.

³ For a vigorous statement of the view that sociology is even at the present time but a figment of the sociologist's imagination, one should consult the articles by

X. THE CHIEF TENDENCIES IN SOCIOLOGY SINCE COMTE

Since the period of Comte there have been two chief tendencies in the development of sociological theory. On the one hand, there has been the attempt, which has been most successfully executed by such writers as Spencer, Ward, Giddings, DeGreef, Durkheim, Stein, Novicow, and Stuckenberg, to develop a complete sociological system which would embrace every phase of the subject, methodological, analytical, and historical. On the other hand, there has been the tendency to specialize in some distinct field of sociological research and to produce works which, while often highly systematic, made no pretension at covering the whole field of sociology. Of these special lines of sociological investigation some nine may be recognized: the methodological, the biological, the psychological, the "group-conflict," the anthropological-historical, the environmental, the statistical, the economic, and the philanthropic.

The most fundamental of the specialized types of investigation and the one which must serve as a starting-point for all varieties of specialized effort, is the *methodological*. This field has been most extensively cultivated by Frédéric Le Play, Professor Albion W. Small, and Professor Émile Durkheim. Others who have made important contributions to special phases of methodology have been Professors Pearson, Hobhouse, Barth, Simmel, Mayo-Smith, Willcox, Giddings, Ellwood, and Hayes.

Biological sociology has been exploited by the more strictly biological school, including such men as Darwin, Huxley, Wallace, Conn, and Keller; the "Organicists," including Lilienfeld, Schaeffle, Fouillée, Worms, De Roberty, Novicow, DeGreef, and Kidd; and by the newer "eugenic" school, which has furnished the center of orientation for the writings of Galton, Pearson, Bateson, Shuster, Lapouge, Schallmeyer, Steinmetz, and Tenney.

The *psychological* school, which has perhaps produced more gratifying positive results than any other special type of sociological

Henry Jones Ford in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XV (1909-10), 96 ff., 244 ff. These articles, together with the same author's *The Natural History of the State*, constitute what is altogether the best example known to the writer of the survival of the conventional views of the "presociological stage" in the development of social science.

theory, has been most effectively represented by Bagehot, Sutherland, Trotter, McDougall, and Wallas in England; by Tarde, Durkheim, Fouillée, and LeBon in France; by Sighele in Italy; by Simmel, Tönnies, and Wundt in Germany; and by Giddings, Ross, Sumner, Cooley, Baldwin, Ellwood, Ward, Vincent, and Howard in America.

The investigation of the sociological importance of the *conflict of social groups* has received the attention of Bagehot and Spencer in England; of Marx, Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, Simmel, and Oppenheimer in Germany; of the Russian Novicow; of the Italians Loria, Vaccaro, and Sighele; and of Ward, Small, and Bentley in America.

Anthropological and historical sociology have been little developed by avowed sociologists, but have received attention mainly from ethnological writers. The chief of these have been the historical jurists Maine, Post, and Ihering; the classical or comparative anthropologists Bachofen, McLennan, Lubbock, Spencer, Tylor, Lang, Morgan, Brinton, Westermarck, Lippert, Bastian, Letourneau, Frazer, and Kovalevsky; and the more recent critical and analytical anthropologists such as Ehrenreich and Graebner in Germany; Boas, Goldenweiser, Kroeber, Lowie, and Swanton in America; and Rivers and Marett in England. Unfortunately, the highly scientific and equally revolutionary theories of this last type of ethnological investigators have scarcely penetrated sociological thought, which has been willing to travel the broad and easy but highly treacherous road of classical anthropology. No branch of sociology is in such great need of modernization of method and content as the anthropological and historical. Professors W. I. Thomas, Émile Durkheim, and L. T. Hobhouse have been the chief and almost the only sociological representatives of the modern critical ethnology.

Likewise, sociology, in the strict sense of the word, has given little relative attention to the subject of the *influence of the physical environment upon society*. This phase of sociological theory has been chiefly contributed by historians like Buckle and Payne; by students of geography, such as Ratzel, Semple, Metchnikoff,

Demolins, Reclus, Ripley, and Huntington; and by psychologists, such as Dexter.

The *statistical* line of investigation, which received its vital impulse from Quetelet, has chiefly interested Galton, Pearson, Yule, Bowley, and Edgeworth in England; Engel, Meitzen, Hasse, von Mayr, and Lexis in Germany; Le Play, Faure, Dumont, Levasseur, and Leroy-Beaulieu in France; Westergaard in Denmark; Bodio and Benini in Italy; and Mayo-Smith, Wright, Willcox, Moore, Durand, Chaddock, Weber, Boas, Thorndike, and Bailey in America. Professor Giddings has been the most ardent and effective advocate of the value of making a larger use of the statistical method in sociology, and, with the possible exception of the psychological school, the statisticians are the most promising group of workers in the sociological field.

Among the *economists* of the relatively orthodox group who have contributed most to sociology have been Wagner, Schmoller, Hobson, Ashley, Gide, Ely, Commons, Fetter, Carver, Jenks, Seager, and Patten. Among the most influential of the radicals have been the English Fabians, Bernstein, Jaurés, Spargo, Loria, and Kropotkin.

Some of the best-known contributors to the literature of *scientific philanthropy* have been Webb, Booth, Devine, Lindsay, Warner, Taylor, Addams, Henderson, Rubinow, Peabody, Goddard, Healy, and the long list of criminal sociologists and penologists.

Such a diversity of interests and so detailed a specialization and division of labor as is here represented makes it reasonable to believe that the most fruitful work of the future in sociology will be done by specialists who will yield up their results for such convenient synthetic compilations of sociological theory as have recently appeared by Eleutheropulos, Pareto, Cornejo, Posada, Blackmar and Gillen, and Hayes.¹

¹ It will be noted that the foregoing classification overlaps in some cases, but accuracy has been chosen in preference to logical exactness. Those who desire to fill in the gap between Comte and the present will find most valuable Ward's *Outlines of Sociology*, Part I; Small's *General Sociology*, chaps. iii-v; Ross's *Foundations of Sociology*, chap. ix; Jacobs' *German Sociology*; Hecker's *Russian Sociology*; and

Convenient — eh? / Huh!

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

As one has to search for the sources of sociological thought before Comte in the works of writers on political and economic theory, on theology, and on history, so one has to rely for a guide to these sources upon the special treatments of the history of these respective special social sciences. There are, however, two fairly satisfactory avowed histories of sociological thought from the earliest period. These are to be found in Ludwig Stein's *Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*, pp. 145-395, and in Guillaume DeGreef's *Le Trans-formisme social*, pp. 8-306. By far the best collection of extracts from the writings of the chief figures in the development of social philosophy is to be found in Coker's *Readings in Political Philosophy*. The history of political theory is outlined in Pollock's *History of the Science of Politics* and has received its best systematic presentation in W. A. Dunning's *History of Political Theories*. The classic work of Janet, *L'Histoire de la science politique*, has never been surpassed as a treatment of the development of political theory and its interrelation with ethical doctrine. The development of economic doctrines is briefly surveyed by Ingram's *History of Political Economy*, is conveniently presented in Haney's *History of Economic Thought*, and for the period since the Physiocrats is systematically treated by Gide and Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines*. The history of theological doctrines is presented in Harnack's monumental *History of Dogma*. The history of history is surveyed in a fairly complete form in Bury's *The Ancient Greek Historians*, Fueter's *Histoire de l'historiographie moderne*, Gooch's *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, and Flint's two volumes on the philosophy of history. An adequate recent treatment in English of the historiography of the mediaeval period is lacking. The most valuable and readily available special discussions of particular periods are the works of Barker, Loos, and Willoughby on the social and political theory of classical antiquity; the analysis of the social and political philosophy of the mediaeval period by Gierke, Carlyle, and Littlejohn; the treatment of the history of social theories between the mediaeval period and the eighteenth century in the volumes of Franck on *Réformateurs et publicistes de l'Europe*; Morley's and Stephen's analyses of eighteenth-century thought in France and England; and the treatment of the German social and political philosophy of this century in Small's *The Cameralists* and Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State*. The advanced student will naturally proceed to the investigation of the sources and the special monographs mentioned in the article. For an aid in interpreting the social environment of the history of sociological thought before Comte no other book which is known to the writer is at all comparable to the brilliant little volume by F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*.

Bristol's *Social Adaptation*. Barth and Squillace provide a more detailed treatment, while Professor Vincent's "The Development of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, X, and Professor Tenney's "Some Recent Advances in Sociology," *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1910, admirably summarize the essential facts.

TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY, TO BE HELD AT
PHILADELPHIA, DECEMBER 27-29,

1917

TENTATIVE PROGRAM

General Subject: Social Control

(Participants in the meeting are requested to observe the time limit of twenty minutes for each paper; twelve minutes for each prearranged discussion; and five minutes for each discussion from the floor. Persons not members of the Society are cordially invited to its meetings.)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27

8:00 P.M. Joint session with the American Economic Association and the American Political Science Association. (Place.) Chairman, ———.

Address by PRESIDENT JOHN R. COMMONS, of the American Economic Association.

Address by PRESIDENT MUNROE SMITH, of the American Political Science Association.

Address by PRESIDENT GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD, of the American Sociological Society.

10:00 P.M. Joint Smoker. Ladies are invited.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28

9:00 A.M. Meeting of the Executive Committee. (Place.)

9:40 A.M. (Place.) Chairman, PRESIDENT GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD.

General Topic: Agencies and Fields of Social Control

"Social Direction of Child Welfare," DR. SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE, University of Chicago.

"Social Direction of Recreation," ALLEN T. BURNS, director of the Cleveland Foundation.

"The War as a Crisis in Social Control," PROFESSOR CARL KELSEY, University of Pennsylvania.

Discussion: DR. LUCILE EAVES, Women's Educational and Industrial Union, Boston; PROFESSOR CHARLES W. COULTER, Western Reserve University; DR. EDITH ABBOTT, Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy.

MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY 249

- 2:00 P.M. (Place.) Chairman, PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, Columbia University.

General Topic: Primitive Social Control

"Primitive Individual Ascendency," PROFESSOR HUTTON WEBSTER, University of Nebraska.

"Primitive Social Ascendency," PROFESSOR F. STUART CHAPIN, Smith College.

"Survival of Primitive Controls in Frontier or Retarded Communities," DEAN J. E. CUTLER, Western Reserve University.

"Social Structure among the Northern Indians," PROFESSOR FRANK D. SPECK, University of Pennsylvania.

Discussion: PROFESSOR A. E. JENKS, University of Minnesota.

- 8:00 P.M. Joint Session with the American Economic Association. (Place.) Chairman, ———.

General Topic: Social Control of Wealth

"Social Control of the Acquisition of Wealth," PROFESSOR E. C. HAYES, University of Illinois.

Paper for the American Economic Association, to be announced later.

Discussion: DR. SCOTT NEARING and one or two other persons.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 29

- 8:40 A.M. Annual Business Session of the American Sociological Society. (Place.) Chairman, PRESIDENT GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD. Report of the Special Committee on Government Statistics.

- 9:40 A.M. (Place.) Chairman, PROFESSOR J. P. LICHTENBERGER, University of Pennsylvania.

General Topic: Social Control of Immigration

"Immigration as a Problem in Social Control," PROFESSOR HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD, Yale University.

"The Immigrant in America as a Factor in Community Planning," MISS GRACE ABBOTT, Federal Children's Bureau.

"Control of Immigration Based upon the True Demand for Labor," PROFESSOR A. J. TODD, University of Minnesota.

Discussion: PROFESSOR HATTIE P. WILLIAMS, University of Nebraska; PROFESSOR HERBERT A. MILLER, Oberlin College; DR. WARREN S. THOMPSON, University of Michigan.

2:00 P.M. (Place.) Chairman, PRESIDENT GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD.

General Topic: Social Control of Political Relations

"A Social Control in a Democracy," PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, Columbia University.

"Social Control in International Relations," PROFESSOR CHARLES H. COOLEY, University of Michigan.

"How Far May Social Control in International Relations Be Democratized?" MISS JANE ADDAMS, Hull-House, Chicago, Illinois.

Discussion: PROFESSOR LUCIUS M. BRISTOL, University of West Virginia; PROFESSOR CECIL C. NORTH, Ohio State University.

NEWS AND NOTES

UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS

At a meeting of the trustees the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws was conferred on Governor Charles H. Brough, of Arkansas. Before his election as governor, Dr. Brough was professor of economics and sociology in the university.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

A club organized to promote the scientific study of sociology has been formed in Pasadena, California. Dr. Jeremiah M. Rhodes, superintendent of schools, is the president of the new organization. Several prominent educators and citizens are on the list of active members. At present the club is making a study of Ward's *Pure Sociology*. Meetings are held weekly, and the discussion is alternately under the leadership of a member chosen for the purpose and Dr. I. W. Howerth, of the University of California.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Philanthropic Service Division of the School of Commerce and Administration in co-operation with the University Public Lectures Committee offered a series of ten lectures on the general subject "Phases of War-Time Social Work" during the Summer Quarter. The purpose of the series was to give an insight into the relations of the different types of philanthropic service to the social problems of war time. The subjects of the individual lectures were as follows: "The Civilian Functions of the Red Cross," "The Responsibility of the Community for the Soldier's Family," "Protection of Working Women and Children," "The Protection of Infant Life," "Canada's Care for the Soldier's Family," "Medical Agencies in Relation to Social Service," "Re-education of the Handicapped Soldier," "Lessons from Mexican Mobilization," "Emergency Relief in Disasters Other than War," and "Woman's Work in War Time."

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Leave of absence on account of the war to take effect when one is called into service has been granted, among others, to Professor W. H. Parker, of the department of Economics and Social Science.

THE COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Professor Maurice Parmelee has been elected an associate of the Institut Internationale de Sociologie at Paris.

KNOX COLLEGE

Dr. Frank U. Quillin, professor of economics and sociology, has resigned to accept the position of professor of social economy in Toledo University.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

In the summer school Professor John Phelan, of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, offered courses in rural sociology; Professor Francis Tyson, of the University of Pittsburgh, gave lectures on "Introduction to Sociology" and "Social Legislation"; and Dr. Carol Aronovici, director of social service of the Amherst H. Wilder Charity, St. Paul, was special lecturer in the course "Social Statistics and Social Surveys."

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Professor C. A. Ellwood gave lectures in sociology in the summer school of the University of Colorado. Assistant Professor L. L. Bernard has resigned to accept an appointment as associate professor of sociology in the University of Minnesota. Mr. C. C. Taylor, instructor in the department, has been appointed acting assistant professor.

NORTH CAROLINA STATE NORMAL COLLEGE

Mr. H. H. Beneke, of the University of Chicago, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of history and social science.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

Dr. Francis Tyson, assistant professor of sociology at the School of Economics, has been made professor of social economy. During the summer Dr. Tyson and Mr. R. H. Leavell, of the Extension Division, were investigators for the United States Department of Labor in its study of negro migration.

RICHMOND SCHOOL OF SOCIAL ECONOMY

On October 1 the first training school of social work to be established in the South on a permanent basis will open its doors—the Richmond

School of Social Economy. The school has been organized in response to a long-felt need for more available training in preparation for social service in the South. The curriculum of the school will be divided into two departments: a department of Social Work, and a department of Public Health Nursing. The organization of the department of Social Work is on the plan of most other schools of philanthropy. Courses will be given in general social work, case work with families and individuals, institutional social work, community and neighborhood social work, recreation and child welfare, juvenile courts and probation. Ten hours a week will be devoted to field work. The primary purpose of the course in Public Health Nursing is to train graduate nurses for positions in public health nursing in the rural and factory communities of the South as well as the cities. Dr. Henry H. Hibbs, Jr., has been elected director of the school. He is a southern man, a Doctor of Philosophy from Columbia University, and for two years a Fellow in the Boston School for Social Workers. He was the director of the two summer schools of philanthropy held in Nashville, Tennessee, in 1915 and 1916, in cooperation with Vanderbilt University. Miss Loomis Logan, for three years executive secretary of the associated charities of Lawrence, New York, will be the supervisor of field work.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Professor T. N. Carver, of Harvard University, gave two lecture courses on "The Theory of Social Progress" and "Rural Economics" in the summer school.

The fourth sociological monograph in the series "Studies in Sociology," entitled *Leading Sociological Books Published in 1916*, by Emory S. Bogardus, has been published by the Southern California Sociological Society, Los Angeles.

A second edition, entirely rewritten and elaborated by the author, of *An Introduction to the Social Sciences*, by E. S. Bogardus, has been published by the University of Southern California Press under a new title, *Introduction to Sociology*.

SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY

Mr. Comer M. Woodward, of the University of Chicago, has been elected to the recently created chair of sociology in the Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Professor W. G. Beach has resigned his position as head of the department of Sociology to become dean of the School of Liberal Arts and head of the department of Economics and History at Washington State College, Pullman.

Mr. W. F. Ogburn, formerly professor of sociology and economics at Reed College, has been appointed professor of sociology and head of the department of Sociology.

CONVENTIONS TO BE HELD

American Sociological Society. Philadelphia. December 26, 27, 28. The general topic of the papers will be "Social Control." Secretary, Scott E. W. Bedford, 5800 Ellis Avenue, Chicago.

National Housing Association. Chicago. October 15-17, 1917. Headquarters, Hotel LaSalle. Secretary, Lawrence Veiller, 105 East Twenty-second Street, New York City.

Recreation Congress of the Playground and Recreation Association of America. Milwaukee, Wisconsin. November 20-23. Secretary, H. S. Braucher, 1 Madison Avenue, New York City.

REVIEWS

An Introduction to Social Psychology. By CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1917. Pp. xii+343. \$2.00.

This volume "is a simplification and systematization of the theories" contained in the author's *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, but with additions and new points of view.

The work has three natural subdivisions, the first of which (three chapters) is a good but somewhat conventional discussion of the relation of social psychology to sociology and other sciences, the scientific methods that should be employed in its study, the distinction between organic and social evolution, and the relation of inherited human nature to human society.

The second division (five chapters) contains the main discussion and is devoted to an exposition of the nature of social unity and of social continuity and the theory of social change. The author emphasizes the point that the psychic is basal to these and consequently is fundamental to a correct knowledge of social processes, social activities, and the coordination of individuals in activity. Social continuity is defined as the unity of society in time, emphasizing, therefore, the same principles and factors as social unity, but embodied in the traditions and institutions of society. Social change, he argues, may take place under normal conditions by adaptation to a slowly changing environment, either unconsciously, or consciously through discussion and leadership. Or, on the other hand, it may take place under abnormal conditions, such as those culminating in social revolutions. These chapters are easily the best part of the volume and furnish an excellent presentation of social psychology proper.

The third division, the remaining chapters, seem more like appendixes explaining and amplifying certain topics of the volume, but in themselves they form no unity and do not carry forward to a conclusion the main argument of the work. One wonders why the substance of these chapters was not incorporated into the earlier ones and irrelevant matter omitted. Criticism directed against the volume would find its chief attack in statements contained in these chapters. Almost any one of the authors, for example, whose views are presented might take exception to some interpretation given to his teachings, owing, doubtless, to

the impossibility of presenting with dogmatic brevity what the authors themselves preferred to amplify so as to guard against misunderstanding.

The volume as a whole is a valuable contribution to the study of social psychology. It is clearly, though not brilliantly, written and is strengthened by chapter references and an excellent index.

BROWN UNIVERSITY

J. Q. DEALEY

American World Policies. By WALTER E. WEIL. New York: Macmillan, 1917. Pp. 307. \$2.25.

The ignorance of the average American regarding foreign affairs and his incapacity to understand or appreciate their importance and significance are proverbial. While generally due to indifference, these shortcomings are in part chargeable to a lamentable want of readable literature, sane and fundamental in character and American in viewpoint. Of the many valuable books produced by the world-war there is perhaps none so admirably suited to the needs of the American public as this very able and readable volume by Dr. Weil. Written in excellent style, corroborated by a compelling array of facts, and replete with excellent illustrations, it presents to the reader a splendid and interesting introduction to the larger aspects of world-politics.

While the writer finds reason to believe that eventually the world may be organized for peace, his belief is not based on a blind optimism, nor does he seek to evade the gigantic problems of world-statesmanship that must be solved. His presentation of these questions with all their complexity and magnitude, but in such a way as to challenge further interest and effort rather than to overcome the reader with dismay, is one of the distinct accomplishments of the book.

Dr. Weil believes that economic factors are the dominant causes of war. He does not deny the influence of other interests, but treats them only as accelerating or modifying forces. He convincingly argues that trade follows the flag to a considerable extent, thereby suggesting an important limitation upon Norman Angell's well-known thesis. However, he believes that the cost of modern war is larger than its profits.

The pressure of increasing population and the change from agricultural to industrial life create a demand for new sources of raw material and an enlarging market for manufactured goods. This brings the progressive nations into deadly conflict over the available markets and agricultural areas of the world. These they must have if they are to

feed and clothe their increasing population. Our freedom from devastating wars has been due to the fact that we have not yet felt these forces of economic pressure. But for many years the balance of trade has favored America, and we are now merging into an industrial state. We shall soon be in the maelstrom of the world's competition for markets, foreign investments, and raw products.

Frequently the raw products and profitable investments are found in backward, tropical countries, where property is insecure and labor contracts are worthless. This means interference in behalf of order and security, and imperialism necessarily follows—the result of economic forces.

To deal effectively with these forces the author argues for a constructive international imperialism, "the ideal of which is to safeguard the interests of the natives, to prepare them for self-government, and to carry on this process, not by competition and war between the interested nations, but by mutual agreement for a common benefit. The present cruelties and dangers are to be avoided. The nations are to unite in a joint, higher imperialism" (p. 149). This will require a dynamic organization of the nations, both political and economic in character, for the equitable distribution and utilization of those things for which men fight and to solve new problems that the future will bring forth.

In the meanwhile America may seek to reduce the pressure tending toward war by eliminating waste, increasing the agricultural areas, decreasing population, and making America fundamentally independent. A fair distribution of wealth, with the results of better home markets and a more satisfied populace, will also contribute materially to this end. The nations will organize constructively for peace only when they see that they can no longer live apart in safety and prosperity. The growing economic interdependence, the absolute necessity of some nations having access to raw material controlled by others, the mutual exchange of capital in investments, the growth of international trusts and labor organizations, and, finally, the increasing cost and burden of war are forces that may ultimately provide the cohesive forces for world-organization. To make these forces effective, however, the growth of population must be controlled, particularly in those countries already overcrowded.

The author closes with an eloquent appeal to America to take the lead in organizing the economic and political forces of the world for peace. America can either "cling hopelessly to the last vestiges of its policy of isolation or can launch out into imperialistic ventures, or finally it can

promote, as can no other nation, a policy of internationalism, which will bind together the nations in a union of mutual interest, and will hasten the peaceful progress of the economic and political integration of the world."

ARNOLD BENNETT HALL

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

New Ideals in Business. By IDA M. TARBELL. New York: Macmillan, 1916. Pp. 339. \$1.75.

Frankly and journalistically Miss Tarbell eulogizes the intelligent, kind, forceful employer. The new industrial leader is adaptive, conciliatory, and eager for light and discussion. In scores of plants he has introduced reforms in the ways suggested by the titles of Miss Tarbell's chapters: "Our New Workshops"; "A Fine Place to Work"; "The Gospel of Safety"; "Health for Every Man"; "Sober First"; "Good Homes Make Good Workers"; "A Man's Hours"; "A Man's Hire"; "Experiments in Justice"; "Steadying the Job"; "The Factory as a School"; and "Our New Industrial Leader." Although not unmindful of the claims of organized labor and unorganized consumer, she appears in her social theory to rely most on the efforts of an enlightened few who perceive the affinity between good business and general welfare. This aspect of the labor question should be stressed. The achievements of business men who have discarded the dogmas and harsh methods of the early stages of the great industry are notable and significant. Even the I.W.W. must admit that there is some leaven in the old lump.

It is true, unfortunately, that in the author's discussion a clear distinction is not drawn between those cases in which the employers' self-initiated plans actually do pay, and the improvements which advancing ethical and legal standards demand but which may not profit employers.

Miss Tarbell's story relates primarily to the employers who appreciate human nature sufficiently to devise methods of stimulating co-operation, decency, and fellowship in their employees within the limits set by the exigencies of business. There *is* a certain area of harmony between wages, profits, and personal good-will. Beyond, however, is a wilder border area in which titles are not clear and in which human interests, individual and group, other than those abstractly expressed by the word "employer" may have prior and just claim. The problems set by this area are the baffling ones of social readjustment; the former problems fall largely within the field of social statics and are easier.

Nevertheless, even in this field there are unsettled questions which the keen intelligence of scientific managers has not answered. Not to speak of the proper proportion of reward which should go to the workman under efficiency systems, the reader is struck by the following incident: "I once heard a safety expert of a great plant tell of giving \$75.00 to a worker for a suggestion which he said was saving the firm \$2,000 a year. The man said very frankly, 'The man himself, a foreigner who could speak very little English, was highly gratified; but I felt as if I were robbing him'; and his feeling was just" (p. 305).

The encouraging examples of profit-sharing, control of unemployment, housing, welfare projects, and scientific management which the author describes seem after all to represent but a small segment of the field of economic enterprise. Consequently, unwary readers who grow complacent and optimistic on reading Miss Tarbell's cheerful pages should hasten to consult the census returns on the number of factory establishments and the wages of women and children; they should read the tale of the opposition of employers to proposed legislation on safety, health, and child labor. At the same time a discriminating appraisal of the theory and practice of scientific management, which was made in Professor Robert F. Hoxie's report, may well be considered in order to connect Miss Tarbell's jublations with the discords of industry. Finally, they should study the fundamental review of this book which was formulated by Mr. Robert G. Valentine in his survey of the factors involved in the problem of economic readjustment and printed in the preceding number of this *Journal*.

E. L. TALBERT

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Mental Conflicts and Misconduct. By WILLIAM HEALY. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1917. Pp. xi+325. \$2.50.

In four introductory chapters (77 pages) the author sets forth, in a simple fashion for the lay worker, the conceptions fundamental to psycho-analysis and the methods used in applying them in the field of juvenile misconduct. The bulk of the work (chapters v-xvi, 234 pages) is devoted to clinical histories of thirty-six cases of mental conflict in juvenile offenders. A final chapter of fourteen pages presents his conclusions.

This work, like others of Dr. Healy, presents the results of pioneer effort. It is the first series of analyses of conflicts in young offenders.

His exposition of the methods of getting at the mental conflicts, as well as the method itself, is so simple that it obviates much of the occultism of some psycho-analysts. His reliance primarily upon the presentation of the facts of the clinic and the procedure therein makes it a work which must be made a starting-point by any future worker in the same field. It is also presented so simply that it must convince any careful reader familiar with young offenders that some of his troublesome cases, who are not feeble-minded and are not insane, may be susceptible to analysis and recovery. It may even be that some of our moral imbeciles, so called, may have a "conflict" etiology, as the author suggests (p. 323). The work is a demonstration that the study of conflicts is a "method of study of some problems of misconduct."

The reported cases (26) seem to be culled from 130 of record (p. 316) in the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute (Chicago).

It would seem that the cases could have been more carefully classified and presented more systematically. In spite of the facts that these thirty-six cases are presented in twelve chapters and that each chapter has a title, the chapter headings mean very little. Chapter headings and cases seem to have been selected and arranged by chance. For instance, chapter x, "Conflicts Arising from Sex Experiences," and chapter xi, "Conflicts Arising from Secret Sex Knowledge," follow upon five chapters of fourteen cases, in thirteen of which conflicts have been found to center in experience or secret knowledge of sex matters. Minor matters of loose structure, such as on pages 105, 116, and 322, and an ineffective index, which does not tabulate "parentage" or "running away," should have attention in a new edition.

The genius of the author as shown in the application of this method of treatment to a class of juvenile offenders cannot be too highly commended. Many puzzling cases will resolve themselves in the light of these histories. Mental conflicts in children are shown to be due principally to sex matters and hidden knowledge about parentage in a well-equipped mind left without means of making sympathetic confidences to older persons in the family. The author finds these children generally willing to communicate these things, whereas their parents claim often to have found them quite inaccessible. The type of child subject to a complex is not a "shut-in" personality of the psychiatric classification. But the author's statements of some of his cases do leave one with the question as to how much sympathy at home, for which he pleads, could have done in preventing the formation of the conflict. This is notably the case with "Royal M.," p. 114.

Besides opening up a new method of treatment of a hitherto baffling species of delinquent, the work as a whole constitutes a potent argument for the study of *juvenile* offenders. As contrasted with study of adult offenders, the juveniles are more *naïve* and *accessible*, yielding better results; and they are more susceptible to training or re-education. A man like Dr. Healy can reclaim many from criminal careers. This work is an exhibition of *preventive mental medicine*.

THOMAS H. HAINES, M.D.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR MENTAL HYGIENE

Social Diagnosis. By MARY E. RICHMOND. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1917. Pp. 511. \$2.00.

Kipling says: "If anything is worth having, it is worth going to some trouble to come at." Frankly, this is the fact regarding Miss Richmond's *Social Diagnosis*, published in May and now in its second edition.

It is the only comprehensive textbook on social work in relation to the individual or family ever written. The book dignifies all social work and marks its first steps on the road to becoming a profession.

The book is not only a textbook but an encyclopedia of information concerning the best practices in social work in all fields. Its theme is the supreme necessity of the social worker to be equipped to assemble and interpret facts. An apotheosis of facts by one who comprehends the cost in money, effort, and intelligence of gathering them, it sets a goal, the attainment of which will utilize the finest effort of workers for years.

The reader's attention is arrested by the freshness of the material and the originality of its presentation. Point after point stands out unique. First comes the assertion of the identity of all social casework: "It soon became apparent," states the author, "that in essentials the methods and aims of social casework were or should be the same in every type of service, whether the subject was a homeless paralytic, the neglected boy of drunken parents, or the widowed mother of small children."

This theory of hers, when accepted and acted upon, will revolutionize the methods and organization of public and private charitable and correctional agencies.

Then follows a discussion of the nature and use of evidence, with warnings concerning the fallibility of witnesses, their suggestibility, the possibility of their racial, national, or self-interest bias, and their possible unreliability because of inattention.

Five chapters are devoted to an exhaustive elaboration of this most original and valuable discussion. These chapters mark the only serious effort to place before the court officers and agents administering social legislation throughout the country a manual to guide them in their tasks. Miss Richmond recognizes that it is among the poor unfortunates that our social legislation programs are tried out. Right here lies her justification for the title which has been challenged by some as too broad for the scope of the book.

The third conspicuously original subject is the discussion of documentary sources of information.

The fourth subject, on which practically nothing has been written before, is what the author calls the interpretation of material. She says: "Obviously it is not enough to add statement to statement, as a phonograph would. The processes of inference, of comparison of material, begin with the first interview and continue through all the steps leading to diagnosis."

And as a climax to this succession of original material is a series of questionnaires concerning types of social disabilities. As the author states, "The purpose and limitations of those questionnaires are bound to be misunderstood by some who attempt to use them, no matter how clearly it is set forth that none are sets of questions to be asked of clients and that none are schedules, the answers to which are to be filled in by anyone. . . . It is in the suggestion of alternative situations and explanations that these questionnaires will, it is hoped, prove of some help."

The book is shot through with bits of sympathetic understanding of the trials, as well as wise recognition of the failures, of social workers. The book is one to be studied and lived with.

Its publication marks the social worker's opportunity to raise his standard of work almost immeasurably, and it also marks the opportunity of the public to become alive in social work "to the difference between going through the motions of doing things and actually doing things."

The book will be applauded by many in all vocations; it will be fully appreciated by the keen-minded, honest-purposed social workers who have eagerly awaited its advent, and whose highest hopes have been justified. It is a great book by a great teacher, and its usefulness is limited only by the mental grasp of those for whom it was written.

AMELIA SEARS

WOMAN'S CITY CLUB OF CHICAGO

Industrial Accident Prevention. By DAVID STEWART BEYER.
Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916. Pp. vii
+421. \$10.00.

This volume represents a great advance in the literature of human conservation. More comprehensive than Van Schaack's book which covered only woodworking safeguards, or than Schwedtman and Emery's which treated mainly compensation systems with only incidental reference to mechanical safety devices, it is veritably encyclopedic in range. While designed primarily for the field of accident prevention proper, it includes much well-selected information on sanitation, relief and welfare work, hospital and first-aid equipment. Hence it is a valuable guide for protecting both the workers and the public. Though here and there one encounters engineering formulae, on the whole it is so simply and clearly written that the unschooled layman can turn to it with confidence. Hundreds of illustrations, chiefly photographs rather than drawings, reinforce the conviction that safety devices are actualities, not mere idiosyncrasies of the author. The outstanding impression the book leaves is the tremendous momentum of the safety movement. Many of the devices described are already on the market. And much of the illustrative material is drawn from the safety codes of such concerns as the Abrasive Wheel Manufacturers, National Founders Association, General Chemical Company, American Gas Institute, United States Steel Corporation, and from public sources like the United States Bureau of Mines and the Interstate Commerce Commission. The chapter on safety organizations, publications, etc., is a revelation of new developments in "social structure" and telesis. The chapter on safety education is perhaps the most interesting to the practical sociologist, though he might wish the author had broadened his definition of safety education to include beside "the entire personnel of a given plant or industry" the careless stumbling public. The social psychologist should find in the section on safety slogans materials illustrating the attempt to make conservation "good form." That the safety movement has already profoundly touched our industrial life is evident from the tables showing notable decreases in both fatal and non-fatal injuries in concerns using preventive methods.

In so comprehensive a work it is inevitable that some topics should receive more detailed treatment than others. Fire protection, lighting, ventilation, electrical hazards, explosive dusts, and machine guards get the greater share of space. The chapters on compensatory legislation, occupational diseases, sanitation, and welfare work are mere

suggestive summaries. But in every case the reader is directed to sources for fuller information. Hence the impression he gets that the author is a scholar as well as a safety inspector and manager of the accident department of an important employees' insurance association. A good though brief bibliography and a fourteen-page index add to the value and usability of the book for students, employees and those responsible for the direction of great industrial undertakings.

ARTHUR J. TODD

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

City Planning. A Series of Papers Presenting the Essential Elements of a City Plan. Edited by JOHN NOLEN. (The National Municipal League Series.) New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1916. Pp. xxvi+447.

There are eighteen chapters in this book, by seventeen different writers. Among the contributors are such well-known names in city planning as Frederick Law Olmsted, John Nolen, Frank Bacus Williams, Edward H. Bennett, Flavel Shurtleff, and Charles Mulford Robinson. Each person writes a chapter in a field in which he is an expert. A valuable feature of the book is a short biographical sketch of each writer, showing his expert training; this increases the reader's respect for the contributor's chapter. To have secured the co-operation of such experts in the preparation of this work is a worthy achievement. Each chapter is followed by a bibliography in the special subject treated; there is a general bibliography at the end of the book. There are many illustrations. The book is full of thought and valuable suggestions and deserves serious reading.

As might be expected, the papers are of different value, and some duplications have slipped in. At least one of the chapters is hardly worthy of printing in this book, while others are invaluable. The reader frequently has the feeling that the material was originally prepared "for another occasion"—one or two papers admit this. One notices the omission of a chapter on municipal aesthetics. The best city planning does not overlook planning for the "city beautiful."

As far as sociology is concerned, we find a wide range in the different chapters, from that by James B. Ford, in which the citizen is recognized as the most important part of the city (chap. xvi), to that by Mr. Olmsted, in which there is little evidence of any information about sociology (chap. i).

The science of city planning is coming into its own in the United States, when two such meritorious books as the one under review and *City Planning* by C. M. Robinson appear within a few months of each other.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Diseases of Occupation and Vocational Hygiene. Edited by GEORGE M. KOBER AND WILLIAM C. HANSON. Pp. xxi+918. Figs. 46. Philadelphia: P. Blakiston's Son & Co. \$8.00 net.

This work deals with the various aspects of occupational hygiene and its relations to health and longevity. The editors deserve commendation for the admirable manner in which the material is presented. The contributors (among whom is the late Dr. Charles Richmond Henderson) are recognized leaders in their particular fields. Although the respective articles have been written by a large number of men, it is exceedingly gratifying to note the general tone of conservatism displayed throughout, especially in the medical discussions. In the Foreword the editors state: "The constant aim has been the presentation of the basic data concerning the diseases of occupation in such a way as to render them available, not only to physicians, but also to employers, employees, efficiency experts, public health officials, and legislators, for it is only as a knowledge of the character, gravity, causes, and prevention of these diseases is diffused that corrective and preventive action can be expected."

Part I includes the specific and systemic diseases of occupation; for example, several sections are given to excellent discussions of lead poisoning. Sir Thomas Oliver of England reports on the prevalency of the poison in Great Britain, the chemistry, the essential requirements and uses of lead, its symptomatology and treatment. Following this, Dr. H. Linenthal of Boston gives the results of his large experience in the early diagnosis of lead intoxication. In the next chapter Dr. Alice Hamilton, whose government monographs on lead poisoning are well known, elaborates on this industrial disease as it occurs in the United States, giving many valuable statistics, including Dr. A. J. Carlson's research on galena poisoning. In Part II, which deals with the causation and prevention of occupational diseases, appears another excellent chapter on lead, by Dr. Kober, dealing especially with the preventive measures. Finally, in the third part of the book a number of pages are devoted to the recent

laws in reference to this occupational poisoning. Part III is intended to be of service to those who may be called to investigate shops, factories, dispensaries, and hospitals, and the relation of occupations to disability and disease. The discussions on legislation and governmental statistics are exceedingly valuable.

The book is well composed and contains many interesting illustrations. The various phases which are so adequately presented in this far-reading study make the book a worthy addition to the working library of scientific men, social workers, employers, and legislators.

PAUL NICHOLAS LEECH

CHICAGO, ILL.

Millinery as a Trade for Women. By LORINDA PERRY, Fellow in the Department of Research, Women's Educational and Industrial Union, Boston. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1916. Pp. xvii+134. \$1.50.

An investigation of the millinery trade for women in Boston and Philadelphia is here presented. The book is a Doctor's thesis. Millinery is conspicuously one of the seasonal, unregulated, handicraft trades, attracting young workers because of its "supposedly" artistic character and the social prestige attaching to it, yet paying, to the greater number of its employees, less than a living wage. It is thus, also, a conspicuous example of a parasitic, subsidized trade. The seasonal character of the work is given as the chief reason for the millinery worker's need of a subsidy. It would be of value to have here for comparison facts as to the making of other objects controlled as millinery is by fashion and the making of similar objects for men not so definitely or completely controlled by fashion, in order to throw more light on the question whether the seasonal trades, such as this, and their attendant irregularity of employment, are so in the nature of the trade itself, or whether it is the irrational control exercised by fashion that is responsible for many of the evils connected with this and other trades.

The present inquiry is limited in scope, but carefully and accurately made. It presents conditions in the trade on the one hand, and an account and estimate of the training for the trade on the other, so that it is of especial interest to trade schools and vocational bureaus as well as to boards of education.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

COLUMBIA, MO.

Form and Functions of American Government. By THOMAS HARRISON REED. Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Co., 1916. Pp. xv+549.

The task of preparing a high-school text in civics that will stimulate interest, afford an accurate, practical, and at the same time a pedagogical approach to the problems of government and politics, and which leaves the student with a wholesome, sane viewpoint of civic responsibility, has recently been undertaken by several able authors. That this important matter is finally receiving such attention is most hopeful, and the present volume is a valuable contribution to the problem.

The work is so comprehensive that practically every important phase of political life is given some attention. In doing this, the author has shown remarkable skill in being brief without being misleading. The language is simple and clear, the statements unusually accurate, and the treatment of controverted matters fair and impartial. A most commendable feature is the evolutionary or organic viewpoint, which finds consistent expression throughout. For example, in dealing with the powers of the Speaker and the Rules Committee, instead of the orthodox, dogmatic statement of their autocratic power one finds the historical precedents, the necessities growing out of the immense bulk of legislation, and the consequent concentration of authority with its attendant abuses. The student of this volume will find that government is in a constant process of change and adjustment, and that back of every institution lies a fascinating story of the forces, ideas, and conditions that gave it birth.

Under the author's arrangement the functions of government are treated separately, the last one hundred eighty pages being devoted to the subject. In the reviewer's judgment this material might better have been used in connection with the study of the appropriate framework and institutions. While perhaps not so logical, it would have been more psychological and would have stimulated greater attention to the skeleton of government by clothing it with the flesh and blood of human interest. It is through the functions of government that the social significance of its framework becomes apparent.

The volume is well proportioned, the relative attention given to local and state government and functions as compared with the federal government being much greater than has been normally the case and directly in line with the best thought on the subject.

On the whole, this text marks a decided advance. The entire work indicates more careful study, more patient and scholarly effort, a better

grasp of the problem, and more skilful craftsmanship than are generally found in elementary texts. There is abundant reason to believe that the actual results will fully justify the author's time and effort.

ARNOLD BENNETT HALL

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Principles of Labor Legislation. By JOHN R. COMMONS, LL.D., and JOHN B. ANDREWS, PH.D. New York: Harpers, 1916. Pp. 524.

In *The Principles of Labor Legislation*, by Professor Commons and Dr. Andrews, we have both an important contribution to social-economic literature and an excellent text. The authors have performed a difficult task so well that they have set a new standard of workmanship in the field of labor problems.

The volume is divided into nine chapters, dealing, respectively, with "The Basis of Labor Law," "Individual Bargaining," "Collective Bargaining," "The Minimum Wage," "The Hours of Labor," "Unemployment," "Safety and Health," "Social Insurance," and "Administration." It closes with an acceptable classified bibliography, a list of cases cited, and an excellent index.

The book is both critical and constructive and the authors have tried to emphasize the principles of labor law rather than mere detail. Yet at times the circumstances under which the volume has been prepared have led to the introduction of detail drawn from many countries, the full significance of which is not evident, and the principles involved do not stand out as clearly as they should. This is the only criticism of any importance to be offered and it applies to only a part of the book. For such a comprehensive study there are few statements to which the student will take exception. In view of the standards set in Oregon, Washington, and Massachusetts, however, he will question the correctness of the statement (p. 178) that the minimum wage in the United States is to be "regarded entirely as a remedy for exceptional conditions, providing only a bare subsistence wage for those considered the most helpless class of sweated workers—namely, women and children." He will take exception also to the uncritical acceptance (p. 405) of Squier's estimate of the extent of old-age poverty in the United States. However they may be interpreted, Squier's statements that "approximately 1,250,000 of the people of the United States above sixty-five years of age are dependent upon public and private charity to the amount of

about \$250,000,000 annually, and that "thus far one person in eighteen of our wage-earners reaches the age of sixty-five in penury," do not agree with the data available.

H. A. MILLIS

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Outline of Applied Sociology. By HENRY P. FAIRCHILD. New York: Macmillan, 1916. Pp. x+353. \$1.75.

Of the various methods of introducing the subject of sociology to the student, that of presenting a comprehensive view of the field is gaining ground. Professor Fairchild in the *Outline of Applied Sociology* has taken a far-reaching view of the entire field of social activities and has aimed to correlate as logically as possible the various forms of social organization and to show the relationship between apparently divergent social activities.

The author has also steered clear of writing a book of dogmatic sociological conclusions. Instead, he has held closely to the presentation of concrete sociological data, which are classified upon the basis of Sumner's fourfold analysis of primitive social forces. Accordingly, the activities of modern society are discussed under four general headings: the economic life, the growth of population and family life, the aesthetic life, and the intellectual and spiritual life. To the social data under this classification are applied the tests of normality and abnormality. Normality is used as referring to the harmonious working together of all the parts of an organism, involving the ideas of welfare and progress. The normal aspects of society are the only bases for the study of the abnormal and pathological and for working out plans for improving society—a point of view which cannot be taught too extensively. Abnormality in social life is of two types: immorality and incompetence. Three kinds of immorality are indicated: sin, crime, and vice. Two kinds of incompetence are given: incapacity and maladjustment. In the improvement of his conditions of life the individual is accorded definite responsibility—the author assumes the doctrine of "the freedom of the will," a position which, without quibbling, is as tenable as, if not more so than, any other.

As to weaknesses, the reviewer finds only those which naturally might be expected to follow from the tremendous size of the task which the author has undertaken. Four points will be mentioned at which the book may be strengthened: (1) a more elaborate analysis of the phases of social life, e.g., political life might be given separate consideration; (2) a more logical analysis of the subheadings, e.g., the reasons do not

seem sufficient for placing a discussion of the use of habit-forming drugs, tobacco, and alcohol primarily under the aesthetic life (as abnormal aspects); (3) the thoroughgoing treatment of the economic life and of the family life (growth of population) may well be extended to the handling of the aesthetic life and the intellectual and spiritual life (true, there are not as tangible data available in these fields as in the other fields mentioned, but sufficient, it would seem, for an extensive presentation); the importance of these fields would seem to call for further treatment; and (4) more specific emphasis upon the vital and ever-present psychological and subjective forces in human interrelationships.

The style of the book is clear, wholesome, and constructive. It is a contribution to a comprehensive consideration of social life and progress on the part of the person who is beginning a scientific study of society.

E. S. BOGARDUS

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

The Physical Basis of Society. By CARL KELSEY. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1916. Pp. xvi+406. \$2.00.

The advantages which the beginning students in sociology at the University of Pennsylvania have had in listening to the survey of the geographic and biological basis of human evolution have now been opened, in a way, to beginning sociological students elsewhere. Professor Kelsey has brought together within a small compass a countless number of facts (physical, hereditary, environmental) which throw light on the nature of human development. Among the anthropo-geographic sources from which the author draws are Osborn, Hann, Semple, Shelford, and Huntington; and among the biological and evolutionary sources are Bateson, Thomson, Pearson, Boas, Thomas, Kropotkin, Ellis, Woods, and White.

Quotations are used extensively. Few generalizations and personal inductions are given. The facts which are presented represent, in general, the best expression of recent findings in the given fields. The author's own thought appears more definitely in the closing chapters and especially in the last one, on "The Nature of Progress," in which the author presents five sets of tests of the fitness of a people or nation to survive and to advance.

The defects, as far as there are any, are essentially those which are related to the use of the survey method. The extensive character of the facts which are given would seem to justify more personal induction than

one finds in the book. A few inaccuracies occur; e.g., the sentence (p. 27) "Activity is determined by structure" is too categorical and would probably be more accurate if stated: "Activity leads to structure, but is limited by it." "Credulity" appears (p. 129) when incredulity is intended.

A splendid and original service has been performed by Professor Kelsey in selecting, bringing together, organizing, and presenting in one volume such a fund of concrete material upon the physical bases of social progress. Students undertaking sociological studies, and the busy reader alike, will find the book of increasing usefulness.

E. S. BOGARDUS

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

An Introduction to Educational Sociology. By WALTER ROBINSON SMITH, PH.D. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1917. \$1.75 net.

Educational sociology does not cover the whole of sociology, even in conspectus. Dr. Smith defines his subject as "the application of the scientific spirit, methods, and principles of sociology to the study of education" (p. 15). It would therefore seem to the reviewer that educational sociology is not sociology at all, in the ordinary meaning of the term, but rather a sociological study of education—that the adjective should be made the noun and the noun the adjective. But that is only a matter of names.

Such a correlation of two different subjects would naturally presuppose some acquaintance with both. "Educational sociology," our author says, "must take into account every phase of sociological thought, but in an elementary treatise an application of the teachings of each division of the general field would be needlessly complex and academic" (pp. 42, 43). He merely selects those principles out of the general field which seem to be necessary to educational sociology as a system coherent within itself. In the list of courses in the Kansas Normal School "general sociology" and "advanced sociology" precede "educational sociology." Yet Dr. Smith says in his preface that he is writing for "educators untrained in sociology, and undergraduates with little training in either field," which means that educational sociology may be an application of sociology only in the mind of the instructor; it is an independent discipline to be developed on foundations of its own.

This book is in two parts of ten chapters each. The first part, and the shorter, is "Sociological Foundations"; the second is "Educational Applications."

Chap. i, "Sociology and Its Relation to Education," is introductory material, such as its title would indicate. The second chapter, "The Individual and the Social Group," presents in twelve pages the mutual interdependence of the individuals in society, after the manner of Baldwin and Cooley, with educational applications in seven pages. The third chapter, "Social Organization," has paragraphs on social osmosis, communication, imitation, and other related topics. The central feature of it, however, is an "analysis of social groups" into three kinds: primary, intermediate, and secondary. This is a logical working out of Cooley's doctrine of primary groups, which are "characterized by intimate face-to-face association and co-operation." If there are primary groups, there must be secondary groups also, "in which relationships are almost wholly indirect," and then intermediate groups to represent the necessary transition from primary to secondary. Chaps. iv-vi treat of the primary groups, which are, respectively, the family, the play groups, and the community. The intermediate groups form the subject of chap. vii—"the school, the church, and a variety of fraternal organizations." "Among secondary groups the state is far the most important," and chap. viii is devoted to that, and two-thirds of it to the relation of the state to education. Then comes a chapter on "The Growth of Democracy, and Its Relation to Education." Political democracy shows the growth most clearly; economic democracy is next in order, and by it the author seems to mean economic freedom of the individual rather than popular control of industry; then comes mention of social democracy, democracy of culture, democracy in education.

The treatment is sane. The style is clear. A wide influence is predicted for the book.

F. R. CLOW

STATE NORMAL SCHOOL,
OSHKOSH, WIS.

Being Well-Born. By MICHAEL F. GUYER, PH.D. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1916. Pp. 374.

Much writing on the subject of eugenics has shown serious limitations from the point of view of the general reader; if the author has escaped the rocks of biological technicalities, it has been only to be lost in a flood of sociological crudities. We are dependent almost necessarily upon the biologists for our books in this field, since the presuppositions of eugenics are primarily biological, but only now and then has a writer added to his biological competence a discerning mind in the use of social data. The

result has been that books which began well with chromosomes and gametes ended lamely with social prophecies based on half-baked statistical inferences.

Professor Guyer has happily avoided these pitfalls for the most part and has given us a volume which combines lucid biological exposition with temperate and illuminating discussion of the social as well as the biological factors. The first half of the book describes the mechanism of heredity in some detail; succeeding chapters take up the inheritance of acquired characters, prenatal influences, moral responsibility, mental and nervous defects, crime and delinquency, and race betterment through heredity. Chap. ix, dealing with crime and delinquency, is particularly timely, correcting, as it does, the overemphasis of mental defect as a cause of crime which has been so common. The discussion of sterilization is another topic revealing excellent judgment. Altogether this little book does for the reader of today what Kellicott's *Social Direction of Human Evolution* undertook to do six years ago and does it much better. A useful glossary is appended.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

ERVILLE B. WOODS

The Drama of Savage Peoples. By LOOMIS HAVEMEYER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1916. Pp. viii+374.

In this interesting essay the author has made a study of those primitive forms of the drama that preceded the Greek. It brings together into one continuous account the scattered references of well-attested authorities and indicates the connection between the savage drama and later forms.

The primitive drama begins with savage man's first crude efforts to express his ideas in pantomime. The universal human tendency to imitate is a fundamental psychic element in the drama, and this is seen in primitive man's effort to recount to the homefolks the experiences of the journey. Here we have the dramatic narrative. But savages use the drama for religious purposes. Sympathetic magic forms the basis of most savage religious drama, and the earliest dramatic religious ceremonies are in connection with plants and animals. When a higher stage is reached, the minds of the people are raised above the all-absorbing process of food-getting, and the theme of the drama changes. Initiation ceremonies illustrate another form taken by the religious drama and seek to teach the boys the history of their people and the morality of their tribe. Although the acting out of historical events by savages

corresponds very closely to the modern pageant, it should be remembered that the religious element is the invariable background of these primitive performances. War ceremonies form an important part of the religious drama. In early Greek drama the vegetation rites of sympathetic magic are marked. In later times the religious element remains, because the plays were held at the festival of Dionysus rather than because it was a part of the subject-matter of the play. In the Middle Ages the drama is reborn in religion, chiefly for the purpose of instructing people concerning the Bible. The Christian festival seasons represent a tendency of the religious drama away from absolute worship, as represented by the Roman Catholic mass, toward plays given for the instruction of the people.

The book is a useful contribution to our knowledge of an interesting human institution.

F. STUART CHAPIN

SMITH COLLEGE

Unfair Competition. By WILLIAM H. S. STEVENS, PH.D.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1917. Pp. iv+266.
\$1.50.

The publication of *Unfair Competition* is timely. The scope of the book is indicated by the chapter headings: "Local Price-Cutting," "Operation of Bogus 'Independent' Concerns," "Fighting Instruments," "Conditional Requirements," "Exclusive Arrangements," "Blacklists, Boycotts, White Lists, etc.," "Rebates and Preferential Arrangements," "Engrossing Machinery or Goods Used in the Manufacturing Process," "Espionage," "Coercion, Threats, Intimidation," "Interference and Manipulation." The author discusses the foregoing as the leading forms of unfair competition. He shows in the first part of each chapter how the particular method of unfair competition is used by large concerns to defeat rivals, and in the latter part of the chapter some space is given to an appraisal of the method of competitive warfare.

General interest in the methods of unfair competition took concrete form in the Sherman Anti-Trust act of 1890 and in the decisions of the courts under this law, and more recently in the Clayton act and the Trade Commission act. The author points out that "unfair competition" formerly meant the marketing of goods by methods involving fraud, misrepresentation, etc. While all these recent acts undoubtedly cover unfair competition in the old meaning, the Federal Trade Com-

mission act was directed especially against a new set of evils, which may be described as "economically unfair." It may also be added that the Sherman Anti-Trust act and the court decisions under it had very definitely in mind also these new economic evils.

The author is very clear in his statement of what "is involved in economically fair competition."

In an economic sense fair competition signifies a competition of economic or productive efficiency. In other words, an organization is entitled to remain in business as long as its production or selling costs enable it to compete in a free and open market. As the productive and selling efficiency of one or more competing concerns in any line of business increases beyond that of others the price of the goods sold tends correspondingly to decline. The more efficient organizations reduce the price in an endeavor to increase their volume of sales, expecting more than to compensate for the decreased profit per unit by the larger number of units sold. Generally, marginal concerns will gradually lose their market. Ultimately, if unable to reduce or hold their costs below the market price, they will be compelled to discontinue business.

The forces here described are held to be antagonistic to free competition because they do not permit the strongest economic institutions or those which produce at lowest cost to survive and eliminate those which produce at highest costs by lowering the prices of commodities to points at which the latter cannot produce. Moreover, those which produce at least cost may be forced to close by being restricted in competition by some of these methods of unfair competition.

Each of the methods enumerated is considered opposed to social welfare. The chapter on "Exclusive Arrangements" is, in the writer's opinion, the weakest chapter of the book, as these arrangements, while classified and considered separately, are adjudged equally objectionable. If the producer desires to sell a portion of his commodities to the consumer at a certain price, it is often necessary for him to make definite contracts with salesmen or appoint middlemen as agents to sell his products. The purpose of the exclusive arrangement should determine whether it is objectionable. Some of these arrangements are very objectionable while others are not, because if we are to justify the right of a producer to sell his standardized product at a fixed price we must not deny him the privilege of making all contracts or arrangements by which the end may be accomplished.

The book is replete with illustrations, is written in an interesting style, and will be welcomed by all interested in this important subject.

J. E. HAGERTY

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The Children's Library. By SOPHY H. POWELL. New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1917. Pp. xiv+460. \$1.75.

This book is unexpectedly interesting and thought-provoking. Its purpose is to present to those interested in children "a study of library work with children based upon broad educational principles and concrete facts, and not upon the opinions of any one class of workers." The discussion begins with the fundamental question of the place of books in education. Conventional theories and practice in this matter are critically discussed: the importance of books in education has been overemphasized and misemphasized, especially for children. Books, for children, are not as valuable as seeing and doing; physiologically and psychologically they may be unsuited to children. As conveyors of moral instruction they are only secondary in importance, and the cultural aspects of literature are, of course, lost upon children. The use of books for children has been ineffective in several ways. Their use has been taught "according to mediaeval and even ancient conceptions which do not fit modern requirements." Children have not learned the use of books as sources of information, on the one hand, nor, on the other, has their reading developed in them discriminating taste, for the difficulty of the mere mechanics of reading for children prevents this.

What values, then, have books for children? The chapter does not make this as clear as the respects in which books have not been properly utilized, but suggests a more functional use of books as sources of information on specific questions, as adjuncts to the more vital ways of learning, and as sources of the condensed experience of the race. "Only in the aged can books be the sole means of cultivating mind and spirit. For the young they are the least important; they may even hinder the ability to think and do."

On the basis of this chapter more specific topics are treated—early libraries for children, the elementary-school library, the high-school library, the library resources of country children. Each of these subjects is discussed fully and in detail: the history, the administrative and mechanical aspects of the problem, together with a mass of concrete facts from contemporary experience in various parts of the country. The pros and cons of conventional theories of library work with children are fully treated, but especially their relation to the real, not supposed or superimposed, needs of children.

Perhaps an even more significant portion of the book is that dealing with the relation, in various phases, of the library and the public school. Here the chapters are entitled, "Public Library Relations with Public

Schools," "The Public Library an Integral Part of Public Education," "The Children's Room," "The Children's Librarian and Her Training." The value of the contribution to the reading of children of both librarian and teacher is examined and emphasized. And under present conditions the shortcomings of each are brought out—the excessive and exclusive bookishness of the librarian, his frequent ignorance both of child psychology and of modern educational standards and values, and the conventional mold in which the teacher's, especially the English teacher's, conception of good reading is cast. The necessity of co-operation between library and school for the best interest of the child is strongly emphasized. One of the most significant points stressed at various places in the book is the responsibility of the library toward young working children, early deprived of their schooling.

An example of the critical method of the author is her discussion of the much-lauded children's room, which, it appears upon careful examination, neither meets an otherwise unmet educational need nor does it properly meet a real recreational need. The last chapter, on "Some Social Aspects of Library Work with Children," suggests a number of possibilities for the library in a wider social field. A full bibliography of 116 pages completes the book. Misprints on pages 77, 232, and 195 should be noted.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

COLUMBIA, MO.

The Minimum Cost of Living. A Study of Families of Limited Income in New York City. By WINIFRED STUART GIBBS. Macmillan, 1917. Pp. vii+93. \$1.00.

The household account kept by seventy-five families receiving relief from the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor forms the basis of this study. An outline of the instruction given the mother by the workers of the home economics department of this society and the detailed list of food materials bought by each family will be of interest to workers in similar fields. There is also given the amount spent by each for rent, food, fuel, and light and sundries, affording material for additional deductions to those drawn by the author.

FLORENCE NESBITT

COOK COUNTY JUVENILE COURT

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Nationalism in the West.—A nation is that aspect which a whole population assumes when organized for a mechanical purpose. Society as such has no ulterior purpose; it is an end in itself. Whenever mechanical purposes are supreme, conflict ensues; economic rivalry brings rivalry where co-operation should obtain. India has been under foreign rulers, but they have been human; all have brought the tribute of their lives to India. But the present government is like a machine. It is an applied science, a hydraulic press whose pressure is impersonal and on that account completely effective. Mortal man has given way to the political and commercial man, the man of limited purpose. Conflict and conquest and not co-operation are at the bottom of Western civilization; even a federation of nations would not have a soul. The war brings home the fact that the West has been systematically petrifying her moral nature in order to lay a solid foundation for her gigantic abstractions of efficiency. In the Middle Ages, Europe was human; men's thought pondered the questions of the soul. Man is now becoming like an exaggerated giraffe; the greedy head is reaping the topmost foliage while the heart is starving. Man in his fulness is not powerful, but perfect; when you make him powerful, you narrow his soul. In this war man is fighting his own creation; the death-throes of the nation have begun. We of the no-nations will some day be thankful that we waited patiently and did not trust machines.—Rabindranath Tagore, *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1917. J. P. S.

Sociology and Psychology.—The difference between sociology and psychology is chiefly one of method. It is the province of sociology to study the interactions, institutions, mythology, and traditions of social groups. It is the business of sociology to ascertain what happens and what has happened before it tries to explain why it happens and has happened. Psychology differs from this only in interpreting these phenomena and explaining why they happen. It is only by means of the psychological method that we can construct the history of the past, especially when a people is devoid of any written record. Westermarch is wrong in assuming that blood-feud is explained by revenge. He does not show that revenge is a universal human trait. Sociology is dependent upon conclusions from psychology to support its assumptions, just as geology is dependent upon chemistry and physics for the explanations of *why* things happened in the geological past. The greatest hope for sociology in the future is in the late movement in psychology connected with the name of Freud and his theory of dreams and the subconscious state as explanations of human conduct. It is on this basis that we can hope to attain a sound knowledge of social psychology. W. H. R. Rivers, *Sociological Review*, Vol. IX, No. 1, Autumn, 1916. A. O. B.

Class-Consciousness.—The distinguishing feature of class-consciousness is the disposition to find one's common interests in connection with a well-defined and exclusive group, and to allow this special connection to dominate one's whole political outlook and activity.

It is with the rise of modern democracy that class-consciousness begins to loom vaguely as a portent. Democracy is criticized in that as soon as the majority discovered their power they would at once rise and expropriate the helpless minority. This, however, does not follow; for in a modern democracy the populace is not a mob which spontaneously will flock to plunder as soon as the ballot is put into its hands. Private interests and points of view are combined with circumstances which insure that these shall meet one another in the field of reason and discussion. In this way the idea of hard-and-fast class lines is discountenanced, and rational considerations, and not selfish interests, gain a preponderating influence. The growth of an intelligent

and convinced majority is encouraged, and they are put in a position to insure that their conviction shall be honestly and promptly carried out.

While there is a tendency to draw class lines in political action among men separated into groups by a conflict of interests, yet the sifting process involved in discussion makes minority representation difficult. In a democracy it is neither the majority nor the minority which rules. A shifting majority rules.—A. K. Rogers, *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1917. A. F. K.

Instinct and the Rational Life.—Man is the rational being. He is also non-rational. A study of human nature involves a study of human behavior. Actions are rational, intelligent, instinctive, or reflex. Rational behavior indicates a capacity to pass judgments. Intelligence involves an associative memory process. In animals associations are formed in the absence of the rational process. Our educational methods reflect the importance of associative memory in man. An examination of associative memory leads to a type of physiological mechanism, the instincts, which may be regarded as complex reflexes. Reflex action is associated with the neuromuscular mechanism. Instinctive actions are influenced by the physiological process and the surrounding conditions. Some reactions are more stable than others. Conditioned or unstable reflexes are the products of training. Reflexes of the unconditioned, instinctive type are the most stable. "The physiological mechanism of intelligent behavior" is constructed out of the conditioned reflexes. Reflex and instinctive actions are modified under changed conditions. Reflexes are controlled, not only by chemical environment, but also by each other. Human capacity to learn is, on its physiological side, a capacity to form conditioned reflexes. The associative memory can be controlled by controlling the reflex mechanism. Reason appears to be only an extension of the power of association. The use of tools involves a complicated association process. Thus man's conduct can be interpreted in terms of the physiological reflexes. "Hereditary complexes, existing as instincts, give character to conduct, and the essential flavor to personality. As a rational animal, man's conduct appears to be controlled by non-rational physiological mechanism that responds to stimulation in accordance with physiological laws."—Harry Beal Torrey, *Scientific Monthly*, January, 1917. A. S.

The International Idea.—There are three aspects of mind toward internationalism. First, that which envisages the nations of the world as individuals—each self-contained and unblending, each an entity in itself. Second, that which sees in the collected nationalities only an assemblage of human beings—variegated and diverse, yet essentially the same in nature and potentiality, and making one tremendous whole. And, third, we have an intermediate aspect of mind which recognizes nations as individual, with the first mind; and humanity as a collection of substantially similar mortals, with the second mind. It comes to regard the world as an assemblage of individual nations, differing in characteristics, but so bound together by mutual needs and inspirations as to necessitate the formation and recognition of a sort of comradeship toward common ends.

At present, international ignorance is the root of international evil. Our first great task is to get mankind to think internationally. Nature cannot solve the problem. Nature can take care of nationality; but it cannot take care of internationalism. That is man's work.

We must pursue the international idea: (1) in travel; (2) through our educational system; (3) by means of an international language; (4) by standardizing coinage, weights, measures, and postage to facilitate intercourse of nations; (5) by placing behind the will-of-the-nations-to-prevent-war a centralized, impartial body or force to carry that will into operation; and (6) our immediate task is to organize those who desire a step forward toward internationality into a body with adequate machinery to make their ideas known and their force felt.—E. Crawshay-Williams, *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1917. A. F. K.

The Mechanism of Mind.—The elements of the mind are instinct and emotion. Instinct is a nervous mechanism that reacts to certain stimuli. These mechanisms

are in the body, while in consciousness there are certain emotions that arise in connection with the same stimuli. All emotions, however, are not a mechanism in the sense that instincts are mechanisms, but a flow of nutritive energy. They are the product of gland activity. While they seem immaterial and unmechanical they are both, if we recognize that antecedent to the emotion there has been a discharge of some fluid into the blood by which the emotion is aroused and the consciousness fixed upon certain objects. If it can be shown that the injection of a given fluid into the blood arouses one emotion and represses others, the material antecedent of emotion becomes apparent even if the dissection of the brain shows no nervous mechanism to accomplish the desired end. Believers in the mechanical character of thought have looked in the wrong quarter for a basis of their claim. The seat of our important mechanisms is in the blood and not in the nerve.—Simon N. Patten, *Annals of the American Academy*, May, 1917. A. F. K.

The Industrial Movement in India.—A popular demand for industries arose at the opening of this century. India is growing in national consciousness. The educated middle classes are seeking new careers. This movement arose in the recognition of the existing poverty. The development is a result of state and private enterprise. The number of industries has grown steadily during the last fifteen years. Nearly every branch had an exotic origin. Gradually the industries began to be managed by the natives (*Swadeshi* industry). A rapid extension of banking followed the *Swadeshi* system. India has great hope for the future, but the advancement will require time. Land and sites can be secured at reasonable prices. Two problems hamper progress: (1) the difficulty of raising capital (the people hoard their money); (2) the mobility of the people, which makes it difficult to secure stable laborers. Heredity specialization in work makes entrance into new fields nearly impossible. The demand for state assistance, especially in new industries, is very strong. Already the Department of Commerce and Industry is doing good work. A protective tariff in nascent industries is being demanded. The solution of India's poverty problem lies in the utilization of her human and material resources.—W. H. Moreland, *Quarterly Review*, April, 1917. A. S.

Social Relief in the Northwest during the Civil War.—Relief of soldiers' dependents was carried on more or less systematically all over the country during the Civil War. In Wisconsin it was easiest because of centralization of control and material, so on April 17, 1861, a moratorium was declared and recruits were exempted from civil process; these were later modified. Other states followed. On May 25 an additional five dollars was voted to enlisted men (not regulars) with dependents. Local authorities were given the right to levy taxes for relief; twenty-six of the fifty-eight counties did so, raising \$618,164.55. Towns, cities, and villages raised \$7,134,341.12. On April 3, 1862, allotment commissioners were provided to take soldiers' pay and give it to their families; they handled \$1,057,519.89. The United States was slow in paying pensions though provision was made on April 14, 1863, to pay relief for six months after the soldier's death. State aid cost Wisconsin \$2,545,873.78. About \$2,580,000 was given from bounties as relief, although this was not the original intent of the bounty. With private charity, relief reached about six and one-half millions. Michigan made relief the duty of counties; no family could receive over \$15. Ohio did the same, but levied a state tax which grew from one-half mill in 1861 to two mills in 1865. The state furnished the needy \$3,590,257.34; the counties furnished about two and one-half millions, and allotments amounted to \$5,135,689.03, or over eleven millions in all. Illinois made no state provision, and thirty counties made no grants; bounties were largely depended upon. I estimate that Michigan spent about \$4,800,000, Indiana \$6,600,000, and Illinois \$8,800,000. States were often out of funds and counties were allowed to borrow. There was much talk of fraud.—Carl R. Fish, *American Historical Review*, January, 1917. J. P. S.

German Trust Laws and Ours.—German courts hold monopoly legal unless it exploits customers unduly; such a case has never been before a court. They allow interlocking directorates. Their courts hold practices forbidden by the Sherman and Clayton acts to be valid unless contrary to custom (*wider die guten Sitten*). It is legal

for contractors to agree on bid limits unless the bids are too high. Stock-watering is checked by the Limited Liability Company law. The trade register long ago replaced the charter. There are no trusts; the German cartel is like our California Fruit Growers Association. Anyone can be ruined by being kept out of the cartel, but states can do a great deal by being members of cartels. States can also fix rates by lowering railroad rates from the seacoast. Lately there is a strong anti-trust movement, especially against the tobacco and shoe machinery trusts. Germany has no department of commerce or national association of manufacturers. Our Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce is a better agent for promoting export trade than any German bureau. Our Supreme Court holds that only unreasonable restraint of trade is illegal and will soon have to decide whether monopoly alone is an offense. The Federal Trade Commission is little help to the courts, but has recommended the passage of laws allowing combination for foreign trade and issues information circulars. Chairman Hurley points out that of 250,000 business corporations there are more than 100,000 with no net income whatever; under combination the latter would not exist. While Germany is tending toward government ownership we still cling to the belief that only illicit competition will bring trusts. What we need is combination with government control or participation.—Otto H. Luken, *Unpopular Review*, January-March, 1917. J. P. S.

Birth-Control and Eugenics.—When Malthus advocated the restriction of births, for economic reasons, continence was his best method for carrying out his program. This method was impractical. The number of people who, from a eugenic motive, could exercise such unselfish self-control must needs be small, while they, from the eugenic standpoint, are the very last people whom we should desire to limit their families unduly. The method of birth-control by the use of contraceptive measures is the one and only method which places in the hands of the whole population possessed of ordinary care and prudence the complete power to regulate, limit, or, if necessary, altogether prevent the production of offspring, while yet enabling the functions of married life to be exercised, without the vain struggle to attain an ascetic ideal or any wasteful impoverishment of physical or spiritual well-being.

That birth-control is the key to the eugenic position has not been emphasized by the pioneers of eugenics. Even Galton spoke as though procreation and marriage were the same thing, so that persons unfit to propagate the race were therefore unfit to marry and must be excluded altogether from all the personal benefits, physical and spiritual, of the marriage sacrament. That, too, was an impractical demand. The only practical instrument for eugenics is birth-control. Its judicious control will enable us to cut off the supply of unfortunates and diminish the output of incapables.

To render these ideals of eugenics effective we must (1) increase and promote the knowledge of the laws of heredity; (2) popularize a knowledge of the methods of birth-control, and (3) act in accordance with our knowledge.—Havelock Ellis, *Eugenics Review*, April, 1917. A. F. K.

The Death-Rate of Children in Its Relation to the Birth-Rate.—Statistics from 1,042 families gathered in 1908 and 1,407 families gathered in 1913 reveal a striking relation existing between the number of conceptions and the number of children surviving their sixteenth birthday. The death-rate increases as the proportion of children in the family increases. More than 76 per cent of the children of families with one child only, reached their sixteenth year, and 66 per cent of the children included in the figures of 1908 and 72 per cent of the children included in the figures of 1913 belonging to families with two children each. In families with the most numerous conceptions, however, only 30.66 and 30.37 per cent, respectively, survived their sixteenth birthday.—"Kinderzahl und Kindersterblichkeit," *Berliner klinische Wochenschrift*, November 26, 1916. Z. T. E.

Fundamental Notions of Criminal Law in French Criminal-judicial Literature.—Most of the writers on criminal law held that there were two notions in criminal law, the offense (*délict*) and punishment (*peine*); but there is really a third, the offender (*délinquant*). Notions of offenses are divided into symptomatic (manifestation of blame), juristic (violation of a juristic norm), and realistic (human act). There are

three elements in the notion of the offender: (1) the author of the offense, (2) *rappports psychiques*, and (3) the personal objective conditions of penal responsibility. Punishment ought to be considered as a notion qualitatively distinct from protection and retribution. If you hold the theory of subjective *rappports* or culpability, it would be illogical to punish the accomplice of a criminal who was not responsible (i.e., an insane man). The same may be said of those who hold the notion of the objective personal conditions of penal responsibility. We hold little in common with the positive school, which in reality still holds to the bipartite notion. Ortolan, Rossi, Reuter, Prins, Le Sellyer, Carnot, Villey, Laine, Thiry, and Vidal all hold the orthodox bipartite notion and dispute as to the guilt of the accomplice. Boitard, Cheveau and Hélié, Blanche, Poittevin, Garrand, and Laborde hold that crime (*délit*) is a deed, but are otherwise orthodox. Garçon and Degois are more realistic, Garçon even accepting the three elements (*trichomie*), but later makes the old contradiction. Most of these writers hold that punishment is a hardship inflicted upon the offender and not a reparation for wrong done.—Thomas Giganovitch, "Sur les Notions fondamentales du droit criminel dans la littérature criminelle-juridique française," *Revue pénitentiaire et de droit pénal*, November-December, 1916. J. P. S.

Some Fundamentals of Prison Reform.—Prison reform is having its place in the sun just now, and there is danger that we may go from considering a prisoner a beast to considering him a superman. Great progress has been made both in and out of prison, but there are some limits. All good reform must follow these lines: (1) Each able-bodied or able-minded prisoner must contribute, for at least five and one-half days a week, an honest day's work. Most prisoners cannot hold jobs because of slack habits of work. (2) The prison fails dismally of its purpose if it is simply a correctional melting-pot, into which all comers are thrown indiscriminately. (3) Rewards and privileges must, so far as possible, supplant in prisons the grossly stupid "Thou shalt not" commands of the past. (4) Punishment, as an element of prison administration, must not be entirely eliminated. (5) Prisoners should be paid for their labor and they should have to pay for their keeping. (6) The personality of the warden of a prison is of the greatest importance. (7) The indeterminate sentence, with its all-important corollary, parole, must be a part of any adequate prison system. (8) Structurally, the Bastille type of gigantic cell block, housing even more than a thousand prisoners, as at Sing Sing, must be abandoned. Instead, there should be detached buildings housing not more than fifty for classification. (9) When the released prisoner comes out on parole, honest work must be accessible to him. (10) Society must remember that the prisoner is a human being, essentially similar to other human beings instead of being essentially different, and everyone has a talent to be developed.—O. F. Lewis, *Unpopular Review*, April-June, 1917. J. P. S.

The Proportion of Mental Defectives among Juvenile Delinquents.—Most investigators have not gotten accurate statistics on the amount of feeble-mindedness among delinquents because of factors of selection, of diagnosis, and of presentation which they have not taken into consideration. The factors of selection are the material ones, such as the inability of the feeble-minded to resist temptation or to cope with normal persons in evading punishment. There are certain artificial factors, such as apprehension, investigation, hearing, probation, commitment, and parole, which are made unequal by the personality of judges and police, the social and industrial status of the child, and the parental neglect of the child, and these inequalities always favor the normal child and detain an undue number of feeble-minded. Then there are combined factors, such as nationality, age, sex, and types of offenses. Then there are superficial factors, such as the investigator's selection of the group to be investigated and his selection within the group. There is always a natural selection which tends to exaggerate the number of feeble-minded among a delinquent group by segregation of the families, both geographically and socially, and there are numerous artificial factors which tend to reinforce the natural ones.—L. W. Crafts and E. A. Doll, *Journal of Delinquency*, May, 1917. J. P. S.

Heredity and Juvenile Delinquencies.—Increased attention has been given during the last few years to the study of heredity as a factor in delinquency. At

least one-third of our delinquent boys are feeble-minded. Among the delinquent girls the proportion is still higher. A recent study in the Whittier State School, California, showed only 20 per cent as normal. Potentially every feeble-minded boy and girl is a social offender. Alcoholism is a direct causal factor in crime. "Out of 350 delinquent boys, 28 per cent were found to have had drunken fathers." Very little is known as to how much this is due to the effect upon the germ-plasm. A study of twelve family histories indicated an extreme importance of heredity in delinquency. Much of our delinquency can be accounted for through the perpetuation of degenerate stock. Environment is also an important factor in delinquency. Defective surroundings and weak-mindedness usually occur together. The remedy lies in an improved "nature" as well as bettered "nurture."—J. Harold Williams, *Eugenics Review*, April, 1917. A. S.

The British Labor Movement and the War.—The labor movement in Britain finds expression through three federations: Federation of Trade Unions, the Trade Union Congress, and the Labor party. Common action is secured through a joint board. Before Britain entered the war the Labor party expressed itself as opposed to entering the conflict. The day after the entrance into the war the party declared opposition to the national policy. It announced that its duty was to secure an early peace. A change was inevitable. By the end of 1914 the Parliamentary party justified England's action. It did not oppose the first war budget. A majority of the members aided recruiting. They agreed to have no strikes or lockouts during the war. The great majority of the trade unionists supported the government, while a minority adopted a critical attitude. Twenty-five labor men's parties declared their faith in the cause of the Allies. They saw the only permanent peace in the overthrow of Prussian militarism. The Independent Labor party has maintained a critical attitude. However, it has never taken any aggressive means against the war measures. In 1915 the Labor party joined the ministry in the new coalition government. Following this the Labor party declined as a parliamentary force. At the end of one year's war a Trade Union congress declared the war "completely justified," but opposed conscription. On January 6, 1916, a special labor congress representing three million workers protested against compulsory service, believing in voluntary methods. In 1915 the Socialist section refused an invitation to confer at The Hague. In 1916 the Labor party would not consider problems of peace. On the whole, labor has supported the government too much for its own good. The Labor movement has no well-defined policy. This accounts for its drifting course. At present the parties are working to perfect their organizations.—A. W. Humphrey, *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1917. A. S.

Crime after the War.—In the maze of all the economic and social problems that are arising and will arise after the war we are likely to forget or to underestimate the enormity of the increase in crime and the criminal class. There will be a new France spring up from this horrible melée, and it should not only have indestructible frontiers, its commercial and social expansion attracting the most of our attention, but also, if France is to come from this death struggle in good form, we must look into ways and means for curbing and reducing the excessive amount of crime that is sure to follow. This excessive crime will come, for it is abundantly established by history: for example, after the Revolution of 1848 and the War of 1870 some exceptional measures had to be taken to control the evil influences which life in the field inculcated. The economic factors will help to produce excessive criminality, such as poverty; complete changes in social and economic status of individuals, etc., will have a tendency to make men follow abandoned lives. This is sure to come, for morality is always at a low ebb during a prolonged conflict, and it is foolish to think that it will regain its equilibrium as if by magic after the war. The heroes of the Marne, Yser, Verdun, and the Somme have a right to our unstinted admiration, but we cannot overlook much of their immorality. The great majority will want to settle down where they left off on August 2, 1914, but the disturbing element will be much larger than normal. Primarily, the war will have two evils. So many children will be deprived of the direction and instructions of their fathers and in many cases will be forced into occupations prematurely which are only suited to adults. In many cases of this kind they will be

exposed to influences of adults before they can have the power of discrimination.—J. A. Roux, "Ce que sera la criminalité après la guerre," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, April 10, 1917. A. O. B.

The Economic Situation of France before and after the War.—It is an established fact that France did not occupy a very powerful economic place among leading world-powers for some time before this war. Our commerce made the notable increase of 91 per cent between the dates of 1870 and 1909, but that is little less than one-fourth of what some other countries have done in that time. In industry and production of materials so necessary to advancement, in building ships for a strong navy, France is incontestably inferior to Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. But a thing of far greater import to us is the fact that our country has been the slave of German influence for many years. Many industrial products have flooded this country. Our university students have been studying even Latin and Greek classics written by German scholars, printed in Germany, on paper and with ink made there. With the invasion of products we also have an invasion of personnel. In our hotel service 70 per cent are Germans. The most important is the moral situation. There has been a tendency to let well enough alone when there is no danger. One cannot doubt that the lack of order and discipline among us will have a bad effect on us. For forty years France has either willingly or unwillingly submitted to this condition. An epidemic of pessimism has permeated our literature. Our industrial situation has been bad for the following reasons: there has been a poor supply in machines, in men, in capital, and in organization. In the future we must of necessity have better commercial agents, men trained especially for that purpose. We are poor in coal and a number of other commercial commodities, but we can organize what we do have to better advantage. We shall have to rid ourselves of tuberculosis, alcoholism, and race suicide.—Georges Renord, "La situation économique de la France avant et après le guerre," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, January, 1917. A. O. B.

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NOVEMBER 1917

The Mechanism and Limits of Human Association: The Foundations of a Sociology of Peace	<i>Jacques Novicow</i>	289
Estrangement in Society	<i>Edward Alsworth Ross</i>	350
The Nature of Interests and Their Classification	<i>Alberl Kocourek</i>	359
The Trade Union and the Old Man	<i>John O'Grady</i>	369
Representation and Leadership in Democracies	<i>Victor S. Yarros</i>	390
News and Notes		403
Reviews		406
<small> <i>Jean Weidenfeld: The Mentality of the Criminal Woman.</i> HERMAN M. ADLER; <i>Thomasina Faldon: An Inquiry into the Nature of Peasants and the Terms of Its Perpetuation.</i> I. W. HOWARTH; <i>John H. Wigmore (ed.): Science and Learning in France.</i> CHARLES A. ELLWOOD; <i>George Nasmyth: Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory.</i> B. D. MCKEWEEN; <i>James Haldane Smith: Economic Moralism.</i> EDWIN L. EARP; <i>Robert Morse Woodbury: Social Insurance: An Economic Analysis.</i> JOHN A. RYAN; <i>Paul L. Vogt: An Introduction to Rural Sociology.</i> EDWIN L. HELTON; <i>H. E. Douglas: Collective Bargaining in the Lithographic Industry.</i> E. H. SUTHERLAND. </small>		
Recent Literature		419

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